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 Abstract 
This thesis explores how the motivation to process a visual stimulus influences 
attentional control. A core aim was to develop and test a motivation-based as opposed to a 
perception-based explanation for reward association effects on visual selective attention. To 
do so, in a series of 12 experiments, stimuli were first imbued with a value, reinforced with 
monetary wins and losses. Then, these same value-associated stimuli were used as distractors 
in spatial attention paradigms, including flanker and visual search tasks, incentive cues in a 
simple detection task, or targets in an ensemble perceptual judgment task. Of primary interest 
were measures of attentional capture by value-laden opposed to neutral stimuli. Taking a 
developmental approach, in a subset of the experiments value-driven biases in late 
adolescents compared to adults were also examined while simultaneous 
electroencephalography was recorded. Collectively, the results from these experiments 
suggest that the effects of motivational salience are inconsistent with perception-based 
accounts but can be encompassed in a motivation-based framework that suggests value-
associated stimuli compete to alter current goals. This motivation-based model is grounded 
in the cognitive control literature and posits a competition among potential goals driven by 
the costs versus benefits of cognitive engagement with stimuli. 
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“Intra due cibi, distanti e moventi d’un modo, prima si morria di fame, che liber’ omo 
l’un recasse ai denti;” 
“Before a man bit into one of two foods equally removed and tempting, he would die 
of hunger if his choice were free.” Translated from Dante (1320), Paradiso IV. 
 
Overview 
 Visual stimulation from the environment is noisy and vast. Thus, processing the entire 
scene would exceed the known capacity of cognitive resources available for information 
processing. Therefore, perceptual decision-making must, often implicitly, prioritize stimuli for 
attentional selection. Two types of visual stimuli are known to be prioritized for selection. The 
first type consists of stimuli that are relevant to current goals (top-down). The second branch 
of stimuli may be irrelevant to goals but are physically salient (bottom-up). However, this 
classic view of attentional selection in visual information processing is inadequate.  
 Stimuli with learned value-associations also need to be prioritized because processing 
them may be beneficial, i.e., in obtaining a positive outcome or avoiding a negative outcome. 
There is now abundant evidence that value-associated stimuli do indeed bias perceptual 
decision-making. For example, value-associated stimuli are prioritized when attention is 
temporally constrained (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009) and when they are presented as irrelevant 
distractors in a spatial attention task (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011). Thus, these stimuli 
are often neither relevant to current goals nor physically salient yet garner perceptual 
selection. As a result, this third class of stimuli are currently neglected in classic accounts of 
perceptual selection and must be incorporated into theories of perceptual decision-making. 
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One line of research suggests that value-associated stimuli directly influence the 
orienting of attention, interacting with top-down and bottom-up factors (Awh, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2014; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). These ideas are discussed 
in more detail below, but briefly, these accounts suggest that because stimuli have previously 
been selected and performance was then rewarded, value-associated stimuli garner an 
attentional priority. Thus, in this view they compete at a perceptual level with goal relevant 
and physically salient stimuli for selection. A second view is based around the idea of 
motivated cognition (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Braver et al., 2014; Kool, Shenhav, & Botvinick, 
2017; Shenhav et al., 2017; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). This theory suggests that 
competition between stimulus- and task-initiated motivational states (goals) determines how 
cognitive resources are utilized. The motivational competition is determined by internal 
computations of the expected costs-benefits of each motivational state to the observer. For 
example, an empty coffee cup visible while reading might motivate a trip to the kitchen, 
disrupting the reading task, whereas the content of the text itself might motivate reading. To 
maintain focus on the immediate reading goal, the reader must either suppress perceptual 
processing of the task-irrelevant object (empty cup) or suppress the irrelevant motivational 
state it instantiates (“I want more”). In the case of value-associated stimuli, it is not clear 
whether they influence perceptual processing or motivated cognition. However, to date the 
literature has favoured the former notion, largely ignoring the possibility that regulation of 
motivational states may be involved.  
The objective of this thesis was to investigate the role of motivational competition in 
understanding the effects of value-associated stimuli on cognition in typical adults and during 
adolescence. To do so, I conducted a series of experiments in which participants first engaged 
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in a value-learning task, whereby participants learned to associate novel stimuli (or colours) 
with a motivational meaning (positive, neutral, or negative). Then, participants performed 
either a task requiring spatial selective attention or a task requiring sustained cognitive 
control. In both types of task, the costs and benefits of attending to value-associated stimuli 
were manipulated.  
This thesis is presented in seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a review of the 
attentional control and motivated cognition literatures, linking each perspective to value-
driven effects on cognition. Chapter 1 also offers a review of how the motivated cognition 
perspective may apply to adolescents’ hypersensitivity to rewards. Chapter 2 directly contrasts 
the differing prediction that can be made from perceptual competition and motivational 
competition accounts of value-driven distraction in a cognitive control paradigm requiring 
shifts between cognitive control strategies (flanker task). Chapter 3 investigates how 
adolescents differ from adults in the computation of costs and benefits when deciding how to 
initiate strategic control in the flanker task. Next, Chapter 4 investigates the role of increasing 
the cognitive costs of attending to value-associated distractors in a classic value-driven 
attentional capture paradigm (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011). Chapter 5 examines differences 
between how adolescents and adults engage in motivational competition in a cueing 
paradigm with concurrent electroencephalography (EEG). In Chapter 6, the role of value-
associated stimuli in a novel ensemble coding paradigm is examined. Finally, a general 
discussion of the motivational competition account of cognition is provided in Chapter 7.   
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Perceptual Competition and Representational Strength 
From noisy visual scenes, information pertinent to current cognitive goals must be 
attended, and distracting information needs to be ignored. Visual selective attention is the 
mechanism by which important information is processed. Classically, visual attention has been 
considered as a ‘spotlight’ that is cast over the visual field (Posner, 1980). Anything within the 
focus of attention is preferentially processed compared to objects in the periphery of 
attention. In overt shifts of attention, the focus of attention converges on items presented to 
the fovea. However, attention can also act independently of eye-movements in the form of 
covert shifts (Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Posner, 1980). In addition to being considered 
spatially, visual attention can also be directed in an object-based manner. This latter form of 
attention is guided by stimulus features that discriminate items.  
Conventionally, two distinct biases are thought to control attentional selection; top-
down and bottom-up control. Attentional templates (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989) form the 
basis of top-down (or goal-directed) control of visual attention. In essence, templates are 
descriptions of potentially relevant stimulus features related to task requirements that should 
be attended (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), alongside templates of potentially distracting 
information that should be ignored. Attentional sets are not restricted to visual biases and can 
also encompass typical motoric responses to stimuli (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). By virtue of 
the predictive nature of top-down attentional control, it is not an independent venture and is 
reliant on a coordinated effort involving multiple brain systems, including between long-term 
memory of similar prior experiences, learning, working memory (for the maintenance of 
templates and goals), selective attention (to implement these templates), and motor control 
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(to initiate responses). Cognitive control is the process by which this coordinated effort is 
governed. 
However, the rigidity of cognitive control is not absolute. If cognitive control always 
proceeded strictly in a goal-driven manner until completion of the current goal, cues 
signalling, for example, danger would be missed. Therefore, attentional control can also be 
stimulus-driven (bottom-up), independent of top-down attentional control (Theeuwes, 1992). 
Stimuli that stand out relative to the surroundings capture attention and gain access to higher-
level processing. Such physical salience is usually characterized by low-level features that are 
primarily processed early in the visual processing stream, such as luminance, contrast, colour, 
shape, depth, and velocity and direction of motion (Itti & Koch, 2000). The speed with which 
bottom-up attentional control captures covert and overt attention suggests that it is 
automatic; the mere presence of a physically salient event will capture attention (Theeuwes, 
1992). 
Therefore, when viewing a typical visual scene object selection must be competitive. 
Each item in the rich visual environment must compete to reach awareness, and stimuli with 
task-relevance or physical salience are most likely to win this competition (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans, this 
competition has been demonstrated right throughout the visual cortex from as early as V1 
(Beck & Kastner, 2009; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Studies in non-human primates have 
shown that bottom-up competition is resolved in a stimulus-driven manner. For example, 
when two stimuli are presented within the same receptive field, neural activity in the 
receptive field matches that when only the most salient stimulus is present. This demonstrates 
that bottom-up competition in the visual cortex is biased in favour of the most salient 
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stimulus, and the second stimulus is inhibited (Reynolds & Desimone, 2003). Similar to the 
influence of bottom-up salience, top-down mechanisms have also been shown to bias 
competitive interactions within receptive fields (Beck & Kastner, 2009; Bichot, Rossi, & 
Desimone, 2010; Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 1997). This neurophysiological 
evidence shows the role of both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in biasing object 
selection at both the psychological and neural levels (Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004; Ogawa & 
Komatsu, 2004).  
Many psychological and computational models of attentional control posit that 
competitive interactions determine the distribution of attention across a topographical 
saliency/priority map. The map consists of stimulus representations, which comprise the 
perceptual attributes that form objects and that separate objects from others according to 
Gestalt principles. Stimulus representations also code the spatial location of the objects (Egeth 
& Yantis, 1997). Such representations are sometimes referred to as object files because they 
are formed of stimulus specific information (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992). Within the 
priority map the strength of each representation is determined, at least initially, by stimulus-
driven factors, including physical salience (Itti & Koch, 2000; Theeuwes, 1992). Some models 
posit that the maps adjust as the visual information progresses through the visual hierarchy 
and new information is added to the representations (Ptak, 2012; Serences & Yantis, 2006). 
Others suggest that different feature maps are created depending on the distinct stimulus 
features in the scene, and then these individual maps are combined into a global map, 
although this final step is not necessary in all models (Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Treisman, 1982; 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994). Regardless, the item with the greatest physical 
salience garners the greatest representational peak and thus attention is grabbed by that 
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item. In other priority mapping models, the map’s topography is also modulated by top-down 
mechanisms. As in biased competition, top-down attentional control can boost the strength 
of task-relevant stimulus representations (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Fecteau & Munoz, 
2006; Ptak, 2012; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). Similar ideas have also been suggested that do not 
make explicit references to a topographical map, but suggest that the sum of coordinated 
activity of neurons through the different levels of the visual system each representing the 
same object, or coherence fields, determine attention (Serences & Yantis, 2006). Coherence 
field theories potentially offer more explanatory power when discussing temporal attention 
because priority maps are somewhat limited to spatial attention. Importantly, though, in both 
types of model attention is given to items in the environment that are represented most 
strongly in visual pathways, whether they create peaks on topographical maps or recruit the 
greatest neuronal coherence.  
The relative influence of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms on the eventual 
topography of the priority map is a matter of debate. Many researchers hold the belief that 
physical salience captures attention regardless of top-down attentional sets. In essence, a 
singleton will attract attention irrespective of an observer’s goal, with the caveat that the 
singleton must fall within an expected spatial location (Itti & Koch, 2000; Theeuwes, 1991, 
1992). Theeuwes (1992) demonstrated that when observers search for a unique shape always 
presented in the same colour amongst homogenously shaped distractors, the presence of a 
colour singleton distractor slows response time (RT) compared to trials without a singleton 
distractor. Theeuwes (1992) explained this effect suggesting that despite the exact attentional 
set being known and colour being task-irrelevant, top-down control had no influence and the 
physically salient distractor still captured attention. Others, though, have shown that top-
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down attentional sets can effectively modulate the impact of physically salient distractors 
(Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). Specifically, a singleton 
distractor, presented simultaneously with the target, is more likely to capture attention when 
it is defined by a feature shared with the target as was the case in Theeuwes (1992), than 
when it does not (Folk et al., 1992).  
In addition to the behavioural evidence, electrophysiological data also offers an 
important perspective on the interplay between bottom-up and top-down attentional control 
in the modulation of priority maps. Event related potentials (ERPs) are the evoked activity 
found in EEG recordings in response to the presentation of stimuli or during the pre-stimulus 
preparation epoch when responses are planned. Two particularly relevant components of the 
ERP when discussing attentional deployment are the N2pc and the distractor positivity (Pd). 
The N2pc has an established history as an index of attentional allocation (Luck, 2005). 
Typically, it is observed around 200 ms after stimulus onset as a negative going deflection of 
the ERP at contralateral compared to ipsilateral scalp sites relative to the visual field where 
the attended stimulus is located. Conversely, the Pd component is thought to be a marker of 
attentional suppression (Hickey, Di Lollo, & McDonald, 2009). It is typically observed later than 
the N2pc as relatively more positive voltage in contralateral versus ipsilateral scalp sites 
relative to the stimulus of interest. Both components are strongest at parietal-occipital scalp 
sites. Studies using these components to investigate the role of top-down and bottom-up 
attentional control in selection have found limited evidence for pure bottom-up attentional 
capture completely independent of top-down mechanisms (Ansorge, Kiss, Worschech, & 
Eimer, 2011; Eimer & Kiss, 2008). For example, Eimer and Kiss (2008) found that the N2pc to 
a salient visual singleton was only present when it matched the task relevant feature of the 
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task, consistent with the earlier behavioural findings of Folk et al. (1992), suggesting that 
attention is only allocated on the basis of physical salience when it is consistent with 
attentional templates. Furthermore, Sawaki & Luck (2010) have shown that not only do task-
irrelevant singleton distractors not elicit an N2pc, and thus do not appear to be attended, they 
in fact produce a Pd; indicating active suppression. This study highlights the importance of 
considering active suppression as well as capture when discussing attentional control. In 
particular, the study supports the view that top-down and bottom-up attentional control 
interact in modulating the topography of priority maps. Irrelevant but physically salient stimuli 
appear to be actively suppressed when they conflict with top-down attentional templates. 
More recent electrophysiological research analysing the time-course of cross-frequency 
interactions in top-down and bottom-up mediated pathways supports the view that top-down 
influences causally modulate bottom-up representational strength (Richter, Thompson, 
Bosman, & Fries, 2017).  
All the evidence reviewed so far suggests that the interaction between top-down and 
bottom-up attentional control determines selection in busy visual scenes. However, in the last 
ten years attentional capture by stimuli that are inconspicuous and irrelevant to current goals 
has been reported (Awh et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). I refer here to stimuli with 
learned reward associations. In this review two classes of theory to account for these effects 
will be considered. The first suggests that rewards influence attention through a mechanism 
that interacts with top-down and bottom-up control in the formation of perceptual priority 
maps (e.g., Awh et al., 2012). The second suggests separable roles of motivation and attention 
in the control of cognition (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009), with rewarding stimuli impacting the 
former. 
General Introduction 
 11 
Value-associated Stimuli – Super-distraction 
A classic example of these learned reward associations capturing attention was 
conducted by Anderson et al. (2011) using a modified version of the additional singleton task 
outlined above (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992), but in a training-test method where the experiment 
is conducted in two distinct parts (e.g., Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). In Anderson et al. (2011), 
participants initially complete a simple visual search task where the target on any given trial 
is always inside either a red or a green circle and distractors are surrounded by differently 
coloured circles. Unbeknownst to the participant at the start of the task, on 80% of trials they 
receive a large monetary reward when the target circle is red and a small monetary reward 
when it is green. These contingencies are reversed for half of participants. Participants then 
engage in a subsequent additional singleton task. Here, they must locate a shape singleton to 
identify a visual target, but crucially all the search items are differently coloured. On a 
proportion of the trials one of the distractors is presented in the previously high or low reward 
associated colour; on remaining trials, no reward associated colours are present. See Figure 
1.1 for an example of the training and test trials. Anderson and colleagues found slower RT 
when a previously high-reward distractor was present than when no reward associated 
colours were in the display. This value driven attentional capture (VDAC) from the previously 
high reward colour occurred despite the value associated distractor being task-irrelevant and 
physically non-salient compared to the rest of the distractors in the visual search display. This 
effect, therefore, seems to be outside the bounds of both top-down and bottom-up 
attentional control (Awh et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). VDAC has also been shown 
when a colour was conditioned to no-reward; in this case, RTs were slowed by the presence 
of the previously high-reward compared to the no-reward distractor, ruling out accounts 
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purporting a sole role of selection history in the effect (e.g., Sha & Jiang, 2016) and pointing 
towards a reward-related slowing (Anderson & Halpern, 2017). However, the effect is also not 
specific to rewards and has been shown for punishment-associated distractors (Wang, Yu, & 
Zhou, 2013). Time and again, similar super-distraction effects, i.e. greater distraction by 
motivationally salient versus perceptually similar neutral stimuli, have been found (Anderson, 
2015a, 2015b; Anderson, Faulkner, Rilee, Yantis, & Marvel, 2013; Anderson, Folk, Garrison, & 
Rogers, 2016; Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Alexia Bourgeois, Neveu, Bayle, & Vuilleumier, 2015; 
Bucker, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2015; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 2009; Failing, Nissens, 
Pearson, Le Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b; Hickey & 
Peelen, 2015; Hickey & Van Zoest, 2012; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015; 
MacLean, Diaz, & Giesbrecht, 2016; Maclean & Giesbrecht, 2015; Munneke, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2016; Munneke, Hoppenbrouwers, & Theeuwes, 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, 
Most, & Le Pelley, 2015; Qi, Zeng, Ding, & Li, 2013; Roper, Vecera, & Vaidya, 2014; Rutherford, 
O’Brien, & Raymond, 2010; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012; Wang et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Example trial from the training task (A) and the test task (B) used to demonstrate value-driven attentional 
capture by Anderson et al. (2011). Taken from Anderson et al. (2011). 
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Super-distraction effects have generally been accounted for by supposing that 
motivational salience modulates representational strength on the attentional priority map by 
lending greater weight to stimuli predictive of rewards. In this way, motivationally salient 
stimuli capture attention. This has led some researchers to posit a reward-driven control 
dynamic as a third branch of attentional control, alongside bottom-up and top-down 
attentional control (Anderson et al., 2011; Awh et al., 2012; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 2009). This third mechanism may be the same 
mechanism that mediates task contingent involuntary orienting (Folk et al., 1992). Specifically, 
stimuli matching reward predicting features may modulate bottom-up attentional control in 
the manner that top-down attentional sets are purported to modulate them. 
Electrophysiological evidence has demonstrated that the N2pc appears earlier and is larger in 
amplitude to high reward targets compared to low reward targets, and this amplitude 
difference correlates with the performance improvement found for high-reward targets (Kiss 
et al., 2009).  
Indeed, at the very earliest stages of visual processing, within 100 ms of stimulus 
presentation, it has been shown that the prospect of rewards modulates vision. Specifically, 
the P1 component of the ERP, which is always observed in response to visual stimulation and 
strongly influenced by low-level stimulus features such as luminance (Luck, 2005), has also 
been observed to be reward modulated (Hickey et al., 2010a; Maclean & Giesbrecht, 2015). 
Hickey et al. (2010a) used a variant of the additional singleton task (Theeuwes, 1992) where 
participants had to search for a shape singleton in the presence of a colour singleton distractor 
and correct performance was randomly rewarded with either a high or a low reward. 
Importantly, the colour of the target and shape singleton could either stay the same from trial 
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n-1 to the subsequent trial or they could switch. When there was no colour change, RT was 
faster following a highly rewarded trial n-1 compared to a low rewarded trial n-1. When the 
colour of the target and distractor singleton switched, RT was slowed following a high 
compared to a low reward. Comparable effects were also found in the electrophysiological 
data examining the lateralized P1. Following a high reward trial and a colour switch, the P1 
contralateral compared to ipsilateral relative to the distractor singleton was increased; 
following a high reward trial and no colour swap the P1 contralateral to the target was greater 
than the ipsilateral P1. Given the timing of the P1 component, the time-course of the effect is 
consistent with the notion that rewards modulate bottom-up attentional control. According 
to Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes (2011) this P1 effect suggests that perception is altered by 
rewards, and this precedes the deployment of attention. However, an alternative 
interpretation would be consistent with a mechanism similar to that of contingent involuntary 
orienting (Folk et al., 1992). In the Hickey et al. (2010a) paradigm the attentional set from trial 
n-1 is replicated on trial n following a reward (Thorndike, 1898), i.e., the participant must 
attend to the rewarded colour. Thus, attention is endogenously driven to objects with the 
previous target’s colour whether it be target or distractor. Consistent with this idea, 
motivational salience is thought to endogenously amplify visual processing from the earliest 
level of visual cortex (Bayer et al., 2017). In this study, the location of a target was cued by a 
100% predictive directional cue that also acted as an incentive cue, informing the participant 
whether a reward would be available on that trial. They found that in response to the search 
array the amplitude of the C1 increased when the cue predicted a reward versus no-reward 
(Bayer et al., 2017). In this experiment, incentive cues rather than the reward on the prior trial 
biased spatial attentional selection. However, in Hickey et al. (2010a), a similar mechanism 
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may underlie the object-based attentional selection of previously rewarded targets. Similar to 
this account, some researchers have suggested that rather than rewards directly biasing 
perception in a bottom-up manner, instead rewards amplify the representational strength of 
reward associated stimuli via a reward-specific mechanism that competes with bottom-up 
attentional capture and top-down attentional control in the formation of the attentional 
priority map (Awh et al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2014; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). However, the 
mechanism underlying the perceptual competition is currently poorly specified. Such accounts 
can be collectively referred to as Selection History accounts.  
 
Selection History Account 
Selection History has been proposed to be the mechanism underlying super-
distraction (Awh et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017, see Figure 1.2). In particular, stimuli 
that have previously resulted in the receipt of a reward following attentional deployment are 
likely to drive future attentional selection. Selection History as a concept has its basis in 
Thorndike’s (1898) ‘law of effect’, which states that actions resulting in a satisfying outcome 
are likely to be repeated if the situation repeats. In particular, Selection History states that 
stimuli that previously resulted in a reward following attentional deployment have a lingering 
bias that alters attentional priority maps when the stimuli are re-encountered (Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2017). The novelty in the notion of the Selection History account as applied to 
visual selective attention is its emphasis on those situations when attentional deployment is 
inconsistent with top-down goals, but cannot be explained by physical salience, yet the 
stimulus has selection history (Awh et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Kadel, Feldmann-
Wüstefeld, & Schubö, 2017). In the previous demonstration of super-distraction effects by 
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Hickey et al. (2010a), selection history was shown to modulate performance on a trial-by-trial 
basis. In this example, selection history is apparently a weak bias and easily reset when 
contingencies change moment-to-moment. However, when training of stimulus-reward 
contingencies is consistently repeated across many, many trials, the impact of rewarded 
selection history has been shown days and even months after reward learning (Anderson et 
al., 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2013; MacLean & Giesbrecht, 2015), suggesting that value-based 
selection history can exert a robust attentional bias. 
 
Super-distraction, though, is not ubiquitously observed. A manipulation as simple as 
changing the screen background between training and test is sufficient to eliminate VDAC 
(Anderson, 2015b). This is despite the top-down goal, the reward history, and the physical 
salience of the reward-associated distractor remaining constant. In this study, the initial 
training, the layout and meaning of all stimuli, and the task were identical between training 
and test and the background change was fully irrelevant to the test task. VDAC is also 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Representation of the Selection History account of attentional bias. Taken from Awh et al. (2012). 
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eliminated when the task-relevance of shape and colour are reversed relative to the typical 
VDAC paradigm, i.e., shape predicts reward in the training task and in the subsequent test 
procedure search is for a unique colour, but a previously rewarding shape is present as a 
distractor on a proportion of trials (Wang et al., 2013). In these studies, despite the selection 
history for the value associated distractor remaining unchanged between conditions there 
was no evidence of VDAC. These findings raise doubts about the Selection History account of 
super-distraction being sufficient. 
There are three main lines of evidence against the reward Selection History theory. 
The first relates to a key tenet of the account that a rewarded behaviour is likely to be 
repeated when the stimulus is re-encountered in similar circumstances. Yet, evidence does 
not support this. For example, Sali, Anderson, & Yantis (2014) again used the same task as 
Anderson et al. (2011), but this time training used only one target, repeated on every trial. 
Correct responses to the sole target were rewarded with a high reward on 75% of trials and a 
low reward on remaining trials. Selection during training, therefore, is completely 
unambiguous; on every trial the participant searched for the same target and was rewarded 
for being correct. Surprisingly, in the subsequent test task, no VDAC was observed. Therefore, 
despite the target during training fulfilling all the criteria for Selection History, it did not 
modulate attentional deployment during test. One potential explanation is that during 
training participants attributed the reward receipt to correct performance rather than 
associating it with the stimulus. In this view, the distractor has no motivational salience during 
the test task. Nevertheless, this finding is difficult to reconcile with the notion of Selection 
History as a mechanism sufficient for super-distraction. 
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The second line of evidence relates to the influence of low-value associated distractors 
in attentional control. A conventional approach to investigating super-distraction in 
attentional control is to initially condition one stimulus to a high reward and another to a low 
reward (or no reward). These stimuli are then both tested either in isolation or simultaneously 
in the subsequent test task. When both previously rewarded stimuli appear in the same trial 
the stimulus associated with the larger reward should gain greater priority and thus bias 
competition, as is often the case (Bucker, Silvis, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2015; Failing & Theeuwes, 
2014). In other trial types when there is no direct competition between previously rewarded 
stimuli, the bias arising from selection history should favour any previously rewarded stimulus, 
but the bias should be stronger for the most highly rewarded stimulus (Anderson, 2016). 
However, evidence for this is lacking. In many studies, the low reward-associated stimulus 
does not capture attention compared to a neutral stimulus, even when the neutral stimulus 
has no selection history (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2013; Anderson & 
Halpern, 2017; Anderson et al., 2011). This is also at odds with notions of rewarded selection 
history being sufficient for attentional control. 
The third set of experiments to question the rewarded Selection History account 
involves participants with subclinical depression. Typical VDAC has been found to be 
eliminated in participants with subclinical depression compared to controls (Anderson, Leal, 
Hall, Yassa, & Yantis, 2014). Similarly, in a variation of the VDAC task, where the target could 
also be reward-associated, controls showed worse performance when the reward-associated 
stimulus was the distractor compared to when it was the target. This effect was eliminated in 
participants with subclinical depression (Anderson, Chiu, DiBartolo, & Leal, 2017). 
Importantly, however, selection history, in the absence of rewards, was shown to bias 
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attentional capture in participants with subclinical depression. In particular, over a period of 
4-days participants searched for a green target, establishing a strong selection history for this 
stimulus. In the subsequent test task, participants with subclinical depression showed 
comparable performance decrements as controls when the distractor compared to the target 
was in the previously selected colour (Anderson et al., 2017). Therefore, the authors suggest 
that super-distraction and selection history rely on independent mechanisms as only super-
distraction is affected by depression (Anderson et al., 2017). 
 
Habitual Control Account 
Consistent with this latter evidence, a somewhat related account of super-distraction 
postulates that selection history alone is not sufficient to bias attentional control (Anderson 
et al., 2017). Instead, during learning, it has been suggested that stimuli predicting reward 
garner a habitual attentional orienting response that reactivates whenever the stimuli are 
subsequently encountered (Anderson, 2016; Anderson et al., 2016). Instead of altering 
attentional priority maps, this account suggests that stimulus-response biases underscore 
super-distraction.  
Similar, to the development of reward-driven effects on attentional control in training-
test procedures, habitual control is thought to be established when actions are repeated in 
the pursuit of the same goal, in the same context until an automatic stimulus-response 
association is formed (Graybiel, 2008; Wood & Rünger, 2016). Once habits are formed they 
are typically instantiated automatically as the default action based on the stimulus-response 
association, although there is some debate about the interaction between habit-based control 
and goal-directed control when the two are in conflict (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Balleine & 
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O’Doherty, 2010; Wood & Neal, 2007). In particular, in healthy participants habits are 
generally the default mode unless they conflict with goal pursuit in which case more deliberate 
control is utilized (although see Wood & Rünger, 2016 for exceptions). This is an issue when 
describing super-distraction in terms of a habitual response for two reasons. First, VDAC does 
not appear to be automatic. Rather than automatically biasing attention super-distraction 
appears to be subject to many factors discussed in the critique of Selection History accounts 
of super-distraction (e.g., Anderson et al., 2015; Sali et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2013). Second, 
animal research has shown that habits continue despite reward devaluation (Graybiel, 2008), 
whereas VDAC has been shown to be subject to extinction (Anderson et al., 2016; Roper et 
al., 2014), although by no means all experiments show this influence of devaluation on super-
distraction. Prioritizing processing of stimuli based on associated reward as a habitual 
response offers a more mechanistic explanation than the Selection History account, yet it also 
is not sufficient. There are some outstanding issues about the extent to which super-
distraction can be described as a habitual account as it does not account for the instances 
where super-distraction is not found.  
One aspect of the habitual-based account of super-distraction that may be a fruitful 
avenue for future accounts of super-distraction is the emphasis on reward-associations 
modulating cognitive control mechanisms in favour of reward-associated stimuli  rather than 
by modulating attentional priority maps. As discussed above the topography of attentional 
priority maps is modulated by both bottom-up and top-down factors (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995). Cognitive control is closely aligned to the idea of top-down control. In essence, 
cognitive control determines the settings for top-down control in line with internal goals, but 
its reach extends beyond the role of adjusting attentional priority maps. Additionally, 
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cognitive control mechanisms activate entire neural networks related to goals, including 
those that code relevant stimulus-response contingencies, i.e. predicted outcomes for 
different behavioural options. Such predictions may be used to bias attentional priority 
maps, choose and plan motoric responses (e.g., press right for an orange target), and alter 
expectations (Buschman & Kastner, 2015). Thus, cognitive control settings are heavily reliant 
on previous experience. Notions of super-distraction as a habitual response are consistent 
with rewards acting at the level of cognitive control, and this mechanism then generating 
the “attend to me” signal for reward-associated stimuli. This is compared to accounts such 
as Selection History that imply a direct role of reward on attentional processes, independent 
of modulations in top-down, cognitive control. A higher-level bias, involving cognitive 
control, in reward processing is supported by the plenitude of results showing reward driven 
effects on many areas of cognition, including working memory, decision making, response 
inhibition, task switching, and attentional selection (Braver et al., 2014). Placing the impact 
of rewards in the context of cognitive control also aligns with the known neurophysiology of 
both rewards and cognitive control.  
 
The Role of Dopamine 
Both reward processing and cognitive control are heavily dependent on dopamine 
(DA) mediated pathways in subcortical and prefrontal structures (Braver et al., 2014; Cools, 
2008). In respect to rewards, positron emission tomography (PET) has been used to 
demonstrate individual differences in the magnitude of super-distraction effects; VDAC is 
strongly predicted by increased endogenous DA release in the right anterior caudate during 
the reward learning training phase (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2017). Likewise, during the 
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test phase on reward-associated distractor present trials elevated DA release in the right 
anterior and posterior caudate, and the right posterior putamen also predicted increased 
VDAC (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016). Interestingly, the latter study also found evidence 
that the ability to ignore reward-associated stimuli was associated with the suppression of DA 
release in the same striatal regions (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016). Similarly, studies 
where reward is predicted by an incentive cue show that rewarding events generate phasic 
DA activity in the substantia nigra and the ventral tegmental area (Schultz, 2000), both of 
which are heavily connected and supply DA to the striatum through the mesolimbic and 
nigrostriatal pathways. Consistent with Anderson, Kuwabara, et al. (2016) the omission of 
expected rewards also depresses DA neurons in these regions in primates (Schultz, 2000). 
Phasic DA release following rewards and DA depression following reward omission has been 
linked to prediction error signalling, which is considered to be a teaching signals for learning 
(Schultz, 2000; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Importantly, in animal studies it has also 
been shown that over time DA activity related to reward receipt becomes linked to the cue 
that predicts the reward such that DA activity is elicited by the cue, an effect known as 
autoshaping (Flagel, Watson, Robinson, & Akil, 2007; Ljungberg, Apicella, & Schultz, 1992) or 
the establishment of cue incentive salience (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Such incentive 
salience likely represents the neural basis of super-distraction following extinction, with the 
cues themselves becoming ‘liked’ (Berridge, 2007; DiFeliceantonio & Berridge, 2012; Volkow, 
Wang, Fowler, Tomasi, & Telang, 2011). Interestingly, in rats there are often large individual 
differences as to whether DA activity is initiated by the cues. In other rats, DA release 
continues to activate solely on receipt of the reward (e.g., Flagel et al., 2007). Similar individual 
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difference in humans may underlie the positive correlation observed between DA release 
during learning and subsequent VDAC (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2017).  
fMRI evidence similarly points to a role of DA rich subcortical structures in reward 
responsiveness. Again, using the VDAC paradigm, BOLD activity in the striatum has been 
observed to be greater on reward distractor present trials compared to reward distractor 
absent trials during the test phase (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2014). In a second experiment 
where reward was omitted during the training phase no differences were found in striatal 
activity between the previously selected and unselected distractors, suggesting that the 
elevated striatal activity was specifically reward driven (Anderson, Laurent, et al., 2014). Both 
these fMRI data in humans and the animal research above point to a link between enhanced 
striatal activity and the motivation to engage with or processing of reward predicting stimuli. 
Indeed, even in complex naturalistic scenes, such as pictures of busy roads, the 
presence of a reward-associated distractor category (e.g., cars) in the scene elicits activation 
in the DA midbrain (Hickey & Peelen, 2015). However, in this study increased midbrain activity 
was associated with suppression of reward-associated distractor information, as measured 
using multivoxel pattern analysis in the visual cortex (Hickey & Peelen, 2015). Given the poor 
temporal resolution of fMRI, the time course of the effect is unclear. One possibility is that 
the midbrain sensitivity was related to the processing of the reward-associated stimulus 
before top-down factors initiated the suppression. This would be consistent with ERP evidence 
showing that when VDAC is reduced behaviourally, a Pd signal to high value associated 
distractors can be observed, whereas large VDAC effects are associated with a N2pc to the 
same distractors (Qi et al., 2013). These data demonstrate the potentially suppressive nature 
of top-down control on the motivation to process reward-associated stimuli.  
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Neuroanatomy of Reward Processing 
Hickey & Peelen (2015) not only showed a strong link between midbrain sensitivity and 
the strength of visual representations in the visual cortex for rewarding stimuli, they also 
demonstrated that a wider network involving the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and parietal lobe also predict the 
reward modulated strength of the information in the visual cortex. The OFC is thought to be 
critically involved in predicting the probability and relative magnitude of different outcome 
values as well as coding the experienced outcome (Li, Vanni-Mercier, Isnard, Mauguière, & 
Dreher, 2016; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). For example, in monkeys, neural responses in the 
OFC were found to be sensitive to the reward history of two conditioned stimuli, both 
associated with liquid rewards. OFC neurons were found to track the relative reward 
magnitude of the two conditioned stimuli (Saez, Saez, Paton, Lau, & Salzman, 2017). 
Specifically, when the amount of liquid reward conditioned to a stimulus remained constant, 
OFC activity in response to the stimulus altered depending on whether a second stimulus was 
conditioned with a lesser or greater reward. The authors suggest that this tracking of relative 
reward magnitude in the OFC reflects the motivational significance associated with the 
stimulus (Saez et al., 2017). The DLPFC, likewise, is involved in predicting reward outcomes 
from different actions (Marcos, Nougaret, Tsujimoto, & Genovesio, 2018). Monkey studies 
have also found the DLPFC to be sensitive to the magnitude of rewards with increased 
neuronal activity in response to larger rewards (Leon & Shadlen, 1999). ERP evidence in 
humans has also shown that the medial frontal negativity (MFN), which corresponds to ACC 
activity, is responsive to the magnitude of rewards and this responsiveness predicts 
behavioural adaptations to previously rewarding distractors (Hickey et al., 2010a). The MFN 
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was originally proposed to be an index of the motivational impact of outcomes (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002) and this corresponds well with Hickey et al. (2010a). All the aforementioned 
areas have strong reciprocal connections with the striatum and can be considered as part of 
a wider reward processing network involved in motivated cognition as these areas are also 
conventionally considered in the context of cognitive control even in the absence of explicit 
rewards.  
 
The Role of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
In particular, the ACC and DLPFC are strongly linked to adaptation in cognitive control, 
although they serve dissociable functions. The ACC has been associated with the monitoring 
of inputs and performance, whereas the DLPFC is likely involved in the implementation of a 
control strategy (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; MacDonald III, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). 
As more research is conducted into ACC functioning its role has become broader. Initially, 
findings that the ACC was more responsive to novel word presentations than practiced words 
on a verbal response task suggested that its main role may be in orchestrating effortful rather 
than automatic responses (Raichle et al., 1994). Other early theories of the ACC highlighted 
its role in error monitoring (Carter et al., 1998). The evidence supporting the ACC in error 
detection is strong and much of the support for this idea comes from the error related 
negativity (ERN, also known as the error negativity). The ERN is a negative deflection of the 
ERP that occurs following an error. Its neural generator is most likely in the ACC (Dehaene, 
Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 2000; Gehring, Goss, 
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Likewise, on correct trials the correct response negativity 
(CRN) has also been found. The CRN is thought to have similar properties to the ERN, and also 
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has its neural generator in the ACC (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). One possibility to 
align CRN findings with the theory that the ACC monitors errors was to suggest that CRN and 
ERN activity represented instances where errors were likely, such as during response 
competition (Brown & Braver, 2005; Carter et al., 1998). Indeed, such evidence inspired one 
of the most influential accounts of ACC function, i.e., conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). It proposes that the ACC is engaged in monitoring for 
conflicts in information processing. Here, conflict refers to response competition; when 
stimuli activate multiple potential responses, information processing must select the most 
appropriate response. When conflict arises, the ACC gauges the need for strengthened 
cognitive control biases to overcome it (Botvinick et al., 2001). Indeed, the conflict monitoring 
hypothesis accounts well for the ERN, as errors and conflicts are likely to coexist (Carter et al., 
1998). In addition, the frontal N2 component of the ERP, which like the ERN is thought to be 
generated by the ACC, has consistently been shown during pre-response conflict in tasks such 
as the flanker task (van Veen & Carter, 2002; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). 
 
The Flanker Task, Conflict Adaptation, and the ACC 
In the flanker task a central target is flanked by two identical distractors, one either 
side of the distractor. Importantly, the distractors (flankers) can either represent the same 
(congruent) response as the central target or the alternative (incongruent) response. 
Incongruent flankers slow RT compared to congruent flankers, an effect known as the flanker 
effect (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974, see Figure 1.3 for an example flanker trial). The slowing on 
incongruent trials reflects the need to overcome the conflict that arises from activation of two 
competing responses, one from the flanker and the other from the target (Eriksen, 1995). 
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Consistent with this interpretation, the influence of the flankers is maximal when flankers 
precede the target by around 100 ms (Flowers & Wilcox, 1982; Mattler, 2003), demonstrating 
that flankers have greatest impact when their response is activated prior to target processing. 
Furthermore, the frontal N2 is considerably larger on incongruent than congruent trials 
(Folstein & Van Petten, 2008), supporting a role of response conflict on incongruent trials. 
 
 
In addition to being a useful measure of response competition the flanker task is also 
a paradigm suited to investigating fluctuations in cognitive control through the analyses of 
sequential trial effects. The interference from incongruent flankers is reduced and RT are 
faster when such trials are preceded by an incongruent compared to a congruent trial. 
Likewise, the benefit from congruent flankers is also reduced and RT are slower when 
congruent trials are preceded by an incongruent rather than a congruent trial. The reduced 
flanker effect after incongruent versus congruent trials is known as the conflict adaptation 
(CA) effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992, see Figure 1.4). Together, these two modulations 
of the flanker effect that make up the CA effect suggest that conflict signals induce 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Example trial sequence from an arrow flanker task. Participants must respond to the direction of the 
central arrow. The example sequence is of a congruent followed by an incongruent trial. Adapted from Seer et al. 
(2017). 
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strengthened cognitive control to overcome similar, future conflict. The strengthened 
cognitive control is thought to overcome conflict by boosting the representational strength of 
the target, and relatively reducing the strength of flanker representations (Egner & Hirsch, 
2005). This effectively benefits performance on a further incongruent trial but is to the 
detriment of performance on a subsequent congruent trial (although see, Mayr, Awh, & 
Laurey, 2003). Importantly, such conflict adaptation effects have also been demonstrated in 
other tasks involving conflict arising from response competition, such as the Simon (Stürmer, 
Soetens, Leuthold, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002) and Stroop (Kerns et al., 2004) tasks.  
In the Simon task, the participant must respond using the directional keys on the 
keyboard as to the colour of the target (e.g., press ‘up’ when the target is orange). Importantly, 
the target can either be presented above or below fixation. Therefore, participants must 
inhibit the prepotent response activated by the location of the target to respond to the target 
colour. When the target response and its location are congruent, RT are faster than when the 
target response and its location are incongruent, an effect known as the Simon effect. 
Consistent with the conflict adaptation effect in the flanker task, the Simon effect is also 
reduced following incongruent trials versus congruent trials (Stürmer et al., 2002). Therefore, 
the behavioural evidence from a variety of tasks involving response competition support the 
notion that conflict elicits modulations in the allocation of cognitive control.  
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The N2 amplitude following congruent and incongruent trials in the flanker task has 
also been found to correspond with this interpretation of the conflict adaptation effect. The 
N2 is larger to incongruent flankers after a congruent compared to after an incongruent trial 
(Clayson & Larson, 2011). The reduced N2 following incongruent trials supports the view that 
the behavioural CA effect is likely to, at least in part, be the result of conflict-driven 
enhancements of task-relevant cognitive control signalled via the ACC. fMRI evidence further 
supports this notion, showing increased BOLD activity in the ACC on incongruent trials 
following congruent compared to incongruent trials (Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, lesions to the cingulate cortex produce a diminished CA effect (Sheth et al., 
2013). Together these studies point to a clear role of the ACC in detecting conflict, as ACC 
activity was increased to conflict signals when the current strength of cognitive control was 
not sufficient to reduce response competition.  
The role of the ACC, however, is not restricted to monitoring conflict. It has also been 
implicated in emotional and motivational processing (Bush et al., 2000). Botvinick (2007) 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Classic conflict adaptation result. The congruency effect (incongruent - congruent) is larger following a 
congruent compared to an incongruent trial. Taken from Egner, Ely, & Grinband (2010). 
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proposed that ACC monitors aversive signals, with conflict merely being an example of an 
aversive event (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012). This idea reconciles conflict monitoring theory 
with other accounts of ACC function that assign it a role in monitoring the outcomes of 
strategic decisions and guiding future decision making (Botvinick, 2007; Bush et al., 2002). This 
notion is supported by studies of conflict adaptation, measured using the lateralized readiness 
potential (LRP) in the Simon task. In this task, an early LRP is found when the previous trial is 
congruent, showing a readiness to respond to the location of the stimulus, but the LRP is 
reduced when the prior trial is incongruent, demonstrating increased control over responses 
(Fröber, Stürmer, Frömer, & Dreisbach, 2017). Interestingly, the same LRP effect has been 
shown to scale with self-reported unpleasantness on the previous trial. When the previous 
trial is reported as unpleasant, no early LRP is evident on the subsequent trial, but early LRPs 
are evident following pleasant trials. Unfortunately, it is not clear what the participants were 
indicating as being unpleasant about the trial. Previous research has shown that face stimuli 
associated with inhibitory responses are rated as lower in trustworthiness than stimuli not 
associated with inhibition (Kiss, Raymond, Westoby, Nobre, & Eimer, 2008). Consistent with 
this finding, Fröber et al. (2017) found incongruent trials, which require inhibition, to be more 
likely to be assigned a more unpleasant rating than congruent trials. Therefore, the 
congruency on the prior trial was probably an important determinant of the Fröber et al. 
(2017) findings. Another possibility is that participants were responding to the success of the 
cognitive strategy on the prior trial, which could either be to utilize or ignore target location 
information. The chosen strategy would likely be informed by the congruency of the prior trial 
(e.g., the conflict adaptation effect). The self-reported pleasantness could be viewed as an 
index of intrinsic feedback (positive affect) for the previous strategic choice, thus motivating 
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future strategic decisions. In support of this view, behavioural conflict adaptation is known to 
be reduced when trials are followed by monetary gain, again demonstrating that strategies 
that result in a payoff appear to be repeated (e.g., Thorndike, 1898), despite the cognitive 
costs (i.e., conflict) experienced (van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). Further evidence 
consistent with this notion has shown that ACC activity is also enhanced during positive 
feedback for actions under volitional control and this activity guides future choices depending 
on the value of the action (Walton, Devlin, & Rushworth, 2004). These data demonstrate that 
modulations of cognitive control in response to recent events are dependent on 
emotional/motivational drivers that estimate the cognitive costs and benefits of strategic 
choices rather than conflict, per se, and that these modulations may be mediated by activity 
in the ACC. 
Cognitive costs, though, are not the only drivers determining the biases instigated by 
cognitive control. Benefits or anticipated rewards probably also play an important role. As 
demonstrated earlier, DA is critically involved in driving incentivized cognition. DA is also 
abundant in the ACC, which is a target for projections from the midbrain (Schweimer & 
Hauber, 2006). Consistent with this, ACC activity is reactive to the receipt of rewards and also 
to expected rewards, especially when the rewards are perceived to be contingent on 
behavioural choices (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Walton et al., 2004). In rats, lesions that 
disconnect neural communication between the ACC and the nucleus accumbens disrupts 
autoshaping, as do bilateral lesions to the ACC, demonstrating the importance of ACC-striatal 
connectivity in stimulus-reward learning and incentive salience (Parkinson, Willoughby, 
Robbins, & Everitt, 2000). Similarly, human neuroimaging supports a role for the ACC in 
predicting reward magnitude (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005), and in 
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particular the pooling of reward information across different possible decisions by coding 
reward prediction errors (Wallis & Kennerley, 2011). Accordingly, it has been proposed that 
this DA system, incorporating striatal projections to the ACC, is responsible for motivating the 
selection of a cognitive action plan to purse goals by coding the predicted rewards and 
incentive salience of multiple options (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). The ACC’s role in the system 
is the “gate-keeper” that computes expected reward and costs associated with different 
response options and promotes the optimal choice (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Rushworth, 
Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). In my 
dissertation I take this idea and apply it to the cognitive operations that are potentially 
executed in response to visual stimuli, and how value-associations may bias the selection of a 
cognitive operation. 
 
Expected Value of Control Hypothesis 
Recently, these ideas have been formalized by Shenhav and colleagues into a model 
called the Expected Value of Control (EVC, Kool, Shenhav, & Botvinick, 2017; Shenhav et al., 
2013, 2017; Shenhav, Straccia, Cohen, & Botvinick, 2014; Trapp, Shenhav, Bitzer, & Bar, 2014). 
Key to the theory is that the dorsal ACC (dACC) manages whether cognitive control is to be 
exerted, determines the strength of that control, and selects the cognitive strategy to be used 
for engagement with information (Shenhav et al., 2013). The theory suggests that these 
decisions are primarily determined by two factors, 1) the expected payoff, and 2) the cost of 
exerting control or not (Kool et al., 2017). The expected payoff in its simplest form can be 
considered as the expected value, either intrinsic (e.g., related to task performance) or 
extrinsic (e.g., monetary reward), of engaging in any given action. The costs of engaging 
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control largely relate to the mental effort required to implement and sustain the control. 
Determining factors in the calculation of costs include the cognitive, motoric, and metabolic 
expense required, all of which hinge on the supposition of limited resources (Shenhav et al., 
2017). For example, working memory is a cognitive resource required to sustain a strategy of 
control, and the limitations in the capacity of working memory are well known (Luck & Vogel, 
1997). Thus, it is cognitively costly to unnecessarily utilize these limited resources. In addition 
to these costs of utilizing control, costs can also be incurred by not implementing control. The 
prevailing cost of not biasing control is cross talk in information processing. Response conflict 
is the result of cross talk, i.e., when two streams of information require similar neural 
resources to process they interact impairing accurate processing of one or both streams of 
information (Bergen, Medeiros-Ward, Wheeler, Drews, & Strayer, 2013).  
I return to the flanker task to consider these ideas. In the flanker task there are two 
appropriate cognitive strategies, 1) attend to flankers and target, and 2) attend to the target 
and ignore distractors. However, the cost of each strategy is dependent on the congruency of 
the trial. The latter strategy is costly not only in terms of the increase in demands required to 
sustain control, but also in relation to the opportunity costs on congruent trials (Kurzban, 
Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2014; Shenhav et al., 2017). Specifically, placing less emphasis on 
flanker processing means that potentially beneficial information is being lost from congruent 
flankers. The former strategy, on the other hand, is most costly on incongruent trials where 
cross talk occurs as a result of the simultaneous processing of flankers and target. The 
resultant response conflict is not only cognitively costly to resolve, but also motivationally 
costly because of its potentially aversive nature (Botvinick, 2007). Consistent with the notions 
of the EVC theory, different cost profiles should be associated with each strategy depending 
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on the congruency of the previous trial. This explains the need for shifts in the strategic 
allocation of control depending on the congruency of the prior trial.  
 
Motivational Competition 
Here, I propose an account of super-distraction that incorporates the ideas of the EVC 
hypothesis. Key to the theory is that high-level cognition and behaviour are regulated by an 
unconscious competition among complex representations of discrete motivational states. In 
this motivation-competition view, motivational states can be automatically instantiated by 
sensory cues (or external objects) that signal upcoming opportunities to achieve goals. They 
can, of course, also be provoked by internally generated, ‘top-down’ signals. Importantly and 
in contrast to perceptual priority frameworks, goals, not sensory cues, are at the heart of each 
representation, enabling a single cue to instantiate multiple, and potentially competing 
motivational states. The representation of each motivational state specifies a motivational 
direction and intensity. Motivational direction refers to the cognitive operations or 
behavioural actions associated with achieving that goal (Eder, Rothermund, De Houwer, & 
Hommel, 2015; Greenwald, 1970; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Intensity 
refers to the strength of each state relative to the strength of all other concurrently active 
motivational states. As in the EVC model, intensity depends on a trade-off between predicted 
goal value and the predicted cognitive, motoric, and metabolic cost of achieving the goal. This 
dependence on prediction means that intensity is determined by both relevant prior 
experience and the current context (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; 
Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Shadmehr, Huang, & 
Ahmed, 2016; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). These ideas are somewhat similar to 
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computational notions of ‘state representations’ used in formal reinforcement learning 
theories (Wilson, Takahashi, Schoenbaum, & Niv, 2014). In this motivational competition 
framework, motivations actively and dynamically compete for access to the high-level 
cognitive machinery needed to control behaviour. This competition ensures that only the 
most intense motivation wins control (Shenhav et al., 2013), reducing the costly periods of 
indecision.  
A key line of research supporting this motivational competition notion of visual 
processing priority (i.e., motivated cognition) comes from studies of effortful behaviour. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, both animal and human research shows that subjects are more willing 
to exert cognitive effort when the personal predicted payoff (reward) is larger. Although 
unsurprising, this concept forms the backbone of the EVC hypothesis. For example, rats in a 
T-maze where they can choose to work for a high reward by climbing a barrier or receive a 
low reward without scaling a barrier prefer the high reward option. However, the same rats 
after intra-ACC infusion of a D1 receptor antagonist show a preference for the low reward 
option (Schweimer & Hauber, 2006). Similarly, rats with a temporarily deactivated ACC show 
reduced willingness to exert cognitive effort for a high reward on a visuospatial attention task, 
instead preferring the low reward but easier version of the task compared to when the ACC is 
functioning typically (Hosking, Cocker, & Winstanley, 2014). In addition, when rats reach 
satiation they no longer prefer the high reward/high effort choice, instead preferring to 
receive less sucrose for the less demanding cognitive task as the ultimate value of the reward 
diminishes (Cocker, Hosking, Benoit, & Winstanley, 2012), demonstrating that the 
computation of cost-benefit is sensitive to internal states. Humans are also more likely to 
choose more demanding cognitive tasks, such as more a demanding working memory task, 
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when incentives for doing so increase (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Kool et al., 
2017; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013). In addition, humans are also more likely to increase 
effortful attentional preparation when incentives for success on an upcoming visual search 
task are high versus low (Sawaki, Luck, & Raymond, 2015). Furthermore, as with rats and 
consistent with the literature discussed earlier demonstrating both reward and cost sensitivity 
in the dACC, human research into effortful behaviour has also shown the dACC to be ideally 
suited for the final cost-benefit computation that forms the basis of the competition between 
motivational states. Accordingly, the dACC is responsive to the net value of decision options 
(Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009; Shenhav et al., 2013). Moreover, the 
motivational competition model is not only consistent with the behavioural and neuroimaging 
data it is also biologically plausible, given the theorized roles and known projections between 
the striatum, dACC, insular, DLPFC, and OFC amongst other regions. 
Implicit in the motivational competition hypothesis, as in classic theories of top-down 
control, is the necessity to incorporate prior experience and learning into the mechanism 
determining the allocation of control. Motivational intensity can be determined by 
immediately prior information, such as during CA, and also more long-term conditioning, as is 
the case in VDAC where stimulus-reward associations are conditioned over many trials both 
just prior to or even weeks before subsequently re-encountering the same stimuli (Anderson 
et al., 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2013). In both CA and VDAC the motivational direction being 
considered (i.e., to reduce flanker processing after an incongruent trial, or to attend to value-
associated distractors) is elicited based on the previous encounters with the stimuli, whether 
it be an immediately preceding encounter or one requiring long-term memory. The 
motivational intensity of both strategies is also reflected in these previous encounters. In the 
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context of VDAC, during learning every encounter with the high-value colour reinforces both 
the large expected payoff of attending to that colour and the opportunity costs of not 
immediately attending to the high reward colour (i.e., missing the reward). This strategy is 
again elicited in the subsequent test-task when the high value colour is perceived, slowing RT. 
As with rats that gradually reduce the estimates of expected payoff of sucrose rewards as they 
become satiated (Cocker et al., 2012), human participants gradually devalue the perceived 
benefits of attending to the high reward colour as they learn that the reward is no longer 
forthcoming, leading to extinction of VDAC (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016; Roper et al., 
2014). The model is also highly sensitive to the magnitude of rewards, given the importance 
of the expected payoff, and therefore accounts for the lack of attentional capture from low 
value-associated stimuli where the motivational intensity of this state is reduced compared to 
high value-associated stimuli. Moreover, although not large there is also a cost of attending 
to the colour in the VDAC test task in terms of the slowing of target processing. This adds to 
the rate of extinction and counteracts the expected payoff of attending to low value colours. 
A prediction that can be made from this motivation-based model of VDAC is that increases in 
the cost of colour processing in the test task, for example by increasing cross-talk from colour 
processing, would reduce VDAC. This prediction is tested in Chapter 4. 
Importantly, currently active cognitive control mechanisms influence the motivational 
competition by modulating predicted costs and benefits of achieving specific goals, thus 
controlling motivational intensity. Mechanisms that inflate a predicted cost or devalue a 
predicted benefit reduce motivational intensity, whereas mechanisms that underestimate a 
predicted cost or inflate a predicted benefit enhance motivational intensity.  
General Introduction 
 38 
Consistent with this notion, individual difference studies show that the strength of 
current cognitive control can have a suppressive influence on states that have heightened 
predicted payoffs. Specifically, individuals who have a higher working memory capacity are 
less susceptible to VDAC (Anderson et al., 2011). Working memory is often associated with 
improved executive function and the ability to sustain proactive task relevant processing 
(Engle, 2002). One possibility is that individuals with high working memory capacity are more 
capable of modulating the intensity of exogenously activated motivational states (those 
instantiated by sensory cues) consistent with task-relevant goals. In VDAC this would suggest 
that high working memory capacity individuals effectively dampen the motivational intensity 
of colour processing in the test task in a proactive fashion because of a strong motivation to 
process shape. Consistent with this notion, individuals scoring highly on the BASDrive subscale 
of the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System Scale (Carver & White, 
1994), thought to index the ability to maintain task-relevant motivations, show reduced 
reward priming (Hickey et al., 2010b). Furthermore, individuals who demonstrate increased 
ability to remain focused on goal-directed behaviours, in this case measured by increased 
mindfulness, also show reduced VDAC (Levinson, Stoll, Kindy, Merry, & Davidson, 2014). 
Analogously, impulsivity, the inability to maintain current motivations, is associated with 
increased VDAC (Anderson, Kronemer, Rilee, Sacktor, & Marvel, 2016). Again, the neural basis 
of this suppressive influence on the motivational intensity of exogenous states also been 
demonstrated. Specifically, the DLPFC has long been considered crucial not just for the 
maintenance and updating of working memory, but also in coding top-down task relevant 
behaviours in response to behavioural goals (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Curtis & 
D’Esposito, 2003; MacDonald III et al., 2000). Recent evidence has linked the strength of 
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connectivity between the DLPFC and striatal regions, such as the caudate, in the expected 
value of incentive stimuli. When smokers are presented with smoking related cues, weaker 
connectivity between the DLPFC and the caudate predicted increased cravings and increased 
cue responsivity in the caudate (Yuan et al., 2017), demonstrating the potentially suppressive 
interactions between goal-directed control in the DLPFC and incentive salience in the caudate.  
 
Proactive and Reactive Control in Motivational Competition 
A distinction between exogenous and goal-directed motivations accords well with 
other theories of how control is instigated. Recently, control dynamics have been 
dichotomized into two distinct types, proactive and reactive control (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 
2007; Braver, 2012). Although the distinction between the two types of control is often 
blurred, proactive control is characterized by preparatory control over attention to minimize, 
for example, predicted conflict in accordance with behavioural goals, whereas reactive control 
generally refers to attentional control implemented post-stimulus processing. CA could be 
classified as both reactive and proactive. The strategy to either process or ignore flankers is 
initiated reactively based on the congruency of the prior trial, but this strategy is then used 
proactively on the subsequent trial. However, typically CA is regarded as a reactive 
phenomenon (Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 2010a, 2010b). Regardless, as discussed above 
the distinction may also be useful when considering competition in motivated cognition both 
between and within goal-directed (proactive) and exogenous (reactive) motivational states. 
Exogenous motivational states such as those initiated by the value-associated stimulus 
in VDAC and other super-distraction effects can generally be considered as being reactive. The 
goal of attending to the reward associated stimulus is only instigated post-stimulus onset 
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because of the expected payoff developed through training, although some preparatory cues 
preparing the observer for the presence of reward associated stimuli are likely given the 
similarity between the training and test contexts (Anderson, 2015). In this view, VDAC is the 
result of the motivational competition between proactive task-relevant processing (i.e., 
attend shape) and the exogenous motivation associated with the value laden stimulus (i.e., 
attend colour). However, motivational competition is not restricted to proactive vs. reactive 
strategies. Instead, the competition can arise from two potentially reactive strategies, such as 
conflict adaptation and value-driven attentional capture. For example, in the flanker task, 
following an incongruent trial, the motivational intensity of the strategy to attend to the 
flankers is low because of the cognitive costs associated with the response conflict; thus, 
flankers are ignored. However, if the flankers were value-associated during a prior training 
task the cost of attending to the flankers would be negated by the increase in the predicted 
payoff. Thus, the expected value of attending to the flankers would be increased relative to 
the value of ignoring the flankers. This is in-keeping with a motivational competition account 
of cognitive control with the strategy that has the largest expected value effectively winning 
control in a winner-takes-all manner. These predictions are tested in Chapter 2. 
 
Motivational Competition in Adolescents 
In view of the proposed dependence on reactive mechanisms in the allocation of 
control to value-associated stimuli and indeed the reliance on estimating the predicted 
benefits associated with allocating control based on learned value-associations, adolescence 
is likely to be a fruitful developmental epoch for investigating these mechanisms. Adolescence 
is typically defined as the developmental period between the ages of 12-17 years (Spear, 
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2000) although in terms of neural development adolescence can be considered to continue 
into the mid-20s when brain development reaches maturity. A defining characteristic of 
adolescence in the developmental literature is that they are more likely to engage in risky 
behaviours. As a consequence, teenagers are at a greater risk of mortality and more 
susceptible to developing addictions (Dahl, 2004). This is underscored by an increase in 
impulsivity that is attributed to imbalances in neural maturation (Chambers, Taylor, & 
Potenza, 2003; Ernst, Pine, & Hardin, 2006; Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2010). 
Neuroanatomical studies in adolescents have revealed that the synaptic density in reward 
processing regions (e.g., striatal regions) follows a quadratic trajectory, peaking at around 14 
years of age. However, areas thought to be involved in more proactive control (e.g., DLPFC), 
including the density of connections from cortical to subcortical regions, develop linearly 
throughout adolescence only reaching full maturity in early adulthood at around 25 years of 
age (Giedd, 2004; Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay & Giedd, 2004; Luna, Marek, Larsen, Tervo-
Clemmens, & Chahal, 2015). 
The observed imbalance in neural maturation has spawned many dual-systems models 
of adolescent risk-taking, concentrating on immature proactive control and hyper-sensitive 
reward processing (Ernst et al., 2006; Geier & Luna, 2009; Pfeifer & Allen, 2012; Somerville et 
al., 2010; Steinberg, 2010). Another perspective suggests that because proactive control is 
weak in adolescents, they become over-reliant on reactive control strategies. Even by ‘late’ 
adolescence, the contingent negative variation of the ERP, thought to index response 
preparation, is attenuated compared to adults in epochs prior to a response (Killikelly & Szűcs, 
2013; Padilla, Pfefferbaum, Sullivan, Baker, & Colrain, 2014). However, the subsequent P3b 
activity, activated post-stimulus onset during the response execution epoch is increased 
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compared to in adults (Killikelly & Szűcs, 2011). Similarly, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2011) used a 
modified version of the Stroop task, where the ratio of incongruent (e.g., naming the ink 
colour of the word blue in red ink) to neutral trials (e.g., naming the ink colour of a non-colour 
word in red ink) was increased. Under such conditions, adults show increased DLPFC activity 
compared to conditions of equal incongruent and neutral trials because the task requires 
sustained proactive control to focus attention on the relevant features (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2011). However, adolescents (mean age = 15.6 years) do not show the same increases in 
DLPFC activity as adults under these conditions. Instead, adolescents show increased ACC 
activity compared to adults after conflict. This would be consistent with teenagers responding 
reactively to each instance of conflict rather than taking global condition statistics into account 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011). In support of this conclusion, the experiment also found that 
lower DLPFC activity in adolescents predicted self-report measures of increased impulsivity. 
Furthermore, behaviourally adolescents also show poorer proactive control. They are slower 
and less accurate during anti-saccade tasks compared to adults, demonstrating an inability to 
maintain task-relevant response tendencies, instead initiating responses post-stimulus onset 
(Hwang, Velanova, & Luna, 2010; Kramer, De Sather, & Cassavaugh, 2005). Together these 
ERP, fMRI and behavioural studies suggest a propensity for adolescents to respond reactively 
to exogenous rather than internally generated motivations (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011; 
Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013; Solomon et al., 2014).  
Despite the apparent differences in how control is allocated in adolescents compared 
to adults, by late adolescence (~16 years) no difference in the ability to detect cognitive costs 
reactively has been reported (Ladouceur, Dahl, & Carter, 2007). In late adolescents, the ERN 
and N2 elicited by incorrect responses and conflict, respectively, during the flanker task are 
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similar to those found in adults (Ladouceur et al., 2007). However, in the same study late 
adolescents did show an increased PE, an ERP with a neural generator also in the ACC, which 
is responsive to motivational aspects of error monitoring (Falkenstein et al., 2000), compared 
to adults (Ladouceur et al., 2007). One possibility is that late adolescents are more sensitive 
to motivational feedback that drives reactive control; Chapter 3 investigates this possibility.  
Alongside the increased propensity for reactive control, adolescents also appear to 
overestimate the expected value of exogenous motivational states. Specifically, it is evident 
when examining the adolescent brain’s responsivity to reward contingencies that they are 
especially sensitive to motivational cues. Adolescents generally show increased striatal 
activity in both the anticipation and receipt of rewards compared to adults (Braams, van 
Duijvenvoorde, Peper, & Crone, 2015; Ernst et al., 2004; Geier & Luna, 2009; Luna, 
Padmanabhan, & Hearn, 2010; Neuroscience & Galvan, 2010; Padmanabhan, Geier, Ordaz, 
Teslovich, & Luna, 2011; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010, although see Bjork et al., 2004; Bjork, 
Smith, Chen, & Hommer, 2010); although the increased activity is not valence specific. Instead, 
the activity appears to be related to the motivational intensity of the outcomes rather than 
the outcome’s positive nature (Galván & McGlennan, 2013). Accordingly, in rats, adolescents 
are much more likely to attribute incentive salience to stimuli. They exhibit an increased 
tendency for sign-tracking than young adults, consistent with an inflated sense of the 
expected payoff leading to the allocation of inappropriate reactive control (Anderson, Bush, 
& Spear, 2013; DeAngeli, Miller, Meyer, & Bucci, 2017). In humans, there is also evidence that 
adolescents are more likely to inflate the expected value of reward-associated motivations. 
VDAC is not only increased in adolescents compared to adults, but also persists long beyond 
VDAC has extinguished in adults (Roper et al., 2014). The latter finding that VDAC survives 
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extinction in adolescents but not adults shows that teenagers fail to modulate the expected 
value of reward-associated control when it is costly to task-relevant goals. The primary finding 
that VDAC is larger in adolescents demonstrates an increased propensity for teenagers to act 
on exogenous motivations (i.e., attend the high value-associated colour). As a result of 
adolescents’ increased sensitivity to reward-driven behaviours they can offer an important 
contribution to the study of cost-benefit trade-offs in the allocation of control. Especially, in 
the understanding of how expected payoffs may influence control without the suppressive 
influence of strong goal-directed control; Chapter 5 contributes to knowledge in this area.  
The motivational competition approach to adolescent cognition extends existing dual-
system frameworks of adolescent risk-taking by offering a more mechanistic appraisal of the 
underlying computations that afford adolescents’ allocation of control. The motivation model 
predicts increased behavioural activation by rewarding stimuli in adolescents because they 
inflate the predicted payoffs as a result of enhanced striatal sensitivity to rewards. This then 
feeds into the computation of motivational intensity, which is not diluted by goal-driven 
control mechanisms because of immature frontal connectivity to mid-brain DA transmission.  
In sum, attentional frameworks (e.g., Selection History) of reward-driven distraction 
are insufficient because they do not offer a mechanistic account of the underlying processes. 
Instead, it has been proposed that rewards bias attention not by altering attentional priority 
maps, but rather by supposing that value-associated stimuli initiate separate goals that have 
specific learned control dynamics, reactively, post-stimulus onset. The motivational 
competition account proposes that multiple motivational states are constantly and 
concurrently competing for control of cognition, and that this competition is resolved by 
computing cost-benefit trade-offs for each motivation. Cognition is then determined by the 
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motivational state with the greatest relative motivational intensity. Value-associated stimuli 
garner increased motivational intensity because of the learned reward. The motivational 
competition account is supported across behavioural, electrophysiological and imaging 
research, and a plausible neural basis largely reliant on connectivity between the dACC, 
striatum, and DLPFC has been proposed. Furthermore, the model is also applicable in 
explaining developmental differences, such as enhanced reward sensitivity in adolescence.  
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Chapter 2. Value-based Modulation of Visual Attention 
Depends on Competition Among Motivational States 
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Abstract 
Task irrelevant, but motivationally salient stimuli sometimes interfere with performance more 
than similar, but motivationally neutral stimuli. Current explanations for these super-
distraction effects posit that motivational salience enhances a stimulus’ perceptual 
representation, improving its competitiveness for gaining control over attention. Here, I 
suggest that competition among stimulus- and task-instantiated motivational states explains 
these effects better than perception-based competition. To investigate, I conducted four 
experiments on healthy young adults using a colour-flanker task involving (a) neutral 
distractors, (b) distractors with motivationally salient shapes (imbued in a prior shape-money 
conditioning task), or (c) perceptual salience (manipulated by brightness). Of particular 
interest was whether well-studied sequential trial effects would depend similarly or 
differently on motivational versus perceptual flanker salience. Although perceptual strength 
accounts of super-distraction predict similar effects, I report opposite effects. Specifically, 
performance interference effects attributable to distractor motivational salience were only 
observable when conflict (colour incongruence) had been experienced on the previous trial 
and not after no-conflict trials; whereas effects attributable to perceptual salience were 
absent after conflict trials but present after no-conflict (congruent) trials. An additional 
experiment showed that when flanker value associations were made more difficult to access 
during the flanker task, their effect on performance disappeared, but, counter-intuitively, was 
reinstated when a concurrent secondary task was required. Collectively, these effects of 
motivational salience are inconsistent with conventional perceptual competition accounts, 
but are adequately explained by positing a competition among motivational states driven by 
costs versus benefits of cognitive engagement with stimuli. 
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Typical visual environments contain multiple objects, each with the potential to 
motivate different behaviours that may or may not be related to one’s on-going task. For 
example, passing a fast-food restaurant while driving home might motivate a diversion via the 
drive-through. To maintain the goal of getting home, the driver must either suppress the 
perceptual processing of the goal-irrelevant stimulus (restaurant) or inhibit the motivational 
state it initiated (“I want food”). Currently, it remains unclear which option the brain uses to 
maintain goal-directed behaviour. However, most studies from the field of selective attention 
clearly favour the notion of perceptual suppression (Awh et al., 2012; A. Bourgeois, Chelazzi, 
& Vuilleumier, 2016; Chelazzi et al., 2014; Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013; 
Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016), and have largely ignored the possibility 
that regulation of motivational states may be involved.  
Time and again, studies in visual attention have shown that motivationally salient but 
task-irrelevant stimuli can interfere with speeded performance on simple visual search or 
decision tasks to a greater extent than perceptually similar but motivationally-neutral stimuli. 
Response time (RT) slowing and enhanced error rates have been found with emotionally 
salient distractors (see Yiend, 2010, for a review), personally relevant distractors (Gronau, 
Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003; Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999), task-irrelevant images related to personal addictions (Field, Mogg, Zetteler, 
& Bradley, 2004; Lubman, Peters, Mogg, Bradley, & Deakin, 2000; Noël et al., 2006; Stormark, 
Field, Hugdahl, & Horowitz, 1997), and of particular importance for the current study, 
distractors that have learned positive or negative value associations (Anderson et al., 2011; 
Bucker, Belopolsky, et al., 2015; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; Failing et al., 2015; Hickey et 
al., 2010b, 2010a; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Munneke et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2013; Roper et al., 
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2014; Rutherford et al., 2010). These super-distraction effects, i.e., greater distraction by 
motivationally salient versus perceptually similar neutral stimuli, have often been accounted 
for by supposing that motivational salience modulates the strength of perceptual 
representations (Awh et al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2014; Rutherford et al., 2010). Stronger 
representations are presumed to have a greater likelihood of capturing attention (Wei & Zhou, 
2006; Yantis & Jonides, 1984), and hence motivational salience makes irrelevant stimuli super-
distracting.  
Such views have been encapsulated within the framework of an attention ‘priority 
map’ (Awh et al., 2012). Attention priority map theories generally posit that selective 
attention is determined by the relative perceptual representational strength of stimuli in the 
visual array, with the strongest representation (corresponding to the tallest peak on the 
priority map) gaining access to high level processing, i.e., capturing attention. In some views, 
peak height on the priority map is solely determined by sensory salience (Franconeri & Simons, 
2003; Itti & Koch, 2000; Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Theeuwes, 1992), other models posit (or at 
least imply) that peak height is determined by a dynamic process of competition that uses 
‘top-down’ task-specific expectations and task requirements to modulate the map’s 
topography (e.g., Bichot et al., 2010; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Folk et al., 1992; Ptak, 2012; 
Sawaki & Luck, 2010). Such models of perceptual competition accommodate super-distraction 
effects by positing that mechanisms sensitive to prior experience can boost the 
representational strength of irrelevant but motivationally salient stimuli (Awh et al., 2012; 
Wang et al, 2013).  
A significant problem for this perception-based view is that the extant evidence 
supporting it is not uniformly strong. A large number of studies report situations in which 
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motivationally salient distractors neither produce interference effects in attention (e.g., Roper 
et al, 2014; Sali et al., 2014; Sha & Jiang, 2016). Moreover, the presence of super-distraction 
effects is often subject to substantial individual differences (Hickey et al, 2010b; Anderson et 
al, 2011; 2013), being present in some but by no means all participants. Yet despite the 
accumulation of this substantial evidence to the contrary, the notion that super-distraction 
effects result from automatic boosts to the strength of perceptual representations remains a 
widely-held view.  
Here I propose an alternative motivated cognition framework for explaining super-
distraction effects based on the idea that sensory cues and top-down signals generate 
motivational states (goals) that compete for control over high-level cognition. The 
motivational competition is resolved in favour of the motivational state with the greatest 
motivational intensity (Shenhav et al., 2013), which is determined by the predicted costs and 
benefits of each state. This competition ensures that only the most intense state at any 
moment controls cognition. As in other views of cognitive control, competition for control 
over behaviour is internally monitored (Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004; MacDonald 
III et al., 2000) so that experience of past conflict enhances the predicted cost of a future 
related goal, effectively dampening motivational intensity for that goal. Put together, the 
notion of a motivation-based competition allows specific predictions regarding the role of 
cognitive conflict in super-distraction effects. Importantly these predictions contrast directly 
with those made using a conventional perceptual competition framework. 
The aim of the experiments reported here was to test these predictions by assessing 
value-based super-distraction effects in a simple attention task. Specifically, I used a value-
learning task to imbue the shape of abstract symbols with monetary value (wins, losses, or no 
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value) and then used these stimuli in a colour flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Super-
distraction effects in the latter task were assessed by contrasting performance in conditions 
in which the flankers were value-associated (value-flanker conditions) with those when they 
had no-value associations (no-value flanker conditions). On each trial a central target symbol 
appeared concurrently with two flanking distractor symbols that preceded it briefly; 
participants made a speeded two-alternative forced choice about the colour of the central 
target. Some trials were congruent, i.e., all stimuli had the same colour, making responses to 
any item correct. Other trials were incongruent, i.e., target and flankers had different colours, 
making responses to flankers incorrect. The degradation of performance (indexed by RT and 
percent correct choices) on incongruent relative to congruent trials is known as the 
congruency effect (CE; Eriksen, 1995) and reflects flanker distraction. (See Table 2.1 for a list 
of performance definitions used in the flanker task). 
 
Table 2.1. Definitions used in the flanker task. 
Term Definition 
Congruent trial Flankers and target have the same colour 
Incongruent trial Flanker and target have different colours 
Congruency effect (CE) RT incongruent trial – RT congruent trial 
CEcon CE after a congruent trial 
CEincon CE after an incongruent trial 
Conflict adaptation (CA) CEcon – CEincon 
Super-distraction effect (SDE) CE (value/bright flankers) – CE (no-value/dim flankers) 
 
Numerous studies have shown that CE depends on the congruency of the prior trial 
(Gratton et al., 1992); CE is large after a congruent trial (CECon) and small after an incongruent 
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trial (CEIncon). This difference in CE magnitude (CECon – CEIncon) is referred to as Conflict 
Adaptation (CA) and is thought to reflect a mechanism that uses the conflict experienced on 
a preceding incongruent trial to modify top-down control settings for a subsequent trial 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Ghinescu, Schachtman, Ramsey, Gratton, & 
Fabiani, 2016; Kerns et al., 2004; Pastötter, Dreisbach, & Bauml, 2013; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & 
Botvinick, 2005). Comparisons of CE and CA with value versus no-value flankers thus provides 
a measure of super-distraction. Here I use these measures to test the different predictions 
made by perceptual versus motivation-based models of processing priority. 
 
Perceptual competition models predict that both CECon and CEIncon should be larger 
with value flankers than with no-value flankers (a positive super-distraction effect), regardless 
of the congruency of the prior trial due to the enhanced likelihood of attention capture by 
these motivationally salient stimuli. However, this difference should be larger after congruent 
trials when flanker suppression is weak or absent, allowing value-associations to enhance the 
perceptual priority of flankers leading to increased attentional capture. After incongruent 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Predicted super-distraction effects for flanker task performance after congruent versus incongruent trials 
using a processing priority framework based on perceptual (dashed line) or motivation-based (solid line) competition. 
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trials, flankers should be suppressed, weakening the effect of value associations, leading to a 
smaller super-distraction effect (see Figure 2.1). 
The motivational competition hypothesis on the other hand makes different 
predictions. To explain, it is easier first to consider a motivation-competition interpretation of 
flanker effects, such as CA, without considering the role of value associations. In this view and 
consistent with previous theories of conflict triggered control adaptations (Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2012, 2015), motivational intensity for identifying target colour (i.e., the main task of 
the experiment) should remain constant regardless of the preceding trial, but motivation to 
identify flanker colour should vary with the congruence of the preceding trial. Thus, 
competition between the two motivational states (identify target colour, identify flanker 
colour) should vary correspondingly (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Ullsperger et al., 2005). After a 
congruent trial, motivational intensity to code flanker colour should be high due to higher 
predicted benefit, enhancing CE. After an incongruent trial (higher predicted costs) motivation 
should be low, with conflict from flankers being inherently aversive (Botvinick, 2007; 
Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015), reducing CE and thereby accounting for CA effects (Gratton et al., 
1992).  
Of interest here is how flanker value might modulate these effects. Notions of 
incentive salience (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) posit that value-flankers offer greater 
predicted benefits than no-value flankers and should thus heighten motivational intensity for 
processing flankers. However, the effect of this added benefit should only become evident 
after an incongruent trial when motivation to code flanker colour is generally low allowing 
motivation to process value-associated flanker features to be relatively stronger. This intensity 
gain should be evident for value flankers and be absent for no-value flankers. Thus, CEIncon 
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should be larger with value-flankers than with no-value flankers, producing a large positive 
super-distraction effect. In contrast, after a congruent trial the motivational intensity to code 
flanker colour is already strong, even without value, because of the benefit experienced on 
the prior trial. Thus, the relative intensity increase from value flankers versus no-value flankers 
is negligible and CECon should be unaffected by flanker value producing no super-distraction 
effect. This prediction is particularly contradictory with a perceptual competition framework 
of super-distraction effects that still predicts an enhanced perceptual priority from value 
flankers and thus a positive super-distraction effect on CECon (See Figure 2.1).  
I tested these and related predictions in four experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, I 
directly contrasted the effects of motivationally salient distractors (Experiment 1) with those 
of perceptually salient distractors (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants began the 
study by learning to associate orange and purple symbols with monetary wins, losses, or no 
value. Only symbol shape, not colour, was predictive of outcome value. In Experiment 2, the 
value-learning task was omitted entirely. Both studies used the same flanker task except that 
in Experiment 2, flankers were either dim or bright instead of being value or no-value 
associated. I predicted that the results from Experiment 1 (motivationally salient distractors) 
would be consistent with the motivation-based framework (as shown in Figure 2.1) and 
inconsistent with the perceptual competition framework. I predicted the reverse pattern for 
the results of Experiment 2. In Experiments 3 and 4, a value learning session preceded the 
flanker task as in Experiment 1, except that here all symbols were white. The aim was to 
reduce the transfer of value associations to the coloured symbols used in the flanker task (Le 
Pelley, 2004). I predicted that colour flankers would only minimally instantiate motivation to 
activate flanker value associations, eliminating value effects on CA. Indeed, I observed this 
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effect in Experiment 3. Experiment 4 used the same learning/flanker stimuli as Experiment 3, 
but this time manipulated motivational state during the flanker task by loading visual-colour 
working memory during each trial.  The aim was to increase the cognitive cost of coding colour 
in the flanker task and thereby reduce motivational intensity for this goal. According to the 
motivational competition hypothesis, this should effectively boost the latent motivation for 
coding flanker shape driven by value associations, allowing super-distraction effects to re-
emerge. Perceptual competition models make no such predictions. In Experiment 5, bright 
versus dim flankers were again used, but similar to Experiment 4 a concurrent WM task was 
also performed. The reasoning was that a WM load should not impact the influence of physical 
salience, so I expected to replicate Experiment 2. To anticipate, the results favour the notion 
of competition among motivational states and are poorly accounted for by perceptual 
competition models.  
 
General Methods 
Participants 
Students from the University of Birmingham participated in exchange for course 
credits or money plus cash earned during the value-learning task (up to an extra £5). All 
participants (see Table 2.2) had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of 
neurological disorder, and were naïve both to the purpose of the experiment and to Japanese 
Hiragana ideograms. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. All procedures 
used here were approved by the University’s Ethical Review Committee. Sample sizes for 
Experiments 1 – 3 were calculated based on the effect size obtained by van Steenbergen et al. 
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(2009) who also examined the conflict adaptation effect depending on reward conditions, 
albeit they were interested in the influence of performance dependent rewards rather than 
the influence of value-associated distractors. They reported a Cohen’s d = .71 for the 
comparison of CECon and CEIncon. I therefore assumed an effect size of d = .71, a power of 0.80, 
and a two-tailed test. The result was a required sample size of at least 13 to observe the 
conflict adaptation effect. For Experiment 4, the sample size was based on a eta2 = .33 
reported by Ahmed & de Fockert (2012) for a three-way interaction with a between-subjects 
factor of WM-group. Again, assuming a power of 0.80, and a two-tailed test a sample size of 
at least 20 participants was required. G*Power 3.1 was used for the calculation of sample 
sizes.  
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Table 2.2. Participants’ Demographic Information and Mean Questionnaire Scores from all 
Experiments (standard error in parenthesis). 
    Exp. 4  
 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 WM No-load Exp. 5 
N 15 15 15 21 21 21 
Females 11 15 13 14 16 16 
Right-
handed 11 11 13 21 20 18 
Age (years)       
Mean 22.5 (3.0) 19.1 (1.1) 20.8 (1.5) 21.4 (1.8) 22.6 (2.1) 19.3 (.2) 
Range 18 - 29 18 - 21 20 - 25 18 - 25 19 – 27 18 - 21 
BIS/BAS       
BIS 21.4 (.8) 22.9 (.8) 21.4 (1.0) 19.7 (.8) 20.6 (.9) 20.3 (.6) 
BAS reward 18.4 (.4) 17.2 (.6) 15.8 (.9) 16.3 (.7) 17.0 (.7) 17.2 (.5) 
BAS drive 10.9 (.7) 9.8 (.5) 9.9 (.6) 10.0 (.6) 12.1 (.6) 10.7 (.5) 
BAS fun 
seeking 12.0 (.6) 11.2 (.5) 10.9 (.6) 11.7 (.5) 11.7 (.6) 11.9 (.4) 
BIS-11       
Attention 9.5 (.7) 9.7 (.5) 10.3 (.5) 10.2 (.5) 11.2 (.7) 11.0 (.7) 
Cognitive 
instability 6.5 (.6) 6.7 (.4) 6.9 (.4) 6.6 (.3) 7.1 (.5) 6.4 (.4) 
Motor 15.6 (.9) 15.3 (.8) 15.0 (.6) 15.9 (.7) 16.0 (.8) 15.3 (.6) 
Perseverance 8.1 (.5) 7.5 (.5) 6.9 (.4) 7.5 (.4) 8.0 (.4) 7.2 (.5) 
Self-control 12.0 (.9) 11.1 (.6) 12.6 (.8) 12.0 (.5) 12.3 (.7) 12.4 (.7) 
Cognitive 
complexity 10.7 (.8) 11.7 (.8) 10.7 (.6) 10.5 (.6) 11.6 (.5) 12.5 (.5) 
 
Apparatus 
Stimulus presentation and data recording were controlled using custom software 
developed with PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2009) controlling a Stone PC-1210. Responses were 
entered using a standard keyboard. Stimuli were presented in RGB colour space on a gray 
(Experiments 1, 3, and 4: 128, 128, 128) or black background (Experiments 2 and 5: 0, 0, 0) of 
a 68 cm LCD monitor with a screen resolution of 1920 x 1080 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. 
Viewing distance was approximately 70 cm. Testing was conducted in a quiet room with 
ambient lighting and without the aid of a chin rest. 
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Stimuli 
 Japanese ideograms (PJ Hiragana font) subtending approximately 1.9° x 1.4°, 
presented in white (255, 255, 255), purple (99, 84, 99), or orange (119, 84, 0) served as stimuli. 
Unless otherwise stated, stimuli were equiluminant regardless of colour. In both tasks, 
symbols appeared along the horizontal meridian; flanker-task targets appeared centrally and 
flanker as well as learning-task symbols were presented laterally left or right by 4°.  
Procedure 
 Value-Learning Task. See Figure 2.2a. Each trial began with a fixation cross (750 ms), 
followed by a brief (250 ms) presentation of two symbols, one on either side of fixation, and 
then a blank screen until response. Symbols were selected from a set of six (Experiments 1 
and 3) or three (Experiment 4). Each was assigned a point value of 0 (No-Value), 500 (Win), or 
-500 (Loss); value-symbol assignments were counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
were told to earn as many points as possible by selecting (unspeeded) the symbol with the 
largest point value. They used the index or middle fingers of the right hand and the ‘1’ or ‘2’ 
key to choose the left or right symbol, respectively. Immediately after response, each symbol’s 
numerical value replaced its symbol for 500 ms. The value of the chosen symbol, i.e., that 
trial’s outcome, remained visible for an additional 500 ms. A running total of points earned 
was continuously presented on the vertical midline 8° below fixation and updated after each 
choice.  
 The two symbols presented on each trial could either be matched or mismatched in 
value. Each possible mismatched symbol (win vs. no-value, loss vs. no-value, and win vs. loss) 
pair was equally likely; the location of the optimal choice on mismatched pairs was equally 
likely to be left or right. Matched trials (included in Experiments 1 and 3, and excluded in 
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Experiment 4) required an arbitrary response and were used to provide experience of 
outcome for each symbol; data from these trials were not analysed. Participants completed 
three blocks of 108 trials in Experiment 1 and 3, or three blocks of 80 trials in Experiment 4. 
The cumulative point total was visible during inter-block rest breaks. Points earned were 
converted into cash and given to participants at the end of the learning session. Eighteen 
practice trials using the same procedure but with Roman letters and explicit value assignments 
(A = 1, B = 2, and C = 3) were completed prior to the learning session.  
Test Scales. After completing the learning phase, participants completed the Munsell 
D-15 colour vision test; all participants performed normally. They then completed the 
Behavioural Inhibition/Behavioural Activation System Scale (BIS/BAS, Carver & White, 1994) 
and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). Differences 
among participant groups in different experiments were non-significant and were non-
significantly correlated with any measure of super-distraction reported here. Data obtained 
from the personality inventories are reported in Table 2.2. Immediately after completing the 
questionnaire participants engaged in the flanker task.  
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Flanker Task. See Figure 2.2b. Each trial began with a fixation cross (1000 ms) that was 
followed by an initial presentation of flankers (two identical symbols in the same colour) on 
either side of an empty centre area for 100 ms. See Figure 2.2b. This was immediately replaced 
with a three-item array comprised of the previous flankers plus a central target all of which 
remained visible until response. The task was to report the target’s colour by pressing the ‘1’ 
or ‘2’ key with the index or middle finger of the right-hand, as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The assignment of key to colour was counterbalanced across participants. Response 
time (RT) from target onset and error rates was recorded. No feedback was given, and no 
points were awarded or lost.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. A. Example trial during the Learning Task. In Experiment 1 symbols were displayed in either orange or purple, 
whereas in Experiments 3 and 4 they appeared in white, as shown here. The task was to earn as many points as possible 
by choosing one of the two symbols. Numbers show the point value corresponding to each symbol and the final frame 
shows the outcome received on that trial. B. Example of two successive trials in the Flanker Task. Here the symbols always 
appeared in orange (depicted here as white) or purple (depicted here as black). The task was to report the colour of the 
target (central symbol) as fast and accurately as possible. The example shows an incongruent trial preceded by a 
congruent trial. 
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The symbols used were the same as those experienced in the learning task. On half of 
trials flankers and target had the same colour (congruent trials); on remaining trials, they were 
colour mismatched (incongruent trials). Each possible combination of flanker symbol/colour 
and target symbol/colour was equally likely to occur. This created colour congruent (C) or 
colour incongruent (I) trials with flankers that had no-value associations, win associations, or 
loss associations (Experiments 1 and 3) or flankers that were dull or bright (Experiment 2). 
Critically, the experiments produced four different two-trial sequences: congruent-congruent 
(CC), incongruent-incongruent (II); congruent-incongruent (CI) and incongruent-congruent 
(IC).  
Participants completed 144 (Experiments 1 and 3) or 128 (Experiment 2) trials of each 
combination of flanker value (or brightness) X congruency, without regard to sequence type, 
split equally between four blocks and presented in a pseudo random order (Experiments 1 
and 3: 864, Experiment 2: 512 trials in total). The trial structures for the flanker task in 
Experiments 4 and 5 are described in their own section. 
Data Analysis 
Value-Learning Task. Proportion optimal choice was calculated for each participant 
across the entire session. Thirteen out of 85 (15%) participants failed to achieve greater than 
75% correct meaning that acquisition of value associations could not be assumed in these 
cases. All their data was excluded, including that reported in Table 2.3. Proportion optimal 
choice for each block was then calculated for each remaining participant. Repeated-measures 
ANOVAs on these data with block (1, 2, or 3) as within-subjects factor was were conducted 
(Experiments 1 and 3). Memory condition was included as a between-subjects factor for 
Experiment 4.  
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Flanker Task. Two participants in Experiment 3, one in Experiment 4, and three in 
Experiment 5 had mean RTs and/or error rates greater than 2.5 SD above the group mean, 
resulting in their data from being excluded from further analysis. All incorrect trials 
(Experiment 1 = 4.6%, Experiment 2 = 6.2%, Experiment 3 = 4.7% of trials; see Experiment 4 
and Experiment 5 for details) and trials faster than 300 ms or slower than 5000 ms were 
excluded (Experiment 1 = 0.2%, Experiment 2 = 0.5%, Experiment 3 = 0.1%, Experiment 4: WM 
= 0.04%, No-load = 0.3%, Experiment 5 = 0.1% of trials), means and SD’s were then calculated 
for each flanker value X prior trial congruency X current trial congruency condition for each 
participant. RTs slower than 3 S.D. above the individual conditions means were also excluded 
(Experiment 1 = 1.9%, Experiment 2 = 2.1%, Experiment 3 = 2.0%, Experiment 4: WM = 2.2%, 
No-load = 2.0%, Experiment 5 = 2.2% of trials). In Experiments 1 and 3 individual means based 
on remaining data were analysed with a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with current flanker congruency, previous flanker congruency, and current trial 
flanker value (no-value, win or loss) used as within-subjects factors. In Experiment 4, the 
within-subjects factor of flanker value only had 2 levels (no-value or win); in Experiments 2 
and 5 it was replaced with flanker brightness (dull or bright). Error rates were similarly 
analysed. Significant three-way interactions of RT data were followed-up by calculating CECon 
and CEIncon for each flanker value. Additionally, conflict adaptation (CA) effects for each 
current trial Flanker Value were also calculated as shown in Table 2.3. 
Significance of CA was tested using one-sample t-tests. Comparisons of CA values 
across conditions used one-way ANOVAs. All follow-up planned pairwise comparisons were 
corrected for multiple comparisons by the False Discovery Rate procedure (Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995). Alpha levels were set at .05 throughout. 
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Experiment 1 
The aim of this experiment was to assess the presence of super-distraction effects in 
the flanker paradigm. Super-distraction involved comparing performance on trials with value-
associated flankers with that when flankers were equally familiar but not associated with a 
motivationally salient outcome. Sequential trial effects were of particular interest (Gratton et 
al., 1992); specifically, the experiment was designed to test the effect of flanker value on the 
interaction of prior trial congruence and current trial congruence, as perceptual and 
motivational competition theories of processing priority predict different outcomes for this 
triple interaction effect.  
 
Method 
Procedure 
 Value-Learning Task. Six symbols were conditioned to three different values (win, no-
value, loss; two to each value). One of the two symbols denoting each value was viewed in 
purple and the other in orange, meaning that shape, not colour, predicted symbol value. This 
symbol-colour-value conjunction remained consistent throughout the experiment. Each 
symbol was equally likely to be presented at either location. On 108 trials both symbols had 
the same value; on half of these value-match trials symbol shape also matched and on 
remaining trials shapes were mismatched. Symbol value (and shape) was mismatched on 216 
choice trials (72 for each possible choice pair, i.e., Win/Loss, Win/No-Value, and Loss/No-
Value), with half having colour-matched symbols and half having colour-mismatched symbols.  
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Flanker Task. Symbols had the same colour-shape conjunctions as seen in the value-
learning task.  
Results and Discussion 
Value-Learning Task. See Table 2.3 for value-learning task performance for all 
experiments reported in Chapter 2. Performance in this Experiment improved significantly 
across blocks F(2, 28) = 64.679, p < .001, eta2 = .822) and averaged 87% correct (S.D. = 6%). 
 
Table 2.3. Mean Proportion of Optimal Choices as a Function of Block during the Value-
Learning Task for Experiments 1, 2, and 3. 
   Exp. 4 
Block Exp. 1 Exp. 3 WM No-load 
1 .76 (.02) .75 (.02) .80 (.04) .83 (.03) 
2 .90 (.02) .84 (.02) .95 (.01) .96 (.01) 
3 .93 (.02) .89 (.02) .96 (.01) .98 (.01) 
Overall .87 (.02) .83 (.02) .91 (.02) .92 (.01) 
Note. There was no Value-Learning Task in Experiments 2 and 5. Standard error in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 2.4. Mean RT as a Function of the Trial Type for All Experiments. 
    Exp. 4  
Trial Type Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 WM No-load Exp. 5 
No-value/Dull       
CC 449 (12) 524 (12) 483 (10) 545 (20) 477 (13) 589 (16) 
CI 515 (14) 577 (10) 547 (11) 605 (22) 525 (10) 601 (11) 
IC 472 (12) 540 (9) 504 (11) 583 (20) 495 (13) 596 (15) 
II 503 (12) 578 (14) 547 (11) 601 (17) 529 (11) 635 (16) 
CA effect 34 (7) 15 (11) 21 (9) 42 (9) 15 (10) -27 (12) 
Win/Bright       
CC 456 (13) 506 (11) 483 (10) 557 (23) 480 (12) 563 (14) 
CI 507 (13) 573 (11) 543 (9) 600 (23) 525 (10) 619 (14) 
IC 463 (12) 543 (11) 508 (11) 569 (19) 510 (13) 598 (16) 
II 510 (12) 586 (10) 542 (11) 608 (20) 528 (11) 640 (15) 
CA effect 4 (6) 24 (9) 26 (8) 4 (12) 26 (10) 14 (11) 
Loss       
CC 449 (11)  489 (9)    
CI 509 (13)  547 (10)    
IC 462 (11)  516 (12)    
II 516 (13)  552 (10)    
CA effect 6 (5)  21 (8)    
Note. There were four trial sequences, congruent-congruent (CC), congruent-incongruent 
(CI), incongruent-congruent (IC), and incongruent-incongruent (II). The conflict adaptation 
(CA) effect was calculated as ((CI-CC)-(II-IC)). There was no loss condition in Experiments 2, 
4, and 5. Standard error in parenthesis. 
 
Flanker Task. Group mean RTs for the main conditions of this and all other experiments 
reported in Chapter 2 are reported in Table 2.4. As expected the statistical analysis showed 
significant effects indicating the presence of CA. Specifically, RTs were slower (by 51 ms) when 
target and flanker colour were incongruent versus congruent (F(1, 14) = 103.280, p < .001, 
eta2 = .881); they were faster (by 7 ms) when the previous trial was congruent versus 
incongruent (F(1, 14) = 16.453, p < .005, eta2 = .540); and, critically, the effect or current and 
prior trial congruence interacted significantly (F(1, 14) = 12.193, p < .005, eta2 = .466). 
Importantly for the current study, the 3-way interaction (current congruency X prior 
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congruency X flanker value) was also significant (F(2, 28) = 8.364, p < .005, eta2 = .374) 1, 
indicating the presence of a super-distraction effect and justifying the analysis of value effects 
on CECon and CEIncon, as well as CA. 
Both CECon and CEIncon for Experiments 1-3 reported are presented in Figure 2.3; super-
distraction effects are shown in Figure 2.4A; and CA effects are presented in Table 2.4. All 
analyses of CECon, CEIncon, and CA effects in Experiment 1 revealed non-significant differences 
between flankers with win- versus loss-associations, consistent with previous studies showing 
that effects of motivational salience on attention are independent of value valence (e.g., 
O’Brien & Raymond, 2012; Rothermund, Wentura, & Bak, 2001; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2015; Wang et al., 2013)2 as would be expected given that the stimuli are only 
secondary reinforcers to wins and losses in the value-learning task; consequently, these 
conditions were collapsed into a single value-associated flanker condition for all further 
analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 Although not related to the aims of the experiment a similar ANOVA using the prior trial flanker value (value 
vs. no-value) as a factor instead of current trial flanker value showed no significant main effects or interactions 
involving prior trial flanker value (all ps > .36). A further ANOVA using target value (value vs. no-value) in place 
of flanker value showed no significant effects involving target value (all ps > .53). However, in both ANOVAs 
typical effects associated with CA were found to be significant. 
2 An ANOVA of RTs excluding the No-Value condition showed the main and all interaction effects involving value 
to be non-significant (all ps > .137). 
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Figure 2.3. Group mean CECon and CEIncon plotted separately for each current trial flanker value or brightness condition in 
Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B), respectively. 
A
B
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In line with the predictions of the motivational competition hypothesis as shown in 
Figure 2.1, a super-distraction effect (see Figure 2.4) was present following an incongruent 
trial. CEIncon was 20 ms larger when flankers had value versus no-value associations (t(14) = 
3.013, p < .01). Although the perceptual competition hypothesis predicts that CECon should be 
larger with value versus no-value flankers, here I found that CECon with value flankers was in 
fact slightly smaller than that with no-value flankers; however, this difference was not 
significant (t(14) = 1.788, p = .095) in line with predictions (See Figure 2.1).  
For no-value flankers, CEIncon was 34 ms smaller than CECon (t(14) = 4.556, p < .001) 
resulting in a significant (and typical) CA effect (t(14) = 4.560, p < .001). However, when 
flankers were value-associated CEIncon and CECon did not differ, resulting in a non-significant CA 
effect (t(14) = 1.160, p = .266). Thus, CA was significantly larger (by 30 ms) in the no-value 
compared to the value flanker condition (t(14) = 3.704, p < .005). 
Analysis of error rates revealed a significant effect of current trial congruency, with 
errors on incongruent trials being 0.19 more probable than on congruent trials (F(1, 14) = 
18.909, p < .005, eta2 = .575). No other effects reached significance (all p’s > .25).  
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The pattern of results here clearly show that previously learned, irrelevant value 
associations are able to influence processing priorities even when they offer no prospect of 
monetary outcomes, confirming previous reports of such effects using value-associated 
stimuli as irrelevant pre-target stimuli in a non-rewarded attention task (Rutherford et al., 
2010). Importantly, these data show that value-associated flankers did not capture attention 
under all conditions. Unlike most previous reports of value-based attention capture where 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Group mean super-distraction effect for each current trial flanker value/brightness condition. A. Experiments 
1 – 3. B. Experiments 4 (WM and No-load) and 5. Error bars represent ±1 s.e. 
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sequential trial effects are not considered, and distractor effects are presumed on all trials, I 
found that value-dependent distraction depended on the conflict of the prior trial. This finding 
raises serious challenges for extant accounts of value-based attention capture that posit 
modulation of a perceptual priority mechanism. However, the findings of this experiment are 
consistent with the notion that value associations influence the motivational intensity driving 
specific cognitive operations.  
 
Experiment 2 
To more directly differentiate motivational and perceptual salience, I conducted a 
second flanker experiment, this time manipulating only flanker brightness and omitting the 
value learning phase of the experiment. The aim was to assess how perceptual salience, as 
opposed to motivational salience of flankers might influence CECon and CEIncon in the flanker 
task. Perceptual competition models predict that the difference between CECon and CEIncon will 
be greater for bright versus dim flankers. In this view, brighter stimuli should generate higher 
peaks on a perceptual priority map and thus be more likely to capture attention increasing 
interference in a bottom-up fashion. Such effects should be exacerbated by a preceding 
congruent trial when attention to flankers is not suppressed. The motivational competition 
hypothesis predicts a similar outcome. The rationale for the current experiment was therefore 
not to distinguish between perceptual and motivational models, but rather to distinguish the 
effects of physical versus motivational salience on flanker effects. 
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Method 
Stimuli 
Stimuli in the flanker task in the experiment differed in two important ways from 
Experiment 1. First, although all symbols were still always presented in orange or purple, they 
were presented as dim (Purple [87, 75, 87]; Orange: [120, 86, 1]) or bright (Purple [168, 145, 
168]; Orange [201, 145, 2]). Second, only two different symbols were used. This was used to 
reduce perceived complexity due to lack of visual experience with the hiragana (no value 
learning task) and to focus the task more closely on colour discrimination.  
Procedure 
Value-Learning Task. There was no value-learning task. 
Flanker Task. One of the two symbols always appeared as bright and the other as dim 
and symbol-brightness assignments was counterbalanced across participants. Each symbol 
was presented in orange or purple equally often. The target and flanker symbol/luminance, 
target and flanker colour, and congruency were all fully crossed within the flanker task. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Flanker Task. As in Experiment 1, the statistical analysis of RT showed significant effects 
indicative of CA. Specifically, RTs were slower (by 50 ms) when target and flanker colour was 
incongruent versus congruent (F(1, 14) = 69.219, p < .001, eta2 = .832); they were faster (by 
17 ms) when preceded by an congruent versus an incongruent trial (F(1, 14) = 31.308, p < .001, 
eta2 = .691); and as in Experiment 1 these current and prior trial congruency effects interacted 
significantly (F(1, 14) = 11.049, p < .01, eta2 = .441). However, unlike Experiment 1, the three-
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way interaction (flanker brightness X prior trial congruency X current trial congruency) was 
non-significant (F(1, 14) = .372, p = .552, eta2 = .026), indicating that flanker brightness had a 
non-significant effect on CA. Yet, the planned comparison of the super-distraction effect 
(defined here as CE with bright flankers minus CE with dim flankers) after a congruent trial 
was significant (t(14) = 2.295, p < .05). This is in stark contrast to Experiment 1 that showed 
super-distraction effects only after incongruent trials. 
These between-experiment differences are supported by an ANOVA on mean RT using 
Experiment (1, 2) as a between-groups factor in addition to the previously described within-
subjects factors. The analysis showed a significant four way-interaction (prior trial congruency 
X current trial congruency, X flanker value/brightness X and salience type; (F(1, 28) = 4.924, p 
< .05, eta2 = .150). Importantly, CA was significantly larger (by 21 ms) with flankers high in 
physical salience compared to those high in motivational salience (t(28) = 2.205, p < .05) and 
super-distraction effects after congruent trials were significantly larger in Experiment 2 (by 25 
ms) that in Experiment 1 (t(28) = 2.897, p < .01). 
Errors in the current experiment were modestly more likely (by .024) when the current 
trial was incongruent compared to congruent (F(1, 14) = 9.312, p < .01, eta2 = .399), and more 
likely (by .018) when the previous trial was incongruent compared to congruent (F(1, 14) = 
15.955, p < .005, eta2 = .533). No other error effects reached significance (all ps > .25). 
The pattern of results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 show clear dissociation 
between motivational and perceptual salience. This dissociation is not easily accounted for by 
views positing that motivational salience enhances the strength of perceptual 
representations. Such views predict a similar pattern of effects for both experiments, 
notwithstanding the possibility that the magnitude of physical and motivational salience may 
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have been dissimilar. Finding salience effects that were opposite in direction is however 
consistent with the view that motivational salience affects processing priorities using 
mechanisms distinct from those affected by physical salience. 
 
Experiment 3 
If processing priorities depends on a competition among motivational states, then 
flanker stimuli that are only weakly linked to motivationally salient outcomes should be less 
effective at disrupting performance than stimuli with stronger, more accessible value 
associations. Experiment 1 presented coloured stimuli during the learning task and even 
though colour was not predictive of value, all value-learned shapes were either orange or 
purple, as seen later in the flanker task. This should have facilitated activation of value-
associations leading to the pattern of super-distraction effects seen in that experiment. In the 
current experiment, I sought to weaken the link between learned value and flanker stimuli by 
eliminating colour using only white symbols in the value learning task, but retaining colour in 
the flanker task as in Experiment 1. Considering that associative transfer is more efficient 
when the relevant features remain consistent (Le Pelley, 2004), I predicted weak activation of 
value associations and thus weak motivational intensity for processing flanker shape. This 
should reduce or eliminate super-distraction effects. Note that a similar prediction can be 
made based on the notion that value associations boost perceptual representational strength. 
Although this experiment does not serve to distinguish these accounts, its follow-up 
(Experiment 4) uses findings from this study to further contrast the motivation-based and 
perception-based frameworks for explaining value effects on visual processing. 
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Method 
Procedure 
 Value-Learning Task. The same procedure as used Experiment 1 was followed except 
that all symbols appeared in white. Six symbols, two producing each outcome (win, loss, no-
value) were used, 
Flanker Task.  One symbol assigned to each value in the value-learning task was 
presented in orange and the other in purple, mirroring the conditions of Experiment 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Value-Learning Task. Performance improved significantly across blocks F(2, 28) = 
33.210, p < .001, eta2 = .703) and averaged 83% correct (S.D. = 6%). 
Flanker Task. As in the previous two experiments, the statistical analysis of RT showed 
significant effects indicative of CA. RTs were slowed by 49 ms when target and flanker colour 
were incongruent compared to congruent (F(1, 14) = 122.651, p < .001, eta2 = .898); were 
faster (by 13 ms) when the prior trial was congruent versus incongruent (F(1, 14) = 30.533, p 
< .001, eta2 = .686); and these effects significantly interacted (F(1, 14) = 17.967, p < .005, eta2 
= .562). However, in contrast to Experiment 1, the 3-way interaction (current congruency X 
prior congruency X flanker value) was non-significant (F(2, 28) = .137, p = .872, eta2 = .010), as 
were all other effects involving flanker value (flanker value: F(2, 28) = 2.554, p = .096, eta2 = 
.154; current congruency x flanker value: F(2, 28) = 2.201, p = .129, eta2 = .136; previous 
congruency x flanker value: F(2, 28) = 1.360, p = .273, eta2 = .089). To underscore, comparisons 
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of CE showed that neither CECon (t(14) = .759, p = .461) nor CEIncon (t(14) = 1.309, p = .212) were 
significantly affected by flanker value (see Figure 2.5). 
An ANOVA on mean RT using Experiment (1, 3) as a between-subjects factor showed 
a significant four way-interaction (prior trial congruency X current trial congruency X flanker 
value X and Experiment); (F(1, 28) = 4.515, p < .05, eta2 = .139). Importantly, with value 
flankers CA was 20 ms larger in Experiment 3 than it was in Experiment 1 (t(28) = 2.166, p < 
.05; See Table 2.4).  Additionally, super-distraction effects (Figure 2.4) after incongruent trials 
were significantly larger in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 3 (by 28 ms, t(28) = 3.103, p < 
.01). 
As in the previous two experiments, errors were significantly (p = .031) more likely 
when the current trial was incongruent compared to congruent (F(1, 14) = 20.157, p < .005, 
eta2 = .590). An interaction effect of prior trial congruency x current trial congruency was 
marginal (F(1, 14) = 3.954, p = .067, eta2 = .220), and all other effects were non-significant (all 
p’s > .18).  
Absence of an effect of flanker value in this experiment could mean that value 
associations were not activated at all because participant did not generalize learning with 
white symbols to coloured symbols. Alternatively, coloured flankers may have only very 
weakly activated symbol value associations, resulting in a weak motivational intensity to 
process symbol shape. The next experiment investigated the latter possibility.  
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Experiment 4 
The motivation-based framework postulates that the cognitive operation or action 
with the greatest motivational intensity will control behaviour. In the flanker task used in all 
the experiments reported here, the ‘attend colour’ motivation should be relatively high 
compared to the drive to ‘attend shape’ because colour is the relevant feature for the task. In 
Experiment 1, I enhanced shape-directed motivation using value associations that were easily 
activated in the flanker task by virtue of close correspondence between the stimuli in the 
learning and flanker tasks. In Experiment 3, I lowered this correspondence by using only white 
symbols in the learning task and thus weakened the activation of value associations in the 
flanker task. This presumably caused super-distraction effects to disappear because 
motivation to process flanker shape was weak.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. Group mean CECon and CEIncon for each current trial flanker value in Experiment 3.  
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It was reasoned that adding a secondary task that required colour processing should 
decrease the motivation to process flanker colour, consequently increasing the relative 
intensity to process flanker shape. This was based on the observation that task-irrelevant 
processing in an attention task is increased when the processing requirements in a concurrent 
working memory (WM) task matched those of the target processing in the attention task (Kim, 
Kim, & Chun, 2005). Specifically, when a concurrent WM load and target processing in a 
modified-Stroop task both relied on verbal processing, but the distractor in the Stroop task 
required spatial processing, distractor interference was increased compared to when there 
was no WM task (Kim et al., 2005). This was not because of the increased cognitive load (e.g., 
Lavie, 2005), but was dependent on the WM feature overlapping with, and thus increasing the 
cost of, target processing. In particular, in a second experiment they also showed that when 
the dominant feature in the WM task matched that of the distractor in the Stroop task, Stroop 
interference was reduced compared to without a WM load (Kim et al., 2005). Similarly, when 
discriminating the orientation of a shape, a line segment distractor that matched the 
orientation of several line segments of the target when it was oriented one way but not the 
other causes increased motivation to suppress (i.e. increased cost of processing) the distractor 
compared to when the task was to simply detect a shape (i.e., no cost of processing the 
distractor, Hickey et al., 2009).  
To test this account, Experiment 3 was repeated but this time demanding, colour-
based, concurrent secondary task was added during flanker trials. The aim was to decrease 
the motivational intensity for processing flanker colour, allowing the intensity of the 
motivation to process flankers as boosted by value associated shapes to gain relative strength 
and thus influence response. Thus, super-distraction effects should once more emerge. The 
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second aim here was to replicate the null findings from Experiment 3 in a second group of 
participants who performed the task with an undemanding, orientation-based secondary task 
that did not involve a concurrent colour-based WM load. 
With this in mind, participants in Experiment 4 underwent value learning using white 
letters only. Half of participants then conducted the flanker task whilst at the same time being 
engaged in a colour-based visual WM task. Remaining participants were required to do a 
secondary, orientation task that did not involve carrying a concurrent WM load demand. It 
was predicted that the WM group should show effects of flanker value (similar to Experiment 
1) whereas the no-load group should produce results similar to those found in Experiment 3, 
i.e. show no super-distraction effect.  
 
Method 
Stimuli/Apparatus  
Stimuli used in the WM task and orientation judgment task were multicoloured arrays 
(each 5° square) comprised of 25 small squares (1° square) each randomly filled with one of 
10 equiluminant colours. The stimuli set comprised 16 unique arrays that were used as study 
and test stimuli. 
Procedure 
Value-Learning Task. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 3, only three white symbols 
were used in the learning task, one for each value (win, loss, no-value). No matched trials were 
presented and each of the three mismatched symbol combinations were equally likely.  
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 Flanker Task. As in Experiment 3, all symbols were equally likely to appear in either 
purple or orange. The flanker task was as described for Experiments 1 and 3 with the following 
exceptions. Only symbols with no-value or win associations were used; each was equally likely 
to appear in orange or purple. All flanker trials were presented as 2-trial sequences with each 
trial pair beginning and ending with a WM study and test array, respectively. Each 2-trial 
sequence began with a fixation cross (1000 ms) followed by a 400 ms display of the WM array. 
Two flanker trials with the same timings as used previously were then presented. Finally, a 
test array was presented rotated either 5° clockwise or anticlockwise for 2000 ms or until 
response. Participants in the WM group were asked to press the space bar using their left 
hand if the test and study array differed and to withhold response if they did not.  Participants 
in the No-WM group were instructed to ignore the study array and to press the space bar with 
the left hand if the test array was rotated clockwise and to withhold a response if it was 
rotated anticlockwise. The direction of rotation of the test array and its match/mismatch with 
the study array was pseudorandomly chosen on each trial such that for each group a space 
bar response was correct on half of trials and a no-go response was correct on remaining trials. 
Participants completed 10 blocks of 64 flanker trials (32 two-trial sequences per block). 
Flanker congruency, previous flanker congruency, flanker value, and correct secondary task 
response type (go, no-go) were fully crossed such that in each session there were 20 
repetitions of each.  
Data Analysis 
 RTs and error rates from the second flanker trial in the trial sequence were analysed 
as reported in the General Methods. Additionally, trials were removed for the first trial 
sequence in every block (3.1% in both groups), if responses on the second flanker trial (WM = 
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2.2%, no-load = 3.3%), the first flanker trial (WM = 2.9%, no-load = 3.8%), or the 
WM/orientation task (WM = 12.9%, no-load = 3.5%) were incorrect. A mixed-effects ANOVA 
with group as the between-subjects factor and flanker congruency, previous flanker 
congruency, and flanker value as within-subjects factor was conducted. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Value-Learning task. Overall error rates did not differ between groups (F(1, 40) = .734, 
p = .397, eta2 = .018) and averaged 91% (S.D. = 0.02) and 92% (S.D. = 0.01) in the WM and no-
load groups, respectively. Performance improved significantly across blocks (F(2, 84) = 46.563, 
p < .001, eta2 = .526) and this rate of improvement did not depend on Group (F(1, 40) = .077, 
p = .926, eta2 = .002).  
Flanker Task. RTs were 78 ms slower for the WM group compared to the No-WM 
Group (F(1, 40) = 11.889, p < .005, eta2 = .229), consistent with previous findings (de Fockert, 
Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Lavie, 2005; Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004). Critically, the 
four-way interaction of group X current trial congruency X prior trial congruency X flanker 
value was also significant (F(1, 40) = 7.265, p < .05, eta2 = .154), justifying separate ANOVAs 
on the RT data from each group. 
As in the previous experiments, the statistical analysis of RT showed significant effects 
indicative of CA for both groups. RTs were slower when the current trial was incongruent 
versus congruent [WM Group: 40 ms, F(1, 20) = 20.921, p < .001, eta2 = .511; No-WM Group: 
37 ms,  F(1, 20) = 61.052, p < .001, eta2 = .753]; RTs were faster when the prior trial was 
congruent versus incongruent [WM Group: 13 ms, F(1, 20) = 6.227, p < .05, eta2 = .237; No-
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WM Group: 14 ms, F(1, 20) = 12.049, p < .005, eta2 = .376] and these two effects interacted 
significantly in both cases [WM Group: F(1, 20) = 7.155, p < .05, eta2 = .263; No-WM Group: 
F(1, 20) = 7.141, p < .05, eta2 = .263].  Critically, the three-way interaction involving flanker 
value was only significant in the WM Group (F(1, 20) = 8.616, p < .01, eta2 = .301), and not the 
No-WM Group (F <1).   
As shown in Figure 2.6, for the WM group CEIncon was significantly larger (by 21 ms) 
with value versus no-value flankers (t(20) = 2.098, p < .05), producing a super-distraction effect 
(See Figure 2.4) comparable to the 20 ms effect obtained in Experiment 1 (Figure 2.4). Here, 
as in Experiment 1, CEcon was unaffected by the value of the flankers (t(20) = 1.306, p = .206). 
Further replicating Experiment 1, the WM group showed CA with no-value flankers, CEincon 
was significantly smaller (43 ms) than CEcon (t(20) = 4.756, p < .001), resulting in a significantly 
larger CA effect for no-value versus value flanker conditions (t(20) = 2.938, p < .01).  
For the No-WM group, comparisons of CE showed that neither CECon value (t(20) = 
.309, p = .761) nor CEIncon (t(20) = 1.893, p = .073) were significantly affected by flanker value, 
resulting in no super-distraction effects (Figure 2.4). Moreover, there was no effect of value 
on CA (t(20) = .895, p = .381), replicating Experiment 3. 
Furthermore, super-distraction effects after congruent trials did not differ between 
no-WM and WM groups (t(20) = .857, p = .402), but after incongruent trials super-distraction 
effects were significantly larger in the WM group than the no-WM group (by 37 ms, t(40) = 
2.819, p < .005). 
Across both groups, errors were .02 more probable when the current trial was 
incongruent versus congruent (F(1, 40) = 8.074, p < .01, eta2 = .168). There was also a marginal 
interaction between current trial congruency x group (F(1, 40) = 3.640, p = .064, eta2 = .083); 
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driven by a slightly larger CE in the No-WM Group compared to the WM Group by .02. No 
other effects, including any involving group, reached significance (all p’s > .15). 
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Figure 2.6. Group mean CECon and CEIncon plotted separately for each current trial flanker value in the WM load (A) and 
the No-load (B) conditions in Experiment 4. 
A
B
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The results from this experiment are important because they provide replications of 
the effects in Experiment 1 and 3, thereby bolstering confidence in these findings. 
Furthermore, they show an interesting and counter-intuitive effect, namely that carrying a 
colour-based WM load allows distractors with shape-based value associations to interfere 
with performance on a colour-based attention task. In contrast when no such WM load is 
being carried, such previously learned colour associations have no effect on performance. 
Given that the secondary task was more difficult in the WM compared than the no-
load group one possibility is that the different pattern of performance between the two 
conditions could be related, at least in part, to the differential demands of the secondary task, 
independent of the colour-based nature of both tasks in the WM group. This possibility is 
reasonable but not explanatory as although finding greater distraction effects with a more 
demanding concurrent WM load has been previously reported (Lavie, 2005; Lavie et al., 2004), 
the notions of perceptual and cognitive load that have been used to account for them cannot 
explain differences observed here with value versus no-value flankers in the WM group. 
Specifically, the cognitive load in both reward conditions is identical; yet the pattern of flanker 
interference effects was clearly dependent on the value-association. Similarly, the perceptual 
and cognitive loads in the flanker task of Experiments 1 and 3 were the same, yet distinct 
differences in super-distraction effects were observed.  
Experiment 5 
 Perceptual competition models do not predict an increase in super-distraction effects 
after an incongruent trial with a concurrent colour-based WM load, as seen in Experiment 4. 
Regardless of a concurrent WM load, perceptual competition models predict that salient 
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stimuli produce higher peaks on a perceptual priority map and thus capture attention 
increasing interference in a bottom-up fashion. After a congruent trial when attention to 
flankers is freely available such effects are exaggerated resulting in a larger super-distraction 
effect than after incongruent trials, as seen in Experiment 2. With a colour-based WM load, 
predictions made by perceptual competition models do not differ as the WM load does not 
influence the physical salience of stimuli. They still predict that super-distraction will be larger 
after a congruent trial. Similar to the rationale of Experiment 2, here I again attempted to 
distinguish the effects of physical salience compared to motivational salience (Experiment 4; 
WM group) on flanker effects. In this experiment the flankers were again either bright or dim, 
and the flanker task was performed alongside the colour-WM task. It was predicted that the 
results would mirror those found in Experiment 2. 
 
Method 
 Stimuli/Apparatus 
 Stimuli in the flanker task were the same as in Experiment 2. Stimuli used for the 
concurrent WM task were the same as in the WM group in Experiment 4. 
Procedure 
 Value-Learning Task. There was no value-learning task. 
 Flanker Task. Only two symbols were used; one was always bright and the other dull 
to match the symbols/salience associations from Experiment 4. Otherwise, the flanker task 
was the same as that used in Experiment 4. 
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Data Analysis 
 Data were analysed as in Experiment 4. Trials were removed for the first trial sequence 
of every block (3.1%), if responses on the second flanker trial (2.5%), first flanker trial (3.7%), 
or the WM task were incorrect (15.1%). A repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors; flanker 
congruency, previous flanker congruency, and flanker brightness was conducted on remaining 
data.   
 
Results and Discussion 
 Flanker Task. RTs were 37 ms slower when the current trial was incongruent versus 
congruent (F(1,20) = 31.515, p < .001, eta2 = .612). RTs were 24 ms slower when the prior trial 
was incongruent compared to congruent (F(1, 20) = 15.704, p < .005, eta2 = .440). The two-
way interaction between current trial congruency and flanker brightness was also significant 
(F(1, 20) = 9.511, p < .01, eta2 = .322), driven by a larger congruency effect when the flankers 
were bright compared to dull by 23 ms (t(20) = 3.084, p < .01). Importantly, the three-way 
interaction between prior trial congruency, current trial congruency, and flanker brightness 
was also significant (F(1, 20) = 5.846, p < .05, eta2 = .226). 
 As shown in Figure 2.7 and consistent with Experiment 2, CECon was significantly larger 
(by 44 ms) with bright versus dull flankers (t(20) = 4.453, p < .001), producing a large super-
distraction effect. CEIncon was unaffected by flanker brightness (t(20) = .330, p = .745), 
consequently no super-distraction effect was present. In addition, the super-distraction after 
congruent trials was significantly larger (by 42 ms) than after incongruent trials (t(20) = 2.418, 
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p < .05). This is in sharp contrast to the results obtained in Experiment 4 (WM group) where 
the direction of super-distraction effects found was opposite.  
 Error rates were low on the second trial in the sequence (.02). However, errors were 
.02 more probable when the prior trial was incongruent compared to congruent (F(1, 20) = 
13.743, p < .005, eta2 = .407). Errors were also marginally more likely (by .01) when the current 
trial was incongruent versus congruent (F(1, 20) = 4.162, p = .055, eta2 = .172). No other effects 
reached significance (all ps > .493).  
 
 The results from this experiment corroborate the findings from Experiment 2. The 
increased super-distraction after congruent compared to incongruent trials with physically 
salient flankers is consistent with the predictions of perceptual competition models. The 
findings further demonstrate that the effects of motivational salience and physical salience 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Group mean CECon and CEIncon plotted separately for each current trial flanker brightness in Experiment 5. 
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are not consistent. The results of this experiment also rule out an alternative interpretation of 
the data from Experiment 4. In Experiment 4, as errors on the WM/orientation task were 
larger in the WM group compared to the no-WM group it was not clear whether the increased 
influence of valued flankers was motivationally mediated or simply the result of a more 
demanding secondary task. Given the results of Experiment 5, the latter interpretation can be 
ruled out as the WM task here was as demanding as that in the WM group in Experiment 4, 
however the pattern of results is clearly not the same. Therefore, it is not simply the presence 
of a demanding secondary task that results in increased super-distraction after incongruent 
trials. Instead, the results are consistent with shifts in the motivational intensity to process 
flanker colour induced by the concurrent colour-based WM task increasing the relative 
intensity to process flanker shape.   
 
General Discussion 
In five experiments, the speed and accuracy of behavioural responses in a simple 
colour flanker task were examined, specifically exploiting well-studied sequential trial 
phenomena that show greater flanker interference (i.e., CE) after congruent trials than after 
incongruent trials (Gratton et al, 1992). In Experiments 1, 3, and 4, meaningless symbols were 
first imbued with value or no-value associations, and then later these conditioned symbols 
were used as stimuli in the flanker task, with the aim of comparing CE effects when flankers 
had value versus no value. In contrast to these experiments on motivational salience, 
Experiments 2 and 5 had no learning component but instead used bright versus dim flankers 
so that the effects of perceptual salience could be directly assessed. In Experiment 1, learning 
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involved symbols that had the same colour as those seen subsequently in the flanker task; in 
Experiment 3 and 4, learning involved only white symbols, but the subsequent flanker task 
only used coloured symbols (as in Experiment 1). Experiment 4 (but not 3) required one group 
of participants to engage in a colour-based WM task concurrently with the flanker task, with 
another group carrying no such WM load (replicating conditions of Experiment 3). In all studies 
CE effects obtained with no-value (or dim) flankers were subtracted from those obtained with 
value (or bright) flankers. Of interest in each experiment was whether the resultant index of 
super-distraction (CEvalue(bright) - CEno value (dim)) depended on the congruency of the preceding 
trial. Sequential trial effects were of interest because two different accounts of the effects of 
motivational salience on visual performance, namely the perception competition account and 
the motivational competition account, make different predictions regarding the interactions 
between flanker value and prior trial congruency. These results come out strongly in favour of 
the motivational competition account. 
 
The Perceptual-competition account  
The more widely held perceptual competition account of value-based super-
distraction proposes that motivational salience acts like perceptual salience boosting the 
strength of distractor perceptual representations and allowing stimuli to compete more 
effectively with target stimuli in a perceptual competition for attention (e.g., Chelazzi et al., 
2014). This notion of perceptual competition, often described using a ‘spatial processing 
priority map’ analogy, predicts that the interactive effects of flanker value and prior trial 
congruency should be in the same direction in Experiments 1 and 2, although clearly, they 
were not. More specifically, this view predicts minimal super-distraction after incongruent 
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trials and large super-distraction after congruent trials in both experiments. Experiencing an 
incongruent trial on one trial is thought to enhance target focus on the subsequent trial 
(Ullsperger et al., 2005), an operation that should generally cause a reduction in CE effects 
and should neutralize any boost in distractor representational strength that arise from high 
value-associations (Experiment 1) or greater physical salience (Experiment 2). Thus, in both 
experiments CE effects and super-distraction should be small when the preceding trial is 
incongruent. Although such an effect was observed in Experiment 2, this effect was absent in 
Experiment 1. Perceptual competition theories also predict that after experiencing a 
congruent trial in which flankers provide redundant, target-congruent information, flanker 
processing should be facilitated (or at least not suppressed) on the subsequent trial; this 
should enable boosts in perceptual representational strength that arise from high value-
associations or greater physical salience to have maximal impact, speeding responses on 
congruent trials and slowing responses on incongruent trials in both experiments. The net 
result should be large CE and large super-distraction effects after congruent trials. Again, this 
effect was found in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1. Instead large super-distraction 
effects were found after incongruent trials and non-significant effects after congruent trials. 
This effect and the clear differences between the results of the two experiments raise serious 
doubts about the viability of a perception competition account for explaining motivational 
salience or value-based effects on visual attention. To explain these findings, I suggest an 
alternative explanation based on a competition among motivational states that is grounded 
in the cognitive control literature (e.g., Shenhav et al., 2013; Braver et al., 2015).  
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The motivation-competition account 
The motivation-competition account posits that control over high-level cognition and 
action results from a dynamic competition among concurrently active and largely unconscious 
motivational states. In this view, a motivational state is an activated neural network that 
represents a desired goal, a motivational direction (the series of cognitive operations and 
actions needed to achieve the goal), and an index of motivational intensity. The latter is a 
value derived by comparing predicted costs versus benefits of achieving the goal (Shenhav et 
al., 2013) in the current context and relies heavily on a combination of prior experience and 
current sensory processing. The most intense motivational state active at any point in time 
will win the motivation-based competition and control high-level processing (e.g., attention) 
and action. Competition is viewed here as an emergent property, possibly involving reciprocal 
inhibition so that as one state gains intensity, others lose power. Importantly, motivational 
states can be automatically activated by external cues if they signal an opportunity to achieve 
goals. This is an important feature of the motivational competition framework because it 
allows any external cue to potentially activate multiple motivational states. A cue’s capacity 
to instantiate a motivation state, i.e., its incentive value (Robinson & Berridge, 1993), is 
determined by prior learning. Like biased competition models of attention (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001) motivation-based competition can be biased 
using cognitive control mechanisms. In this view, these neural mechanisms adjust the 
predicted costs (effort) and/or benefits associated with achieving specific goals (Hare, 
Camerer, & Rangel, 2009), thus modulating motivational intensity and biasing the 
competition.  
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An important distinction between the motivation-competition and the perception-
competition view is that in the former a single sensory cue can activate multiple competing 
states with different motivational directions and intensities, whereas in the latter, each cue 
has only one representation that presumably embodies all its features (Duncan, 1984; 
Kahnemann and Treisman, 1984). For example, in the former framework, a coloured symbol 
could motivate colour recognition (i.e., be colour-directed) and/or shape identification (i.e., 
be shape-directed), whereas in the latter framework, a single representation holds both 
colour and shape information. Another critical distinguishing feature of the motivational 
competition notion is that it specifies a direct means by which prior history can be combined 
with current sensory information, a feature lacking in perceptual models (e.g. Awh et al., 2012) 
How can the motivation-competition framework account for the main findings 
presented here? First, consistent with extant views on cognitive effort (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Shenhav et al., 2013), prior conflict from a just prior incongruent trial in the colour-based 
flanker task should weaken motivation to attend flanker colour on the subsequent trial. As a 
result, flanker shape-directed motivation should be comparatively enhanced, allowing any 
boost from value-associations to make this motivational state competitive. Thus, greater RT 
slowing should be evident on subsequent incongruent trials with value but not with no-value 
flankers, specifically exacerbating CE effects with value flankers and thus producing a large 
super-distraction effect. Indeed, this is the result found in Experiment 1. Applying similar 
reasoning, flanker colour-directed motivation should be especially high after a colour-
congruent trial due to low predicted effort and high benefit, allowing it to easily out-compete 
any shape-directed motive. Even with a boost from value associations, this motivational state 
would be relatively weaker and thus super-distraction effects should be absent. Finding no 
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effect of flanker value in this condition in Experiment 1 is therefore consistent with the 
motivational competition view.  
The motivation-competition view also can explain the counterintuitive findings of 
Experiment 4 where making the flanker task more difficult enhanced value-based flanker 
effects. In Experiment 3 and 4 learning involved white symbols only whereas the flanker task 
used these symbols but presented them in orange or purple, as in Experiment 1. When WM 
was loaded with a coloured pattern in one condition of Experiment 4, the same value effects 
as seen in Experiment 1 were found. When the WM task was absent (Experiment 4: No-load 
condition; Experiment 3), prior value learning had no effect on the performance in the flanker 
task. Couched within the motivational competition framework, the findings of Experiment 4 
are predictable. The colour-based WM load should have caused cognitive conflict for engaging 
with the colour-based flanker task, thus increasing the predicted effort of target and flanker 
colour processing. This should reduce motivational intensity for colour processing and thus 
explains the overall slowing in the WM load versus no-load condition. With colour-motives 
less intense, shape-directed motives instantiated by value associations would have become 
relatively more competitive, accounting for why the pattern of value-based effects seen in 
Experiment 1 once more emerged. This finding is important because it suggests that value-
associated stimulus features are able to automatically activate motivational states that can 
easily take control over cognition and behaviour if other concurrent motivational states 
suddenly wane. This dynamic see-saw process can thus explain sudden impulsivities, including 
relapses from abstinence in addicts in the presence of addiction related cues. 
Perceptual competition theories predict a different outcome for Experiment 4. They 
posit that the contents of WM can be used to pre-activate sensory representations biasing 
Value-based Modulation of Visual Attention Depends on Competition Among Motivational 
States 
 94 
them to be more competitive when matching stimuli are encountered (e.g. Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). A WM load of a coloured pattern, as used in Experiment 4, should therefore 
have biased perceptual competition away from flanker and target related colours, explaining 
the general slowing for all conditions that was found. However, perceptual competition biased 
by the contents of WM (see Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, & Roelfsema, 2011 for a review) does 
not predict a differential effect of WM load depending on flanker value, and although some 
work suggests a modulating role of prior history on attention biases by WM content (Kiyonaga, 
Egner, & Soto, 2012) no clear account for these effects have been previously put forward.  
Another somewhat related view of value-based super-distraction postulates that 
during learning stimuli signalling motivationally salient outcomes garner habitual responses, 
or response tendencies, that become active whenever such stimuli are subsequently 
encountered (de Wit et al., 2012; Graybiel, 2008; Wood & Rünger, 2016). In value-based 
attention capture paradigms, repeated exposure to reward predicting stimuli may establish 
an associative link that later enables automatic preferential attentional selection whenever 
these stimuli are present in visual arrays (Anderson, 2016). However, such automaticity is 
clearly absent in some situations. For example, in Experiment 1 responses on flanker trials that 
were preceded by a congruent trial showed no super-distraction effects leaving this account 
unsatisfying.  A similar view, Ideomotor theory, goes a step further by postulating that 
associative links between cues, actions, and outcomes are bi-directional, with each element 
able to activate the other because of a common complex representation (Eder et al, 2015; 
Greenwald, 1970; Hommel et al, 2001). This notion is very close to what is referred to here as 
a motivational state but here I add the notion of competition between different motivational 
directions, especially when they involve different cognitive operations. It is this aspect of 
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competition that is necessary to explain super-distraction effects in the current series of 
experiments. 
A difference between the current series of experiments and those previously 
conducted that favour a perceptual account of super-distraction effects is that I employed an 
operant conditioning procedure during learning whereas they typically utilize Pavlovian 
conditioning (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011). Given that my interpretation is framed around 
instrumental processes could the different learning contexts explain why a perceptual 
competition account is not sufficient for the current set of experiments? Although perceptual 
frameworks have typically accounted well for previous super-distraction effects in the 
literature, as mentioned above they cannot account for the current data. The motivational 
competition framework posited here though can not only encompass the current data, but I 
believe it also explains well super-distraction effects in the literature. Unpicking the 
consequences of operant versus Pavlovian conditioning during learning is an interesting future 
direction for the field.  
Although the current data cannot speak directly to brain mechanisms supporting the 
notion of a motivational competition, numerous neuroscientific studies suggest a plausible 
neural architecture primarily involving frontal-striatal structures. Striatal mechanisms are 
known to play a role in the rapid instantiation of motivation states arising from motivationally 
salient stimuli (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2000), such as the 
value-associated distractors used here; these mechanisms are also known to be heavily 
modulated by signals from frontal cortex (Hare et al., 2009; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). Perhaps 
motivational intensity is initially determined by these subcortical striatal mechanisms but can 
be quickly suppressed or amplified by frontal areas able to access information about predicted 
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value and predicted effort. Two areas that are associated with estimating effort and cognitive 
conflict are the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC; Botvinick et al, 2001; Shenhav et al., 
2013) and the insula (Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010), although other 
structure may also be involved. The ventromedial pre-frontal cortex (vmPFC; e.g., Kable & 
Glimcher, 2007), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Li et al., 2016), and dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) on the 
other hand are known to be involved in prediction of outcome value, with dlPFC modulating 
value estimates provided by the former structures when self-control is required (Hare et al, 
2009). Collectively these frontal structures may form a network that not only estimates net 
benefits of concurrent motivation states but also enables dynamic competition so that a single 
state can emerge to control cognition and behaviour. In addition to reacting to the 
instantiation of a new motivation, the network could also act predictively when the current 
context is associated with reward outcomes from specific stimuli (Anderson, 2015). Such 
proactive adoption of a motivational direction towards reward associated stimuli would lead 
to stronger representations of these stimuli in early visual areas (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 
2017; Anderson, Laurent, et al., 2014; Bayer et al., 2017; Hickey et al., 2010a; Hickey & Peelen, 
2015). 
In conclusion, these experiments have added to a growing body of empirical evidence 
showing that motivationally salient stimuli can unduly influence visual processing priorities, 
even when it is disadvantageous. However, these data advance theoretical understanding by 
showing that such effects cannot result from augmentation of perceptual representations that 
then effectively bias competition among stimulus representation. Instead, it is suggested that 
stimuli with motivationally salient associations can automatically instantiate motivation states 
that then compete to control cognitive operations and actions.   
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Chapter 3. Motivational Competition in Adolescents 
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Abstract 
Adolescents are more likely to engage in risky behaviours. Underlying this propensity for risk 
taking, adolescents are thought to be hyper-sensitivity to reward-associated stimuli and are 
more likely to activate motivational states (goals) reactively rather than in a proactive fashion. 
A consequence of these two is that adolescents show more goal flexibility because they are 
more sensitive to motivational states activated by external cues. Here, I investigated how 
adolescents resolve competition between externally driven and task-relevant motivational 
states. Adolescents (~17 years) and adults (~27 years) performed a colour-flanker task in 
which the task-relevant motivational state (whether to attend to the flanker colour) was 
constantly changing based on the response conflict experienced on the prior trial. Importantly, 
the shapes of some flankers were associated with value (imbued during a prior value-learning 
task with white shapes), thus conferring an externally driven, task-irrelevant motivational 
state to attend to the flankers. Results showed that only following response conflict 
(incongruent trials) were interference effects attributable to the value-association of the 
flankers found. This effect was only evident in adolescents but not adults. The results are 
discussed in relation to a motivational competition framework of adolescent risk-taking that 
emphasises adolescents inflating the perceived benefits of previously rewarding stimuli 
causing them to reactively initiate inappropriate goals. 
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Adolescence is a period of life often characterised by a propensity to engage in risky 
behaviours (e.g., substance use and dangerous driving) more so than at any other stage of life 
(Dahl, 2004; Kann et al., 2013). One contributing factor is likely to be societal; adolescence is 
when individuals begin to experience freedom in decision making as they take on greater 
individual responsibility for their own actions. However, the increased risk-taking is also often 
attributed to imbalances in cognitive development. Specifically, brain regions sensitive to the 
rewarding properties of stimuli are thought to develop much earlier than those required to 
maintain goal-directed cognitive control. This imbalance in neural maturation is most evident 
in mid-to-late adolescence (Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Chambers et al., 2003; Geier & Luna, 
2009; Luciana & Collins, 2012; Somerville et al., 2010; Spear, 2000; Steinberg, 2010). As a 
consequence of the imbalance, adolescents are thought to be hyper-sensitive to rewards and 
value-associated behaviours. Here, I investigate how attentional deployment to irrelevant 
value-associated distractors is affected by this proposed hyper-sensitivity to rewards in 
adolescents.  
Neuroimaging research has shown that adolescents demonstrate greater activation 
in dopamine mediated midbrain regions, such as the ventral striatum, in response to 
rewards compared to both children and adults (Geier & Luna, 2009; Luciana & Collins, 2012; 
Somerville et al., 2010; Spear, 2000; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). Importantly, in 
adolescents, during an anti-saccade task, increases in BOLD activity in the ventral striatum 
on rewarded compared to unrewarded trials has been shown to predict better accuracy on 
rewarded versus neutral trials. In adults, rewards were not found to influence behavioural 
performance or ventral striatal activity (Padmanabhan et al., 2011). Such evidence suggests 
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that when rewards are contingent on goal-directed attention they improve attentional 
control in adolescents.  
Although Padmanabhan et al. (2011) demonstrated improved performance in 
adolescents on rewarded versus unrewarded trials, baseline performance in the neutral 
condition was worse than in adults. Cognitive control coordinates activity throughout the 
brain to respond to stimuli relevant to current goals (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Sustained 
control is required to inhibit prepotent responses, such as in the anti-saccade task, and 
ignore task-irrelevant information. In adolescents, these sustained cognitive control abilities 
are still developing, and control is not thought to reach full maturity until early adulthood. 
However, adolescents are thought to compensate by utilising cognitive control in a more 
transient manner, as-and-when required (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011; Geier, Terwilliger, 
Teslovich, Velanova, & Luna, 2010; Hwang et al., 2010; Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013; Kramer et al., 
2005; Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004; Padilla et al., 2014; Velanova, Wheeler, 
& Luna, 2009). Evidence has demonstrated that adolescents show a reduced BOLD response 
in brain regions (DLPFC) associated with sustained cognitive control compared to adults 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011). Similarly, ERP evidence has shown that whereas response 
preparation activity (frontal CNV) is attenuated, activity (P3b) elicited by the stimulus is 
increased in late-adolescents compared to adults (Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013; Padilla et al., 
2014).  
These findings are consistent with extant views of cognitive control that assert a 
distinction between proactive and reactive control in goal initialization (Braver, 2012; Braver 
et al., 2007). First, proactive control reflects preparatory and sustained activation of 
behavioural goals consistent with task-demands that prioritise task-relevant stimuli. Reactive 
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control, on the other hand, mobilizes higher-level cognition in accordance with stimulus-
driven goals, re-instantiated from prior encounters with the stimulus. As a function of being 
stimulus-driven, this latter control must be initiated post-stimulus onset and leads to only 
transient implementation of cognitive control (Braver, 2012). Importantly, different external 
cues or even different features (e.g., shape or colour) of the same cue can instantiate 
different and sometimes conflicting goals related to their cognitive analysis (e.g., identify 
colour, recognize shape). Recent models of cognitive control suggest that when such 
conflicts occur, it is resolved by an internal competition that depends on the intensity of the 
different motivational states (goals) to represent such information at a high level (Shenhav 
et al., 2013). If specific cues or cue features have been previously associated with reward, 
then they are likely to instantiate more intense motivational states due to greater predicted 
pay-off than cues with no prior reward history.  
This motivational competition framework may offer an explanatory mechanism for 
the hyper-sensitivity to rewards often found in adolescents. Dopaminergic activity in the 
ventral striatum in response to reward cues is thought to closely relate to estimates of 
predicted pay-off (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Therefore, the heightened reward sensitivity 
in adolescents coupled with the increased tendency to initiate control reactively, likely 
heightens the intensity of task-irrelevant, value-driven attentional biases in adolescents 
compared to adults (Ernst, Daniele, & Frantz, 2011; Romer, Reyna, & Satterthwaite, 2017). 
Indeed, this assertion is consistent with current behavioural data showing a hyper-
sensitivity in attention tasks to previously rewarding (Roper et al., 2014), emotionally 
significant (Grose-Fifer, Rodrigues, Hoover, & Zottoli, 2013) and personally significant (Braet 
& Crombez, 2003) task-irrelevant stimuli in adolescents. For example, Roper et al. (2014) 
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first imbued colours with a high or a low value, these same stimuli were then used as 
distractors in a subsequent visual search task. Search was for a unique shape, amongst 
homogenously shaped distractors. Importantly, the colour of each stimulus was different, 
and on a proportion of trials one of the distractors could be in the previously high or low 
reward colour; on remaining trials no distractor was in a previously rewarding colour. No 
rewards were available in the visual search task. Replicating previous work (Anderson et al., 
2011; Hickey et al., 2010a, b; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Rutherford et al., 2010), they found that 
adults were slowed by high value-associated distractors versus neutral distractors. However, 
such super-distraction effects extinguished after the first quarter of trials in adults. This is 
consistent with adults proactively updating their attentional set to ignore value-associated 
distractors. In adolescents, the super-distraction effect was greater than in adults and 
persisted throughout the experiment (Roper et al., 2014). These data are consistent with the 
motivational competition account. The increased super-distraction effects seen in 
adolescents suggest that they over-estimated the predicted payoffs associated with reward 
associated stimuli compared to adults. As a result, the stimulus driven motivational state 
that they instantiated inappropriately biased cognition. 
Here, the aim was to directly assess whether adolescents show a strong, more 
persistent response to value-associated motivational states from external stimuli than adults 
in a paradigm that places task-relevant and externally generated (value-associated) 
motivational states in constant competition. In the current experiment, adolescents and 
adults completed a two-stage procedure. First, participants undertook a value-learning task 
where novel white symbols were imbued with a monetary value (win, loss, or no-value) so 
that only shape and not colour predicted reward outcomes. In a subsequent colour flanker 
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task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) these same symbols were used as stimuli but were always 
presented in either orange or purple. The symbol shape was always irrelevant, and no 
further money could be earned in the flanker task. Participants had to make a speeded two-
alternative forced choice about the colour of the central target. On half of trials the flankers 
were the same colour as the target (congruent); on remaining trials, they were opposite in 
colour (incongruent). The slowing of response times (RT) and increases in error rate on 
incongruent compared to congruent trials is known as the congruency effect (CE) and 
reflects distraction by flanker stimuli (Eriksen, 1995).  
Of interest here was the common finding that CE depends on the congruency of the 
prior trial (Gratton et al., 1992); CE is larger after a congruent trial (CECon) than after an 
incongruent trial (CEIncon). This difference in CE magnitude (CEcon – CEincon) is known as conflict 
adaptation (CA). CA is thought to reflect a mechanism that regulates top-down control settings 
to minimize future potential conflict following the experienced conflict on a prior incongruent 
trial (Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Ghinescu et al., 2016; Kerns et al., 2004; 
Pastotter et al., 2013; Ullsperger et al., 2005). Comparisons of CE with value versus no value 
flankers on the trial following either conflict (CEincon) or no conflict (CEcon) provides a measure 
of super-distraction.  
The motivational competition account makes clear predictions about the pattern of 
super-distraction effects in this paradigm (as found in Chapter 3, Experiments 1 and 4). I will 
start by outlining the predictions for adolescents. As shown above adolescents have a 
tendency to reactively initiate motivational states and more easily activate motivational 
attraction to value-associated task-irrelevant distractors. Following a congruent trial, they 
should show no super-distraction (CECon). Specifically, the task-relevant motivational state is 
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to attend to the colour of the flankers. The task-irrelevant motivational state is to attend to 
the value-associated shape of the flankers. Therefore, the two states align, and participants 
should show no super-distraction. Following an incongruent trial, the task relevant 
motivational state is to ignore the colour of the flankers because of the response conflict on 
the previous trial. However, the task-irrelevant motivational state is to attend them because 
of their value-associated shape, creating a motivational competition that requires resolution. 
Because of the predicted benefit of the learned value-association, this motivational intensity 
should remain heightened and super-distraction effects should be present after incongruent 
trials (CEIncon). Different predictions are made for the adults. As demonstrated in Chapter 3 
(Experiments 3 and 4) because the shape-based value-associations are completely task-
irrelevant, in adults the motivational intensity of the shape-based motivational state is 
constantly reduced because it conflicts with the proactively defined attentional set. Therefore, 
at no point should the motivational state to attend to value-associated shapes win the 
motivational competition. As a result, no super-distraction effects are predicted for the adults 
after either congruent (CECon) or incongruent (CEIncon) trials, and typical conflict adaptation 
should be observed regardless of the motivational salience of the flankers. Such findings 
would suggest that adolescents inflate the perceived benefits of externally driven value-
associated motivational states that are activated reactively.  
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Method 
 Participants 
 16 adolescents (6 males; 16 – 17 years [mean = 16.87, SD = 0.4]; all right-handed) and 
17 adults (7 males; 24 – 35 years [mean 26.67; SD = 4.3]; 14 right-handed) participated in 
exchange for money (£6 plus up to an extra £5 earned during the value-learning task). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of neurological disorder, 
and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment and to Japanese Hiragana characters. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Adolescents were students in further 
education (colleges for 16 – 18 year-old students) from Birmingham, UK. Adults were also 
from Birmingham, recruited via an online (Gumtree) advertisement. Participants were 
matched for educational attainment at age 15 - 16 through scores in a compulsory secondary 
education examination (GCSE, C grade = 5 points, higher scores represent higher grades) 
(adults = 6.1 vs. adolescents = 5.8). 65% of the adults had completed a university level 
qualification that based on a teacher report was equivalent to that predicted for the 
adolescent group (69%). One adult was removed from the analysis because the mean RT from 
this participant on the Flanker task was more than 4 SD above their group mean. 
Apparatus 
 Stimulus presentation and data recording were controlled using custom software 
developed with PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2009) controlling a Stone PC-1120. Responses were 
entered using a standard keyboard. Stimuli were presented in RGB colour space on a black 
(0,0,0) background of a 68 cm LCD monitor with a screen resolution of 1920 x 1080 and a 
refresh rate of 60 Hz. Viewing distance was approximately 60 cm. Testing was conducted in a 
quiet room with ambient lighting. 
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Stimuli 
 Japanese Hiragana characters (PJ Hiragana font) subtending approximately 1.9° x 1.4°, 
presented in white (255, 255, 255) during the value-learning task and orange (119, 84, 0) or 
purple (99, 84, 99) during the flanker task, were used as stimuli. The colours used in the flanker 
task were equiluminant. In both tasks, the symbols appeared along the horizontal meridian; 
laterally 4° to the left and right during the value-learning task and when presented as flankers 
in the flanker task; targets in the flanker task were presented centrally. 
Procedure 
 Value-Learning Task. On each trial (see Figure 3.1), following a fixation cross (750 ms) 
two symbols were briefly presented (250 ms), one on either side of fixation. A blank screen 
immediately followed until response. On each trial symbols were selected from a set of 3 
symbols; each with a point value of 0 (no-value), 500 (win), or -500 (loss); symbol/value 
assignments were counterbalanced between participants within each group; participants 
were unaware of the assignments at the start of the task. Participants were instructed to earn 
as many points as possible by selecting the symbol with the largest point value. The index and 
middle fingers of the right hand was used to press either the ‘1’ or the ‘2’ key to choose the 
left or right symbol, respectively. Immediately after a response, both symbols’ values were 
presented in place of the respective symbol (500 ms). The value of the chosen symbol 
remained visible for a further 500 ms. A running total of the cumulative points earned was 
continuously presented centrally (8° below fixation) and updated after every choice. 
 The two symbols presented on each trial could be matched or mismatched. Each 
possible mismatched pair (win vs. loss, win vs. no-value, and no-value vs. loss) was equally 
likely and the optimal choice could be presented on the left or right with equal likelihood. Each 
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symbol pair on matched trials (win vs. win, no-value vs. no-value, and loss vs. loss) was 
presented on a third of these trials. Matched trials required an arbitrary response and were 
used to provide experience of receiving the outcome linked to each symbol; data from these 
trials were not analysed. Participants completed 180 trials (60 matched trials), split over 3 
blocks. The cumulative points total and the amount of cash this would be converted into was 
presented during breaks. The cash earned was given to the participant at the end of the value-
learning task. Eighteen practice trials using the same procedure but with Roman letters and 
explicit value assignments (A = 1, B = 2, and C = 3) were completed prior to the value-learning 
task. 
 Test-scales. During a 10-minute rest break following the completion of the value-
learning task, participants completed the Munsell D-15 test of colour vision (all were 
successful), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) and the 
Behavioural Inhibition/Behavioural Activation System Scale (BIS/BAS, Carver & White, 1994). 
Either after the 10-minutes had elapsed or when all tests had been completed participants 
started the flanker task. 
 Flanker task. Each trial (see Figure 3.1) began with a fixation cross (1000 ms) followed 
initially by the presentation of the flankers (two identical symbols of the same colour) on 
either side of an empty central area (100 ms). This was immediately replaced by the same 
flankers plus a centrally presented target, all of which remained visible until a response. Using 
the index and middle finger of their right-hand participants were instructed to press the ‘1’ or 
the ‘2’ key if the target was orange or purple, respectively, as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. Response time (RT) was recorded from the onset of the target. No feedback was 
given, and participants were aware that no further points would be awarded or deducted. The 
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symbols, used as targets and flankers, were the same as those experienced in the value-
learning task. On half of trials flankers and targets had the same colour (congruent); on 
remaining trials, they were opposite in colour (incongruent). Each possible combination of 
flanker colour/symbol and target colour/symbol was equally likely to occur. This created 
congruent (C) and incongruent (I) trials with flankers that had no-value-, win-, and loss-
associations. Critically, four different two-trial sequences were present: congruent-congruent 
(CC), congruent-incongruent (CI), incongruent-congruent (IC), and incongruent-incongruent 
(II). 
 Participants completed 648 trials in total split over 6 blocks, with 108 trials of each 
combination of flanker value x current trial congruency, presented in a pseudo random order. 
Data Analysis 
 Value-Learning Task. Proportion optimal choice was calculated for each block. A 
mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with block (1, 2, or 3) as a within-subjects factor 
and age-group (adolescents versus adults) as a between subjects-factor was conducted. RT on 
matched trials were analysed with a 3 x 2 mixed design ANOVA with trial value (loss, no-value, 
win) as a within-subjects factor and age-group (adolescents vs. adults) as a between-subjects 
factor.  
 Flanker task. All incorrect trials and those with RT slower than 5000 ms were excluded. 
Remaining data were analysed with a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA with current trial 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), prior trial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), 
and current trial flanker value (no-value, win, or loss) as within-subjects factors and age-group 
(adolescents vs. adults) as a between-subjects factor. This was followed up with individual 
repeated-measures ANOVAs for each age-group, and significant three-way interactions here 
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were further followed up by calculating CECon and CEIncon for each flanker value. Additionally, 
conflict adaptation (CA, CEIncon - CECon) effects were also calculated for each flanker value. 
Follow-up planned pairwise comparisons were corrected for multiple comparisons using the 
False Discovery Rate procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Alpha levels were set at 0.05. 
 
Results 
Value-Learning Task. Overall accuracy (see Table 3.1) did not differ between age-
groups (F(1, 30) = .360, p = .722), averaging 86% (S.D.  = 3%) and 87% (S.D. = 3%) in adolescents 
and adults, respectively. Accuracy improved significantly across blocks (F(2, 60) = 33.574, p < 
.001, eta2 = .528), but this rate of learning did not depend on age-group (F(2, 60) = 2.920, p = 
.062, eta2 = .089).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Example of a value-learning task trial (A), and a Flanker task trial sequence (B). The Flanker trial sequence 
represented a congruent followed by an incongruent trial. 
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On matched trials, where both symbols were the same, RTs varied as function of trial 
value (F(2, 60) = 16.063, p < .001, eta2 = .349). RTs were significantly faster on win (513 ms) 
trials than no-value (640 ms, t(31) = 4.078, p < .001) and loss (691 ms, t(31) = 4.850, p < .001) 
trials. RTs were marginally slower on loss trials than no-value trials (t(31) = 1.793, p = .083). 
However, neither the main effect of age-group nor the interaction between trial value and 
age-group were significant (both Fs < 1).  
Table 3.1. Mean percent optimal choices (standard error in parenthesis) as a function of 
block during the value-learning task. 
Block Adolescents Adults 
1 73 (5) 80 (3) 
2 89 (3) 89 (3) 
3 94 (2) 92 (3) 
Overall 86 (3) 87 (3) 
 
Flanker task. Table 3.2 shows RT for each condition and CA effects. Mean RT was 
slower by 85 ms for the adolescents compared to the adults (F(1, 30) = 4.547, p < .05, eta2 
=.132). As is typical for CA (Gratton et al., 1992), RTs were slower by 54 ms on incongruent 
compared to congruent trials (F(1, 30) = 71.817, p < .001, eta2 = .705); they were faster when 
the prior trial was congruent versus incongruent by 12 ms (F(1, 30) = 15.290, p < .001, eta2 = 
.338); and, importantly, the effects of current and prior trial congruency significantly 
interacted (F(1, 30) = 18.270, p < .001, eta2 = .378). Critically for the current study, the four-
way interaction (current congruency x prior congruency x flanker value x age-group) was also 
significant (F(2, 60) = 3.935, p < .05, eta2 = .116), justifying a separate analysis of super-
distraction effects for both age-groups.  
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Table 3.2. Mean RT (with standard error in parenthesis) as a function of trial type. 
Trial Type Adolescents Adults 
No-value   
CC 597 (37) 512 (18) 
CI 674 (40) 577 (18) 
IC 624 (40) 540 (16) 
II 639 (32) 580 (16) 
CA effect 62 (24) 24 (8) 
Win   
CC 604 (38) 503 (15) 
CI 665 (45) 581 (19) 
IC 612 (35) 537 (15) 
II 680 (43) 581 (18) 
CA effect -7 (14) 35 (13) 
Loss   
CC 598 (39) 501 (15) 
CI 655 (39) 571 (21) 
IC 612 (35) 544 (18) 
II 662 (33) 569 (18) 
CA effect 7 (18) 45 (17) 
Note. There were four trial sequences; congruent-congruent (CC), congruent-incongruent 
(CI), incongruent-congruent (IC), and incongruent-incongruent (II). CA effects were 
calculated as ((CI – CC) – (II – IC)). 
 
To investigate the influence of the flanker-value valence, the ANOVA was repeated 
separately for both age-groups without the no-value condition. In the adult group, there was 
a marginally larger CE with win than loss flankers by 13 ms (F(1, 15) = 3.269, p = .091, eta2 = 
.179), but no other main or interaction effects reached significance for either adult or 
adolescent groups (all ps > .109). Therefore, the win and loss conditions were collapsed into a 
single value condition for all further analyses. 
For each age-group, RTs showed significant effects consistent with conflict adaptation. 
RTs were slower when the current trial was incongruent compared to congruent (adults: 53 
ms, F(1, 15) = 70.430, p < .001, eta2 = .824; adolescents: 53 ms, F(1, 15) = 26.523, p < .001, eta2 
= .639); RTs were slower when the prior trial was incongruent versus congruent in the adults 
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(by 17 ms, F(1, 15) = 23.909, p < .001, eta2 = .614) but not in adolescents (F(1, 15) = .452, p = 
.511, eta2 = .029). In both age-groups the interaction between prior and current trial 
congruency was significant (adults: F(1, 15) = 15.758, p < .005, eta2 = .512; adolescents: F(1, 
15) = 7.286, p < .05, eta2 = .327). Importantly, the three-way interaction was not significant in 
the adults (F(1, 15) = 2.474, p = .137, eta2 = .142) but was significant in the adolescents (F(1, 
15) = 5.949, p < .05, eta2 = .284). 
Consistent with the motivational-competition framework, in adolescents a super-
distraction effect was present only when the prior trial was Incongruent (see Figures 3.2 and 
3.3). CEIncon was significantly larger with value versus no-value flankers by 45 ms (t(15) = 3.024, 
p < .01). However, CECon was unaffected by flanker value (t(15) = 1.064, p = .304). For the no-
value flankers, the opposite pattern was found. CEincon was significantly smaller than CECon 
(t(15) = 2.814, p < .05), resulting in CA of 62 ms. However, CA was not present with value 
flankers (t(15) = .048, p = .962). Thus, CA was significantly larger in the No-value compared to 
the value flanker condition (t(15) = 2.437, p < .05). In the adult group, CECon, CEincon, and CA 
were unaffected by flanker value and no super-distraction effects were present (all ps > .129). 
 Moreover, a comparison between age-groups showed that super-distraction effects 
(CEvalue - CEno-value) after congruent trials did not differ (t(30) = 1.452, p = .157), but after an 
Incongruent trial super-distraction effects were significantly larger by 52 ms in the adolescents 
than the adults (t(30) = 3.135, p < .01). CA with value flankers was also significantly larger in 
adults than adolescents (t(30) = 2.679, p < .05). 
Motivational Competition in Adolescents 
 114 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Congruency effects (incongruent – congruent) following a congruent and an incongruent trial for adolescents 
(A) and adults (B). Error bars represent ± 1 S.E. 
A
B
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Overall accuracy was very high in the experiment (96.5%). Analysis of accuracy 
revealed a significant effect of current trial congruency, with accuracy on congruent trials 
being 1.3% higher than on incongruent trials (F(1, 30) = 6.519, p < .05, eta2 = .179). There was 
also a significant interaction between flanker value x age-group (F(1, 30) = 4.918, p < .05, eta2 
= .141). The interaction was driven by adolescents being 2.2% less accurate than adults with 
no-value flankers (t(30) = 2.195, p < .05); accuracy did not differ between the age-groups with 
value flankers (t(30) = .972, p = .339). No other effects reached significance (previous 
congruency: F(1, 30) = .079, p = .780, eta2 = .003; previous congruency x age-group: F(1, 30) = 
2.414, p = .131; current congruency x age-group: F(1, 30) = .073, p = .789, eta2 = .002; previous 
congruency x current congruency: F(1, 30) = 2.220, p = .147, eta2 = .069; previous congruency 
x value: F(1, 30) = .668, p = .420; current congruency x value: F(1, 30) = .124, p = .727, eta2 = 
.004; previous congruency x current congruency x age-group: F(1, 30) = .906, p = .349, eta2 = 
.029; previous congruency x value x age-group: F(1, 30) = 1.608, p = .215, eta2 = .051; current 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Super-distraction effects (Value - No-value) following a congruent and an incongruent trial for adolescents (solid 
line) and adults (dashed line). Error bars represent ± S.E. 
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congruency x value x age-group: F(1, 30) = 1.213, p = .280, eta2 = .039; previous congruency x 
current congruency x value x age-group: F(1, 30) = 1.811, p = .189, eta2 = .057). 
Discussion 
 The results are consistent with adolescents being more susceptible to super-
distraction effects, i.e., greater distraction by motivationally salient versus perceptually similar 
neutral stimuli, than adults. In particular, consistent with the motivational competition 
hypothesis, adolescents appear to inflate the perceived benefits of attending to value-
associated stimuli.  
 Before discussing the increased super-distraction effects in adolescents, it is important 
to note that when flankers had no value-associations typical conflict adaptation was present 
in both adolescents and adults. Although, previous research has shown that in the flanker task 
electrophysiological recordings (ERN and N2) to response conflict are similar in adolescents 
and adults (Ladouceur et al., 2007), the current experiment is the first to directly assess 
conflict adaptation effects in these groups using the flanker task. Here, both groups 
demonstrated typical conflict adaptation effects (Gratton et al., 1992); CECon was greater than 
CEIncon. Importantly, this shows that both groups were equally sensitive to the cognitive costs 
of response conflict when reactively adjusting the current motivational state. Consequently, 
my interpretation of super-distraction effects in adolescents is not confounded by differences 
in how the two groups responded to conflict. Group differences only emerged when the 
flankers had motivational salience, suggesting a crucial difference in the way adolescents 
perceived the predicted payoffs of task-irrelevant stimuli compared to adults.  
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 The main finding from the current data was that motivationally salient flankers 
produced increased super-distraction effects in adolescents compared to adults. This is 
consistent with previous work also showing increased distraction by motivationally salient 
cues that were conditioned in a prior value-learning task, in adolescents compared to adults 
(Roper et al., 2014). However, the current data extend these findings. Only following an 
incongruent trial did super-distraction emerge in adolescents. Consistent with the 
motivational competition framework, the presence of super-distraction was dependent on 
competition between motivational states. Specifically, adolescents were not simply more 
motivated to attend to motivationally salient than neutral distractors, as evidenced by the 
lack of super-distraction after a congruent trial. However, following an incongruent trial, 
despite the utility of attending to the colour of the flankers being low, the perceived benefits 
of processing the shape of the flankers when they were value-associated brought the flankers 
back into competition for cognitive resources. This relative boost in motivational intensity for 
flanker processing based on the discrete motivational state instantiated by value-associated 
shapes explains why super-distraction is present following an incongruent trial. 
 In adults, super-distraction was not only smaller than in adolescents, it was completely 
absent. Based on previous work (Chapter 3) it is likely that this was because only the task-
irrelevant shape of the stimuli predicted value, whereas the task-relevant colour of the stimuli 
had no association with reward. This is also consistent with Roper et al. (2014) who showed 
no super-distraction effects in adults, at least after a quarter of trials had been completed. 
One possibility, for both the current results and those of Roper et al. (2014) is that adults learn 
to incorporate the proactive knowledge that attending to shape is costly because it is 
irrelevant for the current task. Therefore, the motivational intensity to process shape is 
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relatively reduced, and as a result is uncompetitive in the motivational competition for 
cognitive resources. Adolescents, are less likely to incorporate proactive control than adults 
into decision-making (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013; Padilla et al., 2014). 
Thus, adolescents inflate the perceived benefits of value-associated motivational states 
compared to adults and continue to reactively activate the learned goal. 
Although the current study cannot speak directly to neural mechanisms, the idea that 
adolescents inflate the perceived payoffs of rewards is consistent with increases in ventral 
striatum activity in anticipation of rewards previously found in adolescents compared to 
adults (Geier et al., 2010). Dopamine levels in striatal regions are a likely mechanism to purvey 
signals of motivational intensity, especially when estimating the predicted benefits of discrete 
motivational states. Typically, in the human and nonhuman literature, dopamine levels in the 
ventral striatum are increased in adolescence compared to at all other stages of life (Telzer, 
2016; Wahlstrom, Collins, White, & Luciana, 2010), marked by increasing dopamine receptor 
densities through mid-adolescence that reduce into adulthood (Crone & Dahl, 2012). 
Heightened dopaminergic activity in subcortical regions during adolescence is associated with 
laboratory risk taking (Botdorf, Rosenbaum, Patrianakos, Steinberg, & Chein, 2017; Braams et 
al., 2015), sensation-seeking, and impulsivity (Romer et al., 2017; Steinberg et al., 2008). All 
of these findings are consistent with adolescents inflating the perceived benefits in the 
calculation of motivational intensity, leading to increased goal flexibility and impulsivity 
(Barkley-Levenson & Galván, 2014; Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Crone & Dahl, 2012).  
In conclusion, the results support a motivational competition account of adolescent 
super-distraction effects with an emphasis on adolescents inflating the predicted benefits of 
motivational states that were previously associated with a reward. Although further research 
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is required into the motivational competition framework of cognition in adolescents, the 
strength of the model is in quantifying a cost-benefit trade-off of cognition that can be 
targeted by interventions aimed at increasing the perceived personal benefits of prosocial 
behaviours (Telzer, 2016). A second feature of the model is that it assumes that inflating the 
perceived benefits of externally driven goals may be beneficial to adolescents in the long-
term. Specifically, the resulting increases in goal flexibility can increase the richness of 
experience (Romer et al., 2017) that would feed into future computations of motivational 
intensity.  
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Chapter 4. Motivationally Driven Attentional Capture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivationally Driven Attentional Capture 
 121 
Abstract 
Visual search is sometimes slowed when a previously rewarded versus unrewarded 
distractor is present. This so-called “value-driven attention capture” (VDAC) is widely viewed 
as a perceptual phenomenon; positive reward history is thought to boost a stimulus’s 
representational strength regardless of current motivational contexts (e.g., task relevance), 
thus causing inappropriate attention capture (or VDAC). Alternatively, motivation could drive 
attention and account for VDAC via on-line computations of cost versus benefits for 
processing specific stimulus features. If so, then VDAC should depend on current motivational 
contexts, rather than on selection history alone. In this view, any concurrent secondary task, 
e.g., a working memory (WM) task, involving the reward-associated distractor feature should 
alter the cost/benefit trade-off for this feature and consequently modulate VDAC. However, 
if VDAC is driven by selection history alone, then such manipulations should have no effect. 
To investigate, I conducted a conventional two-phase VDAC experiment, but added a 
concurrent visual WM task to the second, non-rewarded visual search phase in which reward-
associated distractors are presented. The WM task involved maintaining either (a) colour (the 
reward-associated feature), or (b) shape (the target-defining feature) information during each 
search trial. WM tasks were matched for difficulty. It was predicted that a colour WM task 
would increase the cost of processing the reward-associated distractor feature (colour), thus 
reducing motivation for processing it, and obliterating VDAC. In contrast, the shape WM task 
should increase shape processing costs, leaving motivation to process the distractor colour 
unaffected and enabling VDAC. Consistent with this motivation-driven account, VDAC was 
absent with a colour WM task but robust with a similarly difficult shape WM task. These 
effects show that selection history alone cannot account for VDAC; instead contextually 
determined motivational cost-benefit trade-offs appear to drive attention and reward-
association effects on processing.  
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Visual selective attention is necessary to focus cognition on pertinent information in 
the visual percept. Recent models of attentional control extend the classic dichotomy 
between top-down, in which attention is guided by stimuli relevant to current goals, and 
bottom-up, when perceptual salience guides attention, control to include attentional 
selection guided by stimuli with previously rewarded selection history (Awh et al., 2012; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). This proposed third branch of attentional control has largely been 
informed by studies that show super-distraction effects, i.e., greater distraction by 
motivationally salient versus perceptually similar neutral distractors. However, the 
mechanism through which motivationally salient stimuli compete for attentional control is 
poorly defined. To investigate the underlying cognitive mechanism, the constraints on value-
driven attentional control need to be better understood.  
Anderson and colleagues (Anderson et al., 2011) developed a paradigm that has been 
widely used to demonstrate super-distraction effects. The paradigm is a modified additional 
singleton task (Theeuwes, 1992), whereby participants first learn to associate a specific colour 
with receiving a small monetary reward and another colour with a larger monetary reward. In 
a subsequent visual search task for a shape singleton the presence of a distractor with the 
high-reward associated colour slows performance compared to when a distractor with a 
colour not associated with any outcome appears in place of the reward-associated colour. 
However, the same slowing is not found when the previously low-value distractor colour is 
used (Anderson et al., 2011).  
This “value driven attentional capture” (VDAC) is inconsistent with classic top-down 
and bottom-up attentional control because the value-associated distractors are neither 
relevant to current goals nor physically salient, yet they capture attention (Anderson et al., 
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2011; Awh et al., 2012). Common accounts suggest that “…arbitrary reward-related stimuli 
capture attention involuntarily and persistently as a result of associations that develop rapidly 
during learning.” (pp. 10369, Anderson et al., 2011). It has been proposed that the involuntary 
attentional capture is adaptive to make observers aware of unexpected changes in the 
environment that may signal opportunity. These sentiments are captured in Selection History 
(Awh et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017) and Habitual Control (Anderson, 2016) theories 
of super-distraction.  
The Selection History account suggests that super-distraction effects occur because a 
bias has built up to the target after repeated selection during learning. When rewarded for 
the selection, the bias is reinforced and develops quicker than without an explicit reward. 
According to Selection History accounts, super-distraction is a perceptual phenomenon, with 
the representational strength of previously selected stimuli increasing on attentional priority 
maps (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2000; Theeuwes, 1992; Ptak, 2012) that determine attentional capture. 
The increased representational strength allows previously selected stimuli to garner a 
competitive advantage over stimuli that are task-relevant or physically salient (Awh et al., 
2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). Selection History accounts suggest that it is through this 
mechanism that VDAC emerges. Likewise, the Habitual Control hypothesis (Anderson, 2016) 
suggests that an attentional habit develops during learning such that the stimulus develops 
an automatic attentional orienting response when re-encountered.  
However, the automaticity of super-distraction has been questioned by previous 
failures to demonstrate VDAC (e.g., Sha & Jiang, 2016) and by studies demonstrating 
substantial individual differences in super-distraction (Hickey et al, 2010b; Anderson et al, 
2011; 2013; 2016; 2017). Here, I assess whether VDAC is affected by two factors that are 
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known to influence the magnitude of distraction in conventional attention tasks. In 
Experiment 1, the impact of a concurrent working memory load is investigated. In Experiment 
2, the influence of just prior distraction by rewards (sequential trial effects) is examined. The 
aim was to better understand the conditions required for super-distraction effects to emerge.  
 
Experiment 1 
 When people have to perform two tasks at once, their performance suffers on one or 
both of the tasks. For example, distractor interference is increased in tasks requiring selective 
attention when working memory (WM) resources are being utilized to maintain information 
in a secondary task (de Fockert et al., 2001). Cognitive Load theory suggests that cognitive 
control mechanisms are required to maintain current attentional priorities and reduce 
distraction (Engle, 2002; Lavie et al., 2004). According to this theory, WM resources are 
necessary to resolve the perceptual conflict that arises between salient distractors and targets 
in visual search tasks (Lavie, 2005). A consequence of a taxing WM task, therefore, is that 
central resources that would otherwise reduce distraction from salient stimuli are occupied, 
resulting in large distraction compared to when under no WM load.    
 Consistent with the Cognitive Load account, Selection History and Habitual Control 
theories of super-distraction would predict increased VDAC when WM resources are loaded. 
According to these accounts, reduced WM resources should limit top-down biases that 
prioritize task-relevant stimuli. Reduced WM resources should also reduce the resources 
available for the suppression of salient task-irrelevant distractors, which in this case are 
motivationally salient. Therefore, if motivational salience boosts the perceptual 
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representations of stimuli then VDAC should increase with a concurrent WM load. In line with 
this prediction, reduced WM capacity has been shown to predict larger VDAC (Anderson et 
al., 2011). The first aim of the current experiment was to directly assess the impact of a 
concurrent WM load on VDAC. 
 The second aim was to investigate whether the type of information being held in WM 
influences VDAC. Despite WM capacity often being linked to a central executive (Morey & 
Cowan, 2004), WM resources can be also distinguished between verbal and visual domains 
(Baddeley, 1986; Luck & Vogel, 1997). Indeed, when maintaining a WM load, the degree of 
distractor interference in a concurrent visual attention task has been shown to depend on 
whether the information in the WM task and in the attention task require overlapping 
domain-specific processing units (Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Umiltà, Stablum, Tebaldi, & Cantagallo, 
2010; Kim et al., 2005). Kim and colleagues used a WM sandwich task (e.g., de Fockert et al., 
2001), whereby participants either had to perform a verbal or a spatial WM task. During the 
WM maintenance period, participants performed a modified Stroop trial where they had to 
identify the meaning of a word (“right” or “left”) while ignoring an arrow pointing either right 
or left. The target, therefore, required verbal processing, but the distractor was in the spatial 
domain. Consistent with Cognitive Load theory, they found that when the WM task was verbal 
(matching the target), there was increased distraction (larger congruency effect) from the 
arrow compared to when there was no WM task. However, when the WM task was spatial 
(matching the distractor), interference was reduced compared to without a WM task (Kim et 
al., 2005). This dissociation demonstrates that a WM load can both benefit and impair 
attentional control. Importantly, the distractor in Kim et al. (2005) was sometimes congruent 
and informative to the goal of identifying the target word. Their effect, therefore, represents 
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a modulation of goal-directed, strategic attentional control in response to the WM load. 
Specifically, when distractor processing is likely to interfere with WM maintenance because 
of the perceptual similarity between both sets of stimuli, the internal costs of processing the 
distractor are increased, making it less likely (Shenhav et al., 2013). The second aim of the 
current experiment was to investigate whether the same dissociation is found for VDAC when 
the motivationally salient distractor is always in conflict with goal-directed control (Anderson, 
2016; Anderson et al., 2011; Awh et al, 2012). 
Here, I expanded on Kim et al. (2005) by examining the influence of two different WM 
tasks, one matching the target domain (shape) and one matching the distractor domain 
(colour), on VDAC. A modified version of the VDAC task was used. Initial learning was 
consistent with that previously used by Anderson et al. (2011). However, during the test task, 
visual search trials were either sandwiched between a WM task requiring maintenance of a 
colour pattern or an irregular four-sided polygon. Another difference from the typical test task 
was that the target was always specified by a diamond amongst circles, rather than as the 
shape singleton (Anderson et al, 2011). This was to ensure maximum overlap between the 
shape WM task and the target processing in the visual search.  
If super-distraction is driven by an involuntary attentional capture mechanism, 
independent of goal-directed control, then a concurrent WM load should increase VDAC 
regardless of the domain of the WM stimuli. If the magnitude of VDAC depends on the domain 
of the concurrent WM load, consistent with Kim et al. (2005), then it would suggest that the 
mechanism underlying super-distraction is strategic. In this case, when the WM domain 
matches that of the distractor feature in the visual search task (i.e., colour-based), VDAC 
Motivationally Driven Attentional Capture 
 127 
should be reduced compared when the WM domain matches that of the target feature (i.e., 
shape-based). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-seven (all females; 22 right-handed; mean age = 21.0 years [S.D. = 4.6, range 
= 18 - 33]) naïve participants from the University of Birmingham took part in exchange for 
course credits or cash (£12, plus up to an additional £8 earned on the value-learning task). 
One participant failed the Munsell D-15 test of colour vision and was removed from all 
analyses; all remaining participants in both experiments had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and no history of neurological illness. A further two participants were removed from 
the analyses because their performance on the value-learning task over the two days was 
below 70% correct and learning of the value/colour contingencies could not be assumed. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and all procedures were approved by 
the University of Birmingham ethics committee. Based on a study by Gil-Gomez de Liaño et al. 
(2010), who reported an effect size of eta2 = .39 for a two-way interaction between WM-group 
(target-match or distractor-match) and Stroop congruency, and a power = 0.80 (two-tailed) 
the calculated sample size should be at least 18. A final sample of 24 was chosen to match 
Anderson et al. (2011). The same criteria were also used in Experiment 2. 
Apparatus 
 A Stone PC-1210 running Matlab 2013b (The MathWorks, Inc) software with the 
Psychophysics toolbox was used to present the stimuli on 68 cm LCD monitor with a screen 
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resolution of 1920 x 1080 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants were seated approximately 
70 cm from the screen in a room with ambient lighting. Responses were entered using a 
standard keyboard. 
Stimuli 
 In both the value-learning and the test task, all stimuli were presented on a black 
background. The fixation cross subtended 0.5 x 0.5 and was presented in white. In both 
tasks, the search display comprised 6 shapes (2.3 x 2.3) equally placed around an imaginary 
circle with a radius of 5 centered on fixation. Inside each circle was white line that was 
approximately 2 long and 0.1 wide. In the test task, the colour-WM array consisted of a 3 x 
3 pattern of colours (red, green, blue, orange, yellow, pink, purple, white, and grey) 
subtending 5.6 x 5.6. The shape-WM array consisted of an enclosed random 4-sided gray 
shape with a maximum area equal to that of the Colour-WM pattern. All WM arrays were 
centered on fixation. 
Procedure 
Each participant was tested over two consecutive days with the following routine. Each 
day participants first completed the value-learning task followed by a test task. Half of the 
participants completed the colour-WM task on Day 1 (colour-first) and the shape-WM task on 
Day 2; remaining participants performed the tasks in the alternate order (shape-first). 
Value-Learning Task. See Figure 4.1a. Following a fixation cross that was presented for 
a randomly chosen interval of 400, 500, or 600 ms, the search display appeared for a maximum 
of 800 ms or until response. Then a blank screen (500 ms) followed by the reward display 
(1000 ms) appeared before the screen went blank (for 500 ms) and the next trial began.  
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The search display consisted of 5 distractor circles, each presented in a different colour 
(orange, yellow, pink, purple, and white). On each trial, either a red or a green circle was also 
presented, and this was always the target. Inside all distractor circles was a line segment 
oriented 45 randomly to the left or right, inside the target circle was either a vertical or a 
horizontal line segment. The locations of all the circles were chosen at random. Participants 
pressed either ‘1’ or ‘2’ with the index and middle fingers on their right-hand if the target line 
was vertical or horizontal, respectively, “as quickly as possible while minimizing errors”. If the 
participant was correct, the reward display informed the participant how much cash they had 
earned on that trial (1 pence or 5 pence) and the total accumulated cash. If they were incorrect 
or too slow, the reward display informed them of this instead.  
On Day 1, there were 240 trials with a self-paced break half-way through where the 
participant could see how much money they had accrued. On Day 2, there was one block of 
120 trials. On both days, the target colour (high reward and low reward) and target line 
orientation (vertical and horizontal) were fully crossed and trials with every possible 
combination occurred equally often. Trial order was pseudorandom. The target location was 
random across the six possible locations on every trial. For half of participants, on 80% of trials 
a red circle predicted a high reward (5 pence) and a green circle predicted a low reward (1 
pence); on the remaining 20% of trials for each colour the contingencies were reversed. These 
colour/reward associations were reversed for the other half of participants. The 
colour/reward associations were also counterbalanced within each WM task order group. 
Colour/reward associations remained consistent across both days for each participant. Before 
the experimental trials on Day 1, participants completed 50 practice trials in which rewards 
were replaced by a correct message on the reward display. There was no practice on day 2. 
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Test Task. See Figure 4.1b. The trial structure followed a 2-trial sequence configuration. 
Following a fixation cross presented for a randomly varying interval of 400, 500, or 600 ms, a 
WM array appeared (500 ms). Then two visual search trials began. Each started with a fixation 
cross for a randomly varying interval of 400, 500, or 600 ms. Then the search display appeared 
for a maximum of 2000 ms on the first visual search trial, and a maximum of 1500 ms on the 
second. After the maximum time had elapsed or a response was made the feedback screen 
appeared (1000 ms). Immediately after the feedback screen appeared on the second trial in 
the sequence, a WM test array appeared until a response was made or 1500 ms had elapsed. 
Finally, the screen went blank for 1000 ms before the next 2-trial sequence began. 
Participants were informed to remember the WM array. The search display comprised 
five circular outlines (distractors) and one diamond outline (target), each presented in a 
different colour. The target was randomly presented in one of the distractor colours from the 
value-learning task and four of the distractor circles had colours matching the remaining 
distractor colours from the value-learning task. The final distractor colour was always 
presented in the high reward colour, low reward colour, or no-value colour (blue). The 
locations of all stimuli were chosen at random. A line segment randomly oriented 45 to the 
left or to the right was placed in each distractor circle. Inside the target diamond was either a 
horizontal or vertical line segment. Participants pressed the ‘1’ or the ‘2’ key with the index 
and middle fingers of their right-hand if the target line was vertical or horizontal, respectively, 
“as quickly as possible while minimizing errors”. After every visual search trial, the feedback 
display informed the participant as to whether their performance was “correct”, “wrong”, or 
“too slow”. The WM test array could either be the same as the WM array or different. On 
change trial sequences, for the colour-WM task four out of the five colours remained in their 
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original locations and the other 5 switched. For the shape-WM task change trials, 3 out of the 
4 points and the x-axis position of the final point remained the same but the y-axis position of 
the 4th point could be 100 pixels (0.8) above or below the original y-axis position. Participants 
were instructed to press the ‘space-bar’ with their left-hand if the WM test array had changed 
and withhold responding if it had not. 
For each WM task, there were 360 trials with a self-paced break every 72 trials. The 
first trial (of the 2-trial sequence) distractor value (high reward, low reward, and no reward), 
first trial target line orientation (vertical and horizontal), second trial distractor value, and 
second trial target line orientation were all fully crossed. On half of the 2-trial sequences the 
WM test array had changed; on the rest, it was the same. On both days, before the 
experimental trials, participants completed 10 practice 2-trial sequences using the same WM 
task as they would on the experimental trials that day. 
 
Data Analysis 
Value-Learning Task. The first trial of every block was removed from the analysis. RT 
and accuracy on remaining trials were analysed with a 2 x 2 repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with Day (1 vs. 2) and Target Value (low reward vs. high reward) as factors.  
Test Task. For both RT and accuracy analyses, trials from the first 2-trial sequence and 
those with RT faster than 250 ms were removed from the analysis. Remaining trials were 
analysed with a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with WM Task (colour-WM vs. shape-WM) 
and Distractor Value (no reward vs. high reward) as factors. Accuracy on the WM task (colour-
based vs. shape-based) was analysed in a paired-samples, 2-tailed t-test. Follow-up planned 
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pairwise comparisons were corrected for multiple comparisons using the False Discovery Rate 
procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Alpha levels were set at .05 throughout.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Value-Learning Task. See Table 4.1 for RT data from the value-learning task. RT were 
faster on day 2 than Day 1 by 23 ms (F1, 23) = 21.334, p < .001, eta2 = .481) and accuracy was 
higher on Day 2 than day 1 by 10% (F1, 23) = 87.396, p < .001, eta2 = .792). RT were also faster 
when the target had a high compared to a low value by 9 ms (F(1, 23) = 4.786, p < .05, eta2 = 
.172.), although accuracy for the two values was comparable (F(1, 23) = 2.508, p = .127, eta2 
 
 
Figure 4.1. A. Example trial during the Value-learning task. Participants reported the orientation of the off-diagonal line 
segment (horizontal or vertical). The target was always within either a red or a green circle. One of the target colours 
predicted the receipt of a high reward (5p) and the other a low reward (1p) on 80% of trials and the reverse on 20% of trials. 
B. Example of a 2-trial sequence during the Test task in Experiment 1 in the colour working memory condition. C. Example of 
a 2-trial sequence during the Test task in the shape working memory condition. Participants first encoded the WM array, 
then performed two visual search trials, before performing a change-detection task with the WM test array (B and C are 
examples of WM change trial sequences). In the visual search task, the target was inside the shape singleton and one of the 
distractors was presented in the high-, low-, or a no-value colour. No further rewards were available. The test task in 
Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1, but without the WM components of the trial. 
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= .098). The two-way interaction was not significant for RT (F(1, 23) = .551, p = .465, eta2 = 
.023) or accuracy (F(1, 23) = .821, p = .374, eta2 = .374) 
 
Table 4.1. Mean reaction times in milliseconds (with standard error in parenthesis) on the 
Value-Learning task in Experiment 1 (depending on Day) and in Experiment 2. 
 Low-value High-value 
Experiment 1   
    Day one 571 (8) 563 (8) 
    Day two 551 (11) 540 (10) 
    Overall 561 (9) 552 (9) 
Experiment 2   
    Overall 537 (10) 531 (9) 
Note. There was only 1 day of testing in Experiment 2. 
 
Test Task. See Table 4.2 for RT data from the test task. RT were comparable for visual 
search in both WM conditions (F(1, 23) = .632, p = .431, eta2 = .027) and regardless of WM 
task RT were marginally faster with a no value compared to a high value distractor (F(1, 23) = 
4.042, p = .056, eta2 = .149). Crucially, the two-way interaction was also significant (F(1, 23) = 
5.622, p < .05, eta2 = .196). 
With a shape-based WM load typical value driven attentional capture was observed 
(Anderson et al., 2013; Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a; Anderson et al., 2011b; Anderson 
& Yantis, 2012). RTs were slower when a high value distractor was in the search array 
compared to when a no value distractor was present (t(23) = 2.598, p < .05). However, value 
driven attentional capture was eliminated when participants held a colour information in WM 
(t(23) = .907, p = .374). Underlining the difference between the two WM conditions, VDAC 
(high value – no value) was significantly larger in the shape compared to the colour WM 
condition (t(23) = 2.363, p < .05). See figure 4.2 for VDAC in both WM conditions.  
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Table 4.2. Mean reaction times in milliseconds (with standard error in parenthesis) for each 
value distractor across both working memory (WM) conditions. 
 No-value Low-value High-value 
Colour WM 735 (26) 742 (26) 740 (26) 
Shape WM 710 (21) 718 (21) 727 (23) 
 
Accuracy on the search task did not depend on the WM task (F(1, 23) = 1.379, p = .252, 
eta2 = .057) or the distractor value (F(1, 23) = .640, p = .432, eta2 = .027) and the two-way 
interaction was also not-significant (F(1, 23) = .164, p = .689, eta2 = .007). Importantly, 
accuracy on the WM tasks was comparable (84% on both, t(23) = .028, p = .978), therefore 
WM task difficulty can be ruled out as an explanation for the lack of value driven attentional 
capture in the colour-based WM condition.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean value driven attentional capture effect (VDAC), calculated as High-value – No-value distractor 
conditions, for both the colour and the shape working memory (WM) conditions. 
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 The finding that VDAC is eliminated when the contents of WM are in the same feature 
domain as the distractor feature that is associated with value (e.g., colour) are consistent with 
the previous findings of Kim et al. (2005). However, the current experiment expands on Kim 
et al. (2005) by demonstrating a feature-specific (e.g., colour vs. shape) influence of the WM 
load rather than a modality-specific (e.g., verbal vs. spatial) effect. 
Importantly, the mere presence of a demanding secondary task was not sufficient to 
reduce VDAC, as evidenced by the typical VDAC observed with a concurrent shape-based WM 
task. Therefore, the results are inconsistent with Cognitive Load theory (Lavie, 2005), and 
accounts of super-distraction that suggest the underlying cognitive mechanism is involuntary 
attentional capture based on increased salience (Awh et al., 2012). Specifically, if this were 
the case, then VDAC should have been increased with a concurrent WM load because the load 
limits the executive resources available to suppress salient distractors (Lavie, 2005). Instead, 
the results favour an interpretation of super-distraction that suggests learned value-driven 
biases modulate (unconscious) strategic control (Shenhav et al., 2013). In particular, because 
colour processing during the maintenance of a colour-based WM load would interfere with 
the WM representation (Ahmad et al., 2017), the colours in the concurrent attention task 
must be ignored to reduce the conflict. When the WM load was shape-based, processing the 
value-associated distractors did not conflict with WM maintenance, so they were freely 
processed. Therefore, in Experiment 1 the current goals of the observer were found to interact 
with the strength of the learned value-driven bias. 
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Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 1, value-associated distractors were likely ignored because the sensory 
inputs would have potentially conflicted with maintenance of the memory representations for 
the colour-based WM task. In a typical VDAC experiment, processing the value-associated 
distractors also creates conflict with task-relevant processing within the visual search task; 
evidenced by the RT slowing with high value-associated distractors compared to neutral 
distractors (Anderson et al., 2011). However, strategic control does not seem to be 
immediately sensitive to this conflict, otherwise VDAC would not occur.  
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the attentional system adapts to this conflict 
after repeated exposures to the value-associated stimuli in extinction, i.e., when the reward 
is no longer forthcoming. Specifically, VDAC is known to be eliminated after as few as 60 
extinction trials (Roper et al., 2014)3. If the cognitive mechanism responsible for super-
distraction is strategic, then it should be sensitive to the conflict from inappropriate 
attentional capture by the value-associated distractors. This should be evident in behavioural 
adjustments on a trial-by-trial basis within the visual search task. 
 It is well known that trial-by-trial conflict driven adjustments in attentional control 
occur, such as negative priming (Tipper, 1985) and conflict adaptation (CA) effects (Gratton et 
al., 1992). For example, when stimuli conflict with target processing these stimuli are ignored 
on the subsequent trial. However, when stimuli facilitate target processing they are attended 
to on the next trial (Botvinick et al., 2001; Gratton et al., 1992). Such sequential trial effects 
have also been shown to be influenced by rewards (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 2009; Hickey 
                                                      
3 Of course, an alternative possibility is that extinction occurs because the stimuli lose their motivational 
salience through prediction error signaling (Schultz, 2000). 
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et al., 2010a, b; van Steenbergen et al., 2009). However, in these studies, rewards were 
dependent on performance and thus likely reinforced the behaviour on the prior trial. 
Here, sequential trial effects were investigated in VDAC to examine strategic 
adjustments in control in response to the value-associated distractors. To do so, the classic 
VDAC paradigm was replicated (Anderson et al., 2011). The aim was to examine whether a 
value-associated distractor on the prior trial influences VDAC on the current trial. It was 
predicted that when the value-associated distractor is absent on the prior trial, typical VDAC 
should be observed on the subsequent trial because no conflict was experienced. However, 
following a high value-associated distractor trial, VDAC should be eliminated. Specifically, the 
conflict with target selection from the value-associated distractors should be strategically 
overcome on the subsequent trial by ignoring these distractors.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four (2 males; 22 right-handed; mean age = 19.38 years [S.D. = 2.2, range = 18 
- 29]) naïve participants from the University of Birmingham took part in exchange for course 
credits or cash (£5, plus up to an additional £5 earned on the value-learning task).  
Apparatus 
 Same as Experiment 1. 
Stimuli 
 The was no WM arrays. All search display information in both the Value-learning task 
and the Test task are the same as in Experiment 1.  
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Procedure 
The experiment took place over a single session. 
Value-Learning Task. The same as Experiment 1. 
Test Task. The visual search trials were the same as in Experiment 1, but with the 
following exceptions. The maximum presentation time of the search display was always 1200 
ms. The search display either comprised five circular distractor and one diamond target 
outlines or five diamond distractor and one circular target outlines. The shape singleton 
always denoted the location of the target. There were 324 trials, with a self-paced break every 
108 trials. The current trial distractor value (high-reward, low-reward, and no-reward), the 
target line orientation (vertical and horizontal), and the singleton type (circle and diamond) 
were all fully crossed. The location of the singleton was random on every trial. Participants 
first completed 20 practice trials that were the same as the experimental trials; except all 
practice trials were no-reward trials.  
Data Analysis 
Value-Learning Task. The first trial of every block was removed from the analysis. RT 
and accuracy on remaining trials were analysed with 2-tailed t-tests comparing high versus 
low value trials.  
Test Task. For both RT and accuracy analyses, the first 2 trials and those with RT faster 
than 250 ms were removed from the analysis. Remaining trials were analysed with a 2 x 2 
repeated-measures ANOVA with Previous Trial Distractor Value (No-value vs. High-value) and 
Current Trial Distractor Value (No-value vs. High-value) as factors. Follow-up planned pairwise 
comparisons were corrected for multiple comparisons using the False Discovery Rate 
procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Alpha levels were set at .05 throughout.  
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Results and Discussion 
Value-Learning Task. See Table 4.1 for RT data from the value-learning task. RT were 
marginally faster when the target had a high compared to a low value by 6 ms (t(23) = 1.774, 
p = .089). Accuracy did not differ depending on the value of the target (t(23) = .847, p = .405). 
Table 4.3. Mean reaction times in milliseconds (with standard error in parenthesis) for each 
value distractor when preceded by No-value and High-value distractor trials. 
 Current trial distractor value 
Previous trial distractor value No-value Low-value High-value 
No-value 635 (14) 651 (14) 657 (15) 
Low-value 649 (14) 650 (16) 642 (12) 
High-value 640 (12) 642 (15) 631 (13) 
 
Test Task. See Table 4.3 for RT data from the test task. RT were marginally faster when 
the previous trial distractor was associated with a high-value compared to no-value by 11 ms 
(F(1, 23) = 4.054, p = .056, eta2 = .150). The results failed to replicate Anderson et al. (2011) as 
no effect of distractor value was found on the current trial (F(1, 23) = 1.211, p = .282, eta2 = 
.050). Importantly, the two-way interaction between previous trial distractor value and 
current trial distractor value was significant (F(1, 23) = 8.637, p < .01, eta2 = .274). 
When the distractor on the previous trial was associated with no-value, typical VDAC 
was observed (Anderson et al., 2011). When preceded by a no-value distractor trial, RT were 
significantly slower when the distractor value on the current trial was associated with a high-
value compared to no-value (t(23) = 2.726, p < .05). This effect was eliminated when preceded 
by a high-value distractor trial (t(23) = 1.175, p = .252). Importantly, the VDAC (high-value – 
no-value) was significantly larger when the distractor on the previous trial was associated with 
no-value versus a high-value (t(23) = 2.947, p < 05). See Figure 4.3 for VDAC as a function of 
the previous trial.  
Motivationally Driven Attentional Capture 
 140 
Accuracy on the search task was consistent with previously reported current trial 
VDAC. Accuracy was lower when the distractor on the current trial was associated with a high-
value (85%) compared to a low-value (89%) (F(1, 23) = 4.518, p < .05, eta2 = .164). The main 
effect of previous trial was not significant (F(1, 23) = .392, p = .538, eta2 = .017, nor was the 
interaction between previous and current trial distractor value (F(1, 23) = .809, p = .378, eta2). 
 
 
 This experiment provides evidence that the degree to which value-associated stimuli 
are attended is dependent on the predicted utility of those stimuli. This predicted utility was 
shown to be dependent on immediately prior experiences. Specifically, when attending to the 
value-associated distractors caused conflict with target selection, they were ignored on the 
subsequent trial. This further suggests that value-driven attentional biases are governed by 
strategic control. However, an alternative interpretation, consistent with repetition priming 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean value driven attentional capture effect (VDAC), calculated as High-value – No-value distractor 
conditions, when the distractor on the previous trial was associated with no-value and high-value. 
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(Mayr et al., 2003), suggests that RT should be faster on two consecutive high value distractor 
trials compared to a sequence that switches to a no-value distractor trial because the 
perceptual similarity between trials facilitates stimulus processing. Arguing against this 
interpretation, such repetition priming effects were not observed for two consecutive no-
value or low-value trials in the current data. Therefore, I can rule out this possibility in 
explaining the sequential modulations in super-distraction observed here.  
 Despite these clear conflict-driven sequential effects, it should be noted that the 
current experiment failed to replicate the typical current trial VDAC effect (Anderson et al., 
2011). One possibility for the null finding, which is consistent with the conflict driven 
interpretation of the sequential trial effects, is that the ratio of no-value to value trials was 
different here compared to the ratio used in the original VDAC experiment. Here, each 
distractor trial was equally likely. However, typically, no-value trials are more likely; appearing 
on 50% of trials. The remaining 50% of trials are split evenly between the low and high value 
distractor conditions (Anderson et al., 2011). With fewer no conflict (i.e., no-value) trials, the 
utility of the high value-associated distractor is relatively increased because it is less likely to 
be preceded by a trial with a high value-associated distractor. Accordingly, the overall 
magnitude of VDAC would be increased. This would be consistent with sequential trial effects 
in CA whereby distractor interference increases when the proportion of no conflict trials also 
increases (Lowe & Mitterer, 1982). Future research should examine this possibility. 
 However, without demonstrating the sequential trial effects when typical VDAC is also 
observed it is difficult to generalize the current findings to previous observations. To this end, 
I contacted another lab that had also ran a study using an Anderson et al. (2011) style 
paradigm and reported typical VDAC (Milner, personal communication). Their first experiment 
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was a replication of Anderson et al. (2011) but the target in both the training and the test task 
was defined by colour. They observed typical VDAC (F(2, 44) = 9.190, p < .001, eta2 = .295). 
Importantly, the analysis of the sequential trial effects was consistent with the current 
experiment. After a high-value distractor (15 ms) trial, VDAC was reduced compared to after 
a no-value distractor (35 ms) trial (F(4, 88) = 7.205, p < .001, eta2 = .247). This provides 
important evidence for sequential trial effects even when typical VDAC is observed.  
In a second experiment ran by this group (Milner, personal communication), they 
replicated the design of Anderson et al. (2011) except they removed the no-value distractor 
condition. Here, VDAC was computed as the difference between high and low value-
associated distractor trials (high-value – low-value). Again, after a high value-associated 
distractor (-4 ms) trial VDAC was eliminated, and was significantly reduced compared to after 
a low value-associated distractor (17 ms) trial (F(1, 21) = 8.447, p < .01, eta2 = .287). 
Interestingly, in this latter experiment there was no current trial VDAC (F < 1), which is 
consistent with other experiments comparing high vs low value-associated distractors (e.g., 
Sha & Jiang, 2016). Therefore, the strategically driven sequential trial effects reported here 
may help to interpret similar null findings.  
 
General Discussion 
 In two experiments, super-distraction was shown to be dependent on the degree to 
which attending to value-associated stimuli conflicted with task-relevant processing. In 
Experiment 1, value-associated distractors were constantly ignored when processing the 
reward-predicting feature would have disrupted WM maintenance of similar items in a 
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secondary task. The same suppression was not observed when the relevant feature in the WM 
task differed from the reward-predicting feature. In Experiment 2, the likelihood that value-
associated distractors were attended fluctuated on a trial-by-trial basis depending on their 
utility on the prior trial. In both Experiments, it was the cost associated with processing the 
reward-associated feature that determined super-distraction, which suggests a strategic bias 
in value-driven attentional capture. 
 Given that in both experiments, and across all conditions the initial reward learning 
was identical, these findings show that selection history is not sufficient to produce value 
effects on attention. Instead, the current experiments demonstrate that when a value-laden 
stimulus is encountered, sensitivity to the stimulus is determined by current strategic control. 
This is consistent with models of cognitive control that emphasize conflict monitoring 
(Botvinick et al., 2001) and the integration of conflict signals into the allocation of cognitive 
resources (Shenhav et al., 2013, 2016). The current data extends these models, suggesting 
that value signals potentially act on similar mechanisms as conflict signals in determining 
control. The two types of signal are effectively in competition in determining how control is 
allocated to stimuli. Whereas conflict signals typically instigate a tightening of attentional 
control consistent with current goals (Botvinick et al., 2001), value-signals appear to initiate a 
competing goal. This competing goal is the re-activation of a learned response to the stimulus 
(Anderson, 2015; Braver, 2012). One factor that determines whether this value-driven goal 
affects behaviour is the predicted benefit (i.e., the learned reward); when this is high it is more 
likely to bias cognition (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011). However, the current series of 
experiments further suggests that this competing goal only ‘wins’ the competition for control 
when the conflict it creates with task-relevant processing is weak. When processing the value-
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associated stimulus is deemed highly costly to current goals it is ignored (e.g., Shenhav et al., 
2013). 
In conclusion, the experiments reported here have demonstrated that the allocation 
of attention to reward-predicting stimuli is not automatic and instead may be the result of an 
online computation of the costs-benefits associated with different cognitive strategies 
(Shenhav et al., 2013).
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Chapter 5. Adolescent Incentive Cue-related Signal Suppression: An 
EEG Study 
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Abstract 
Stimuli signalling the opportunity to gain reward are known to bias cognition in adolescents 
more than in adults. Although previous studies have examined value-driven attentional 
capture in teenager, here I examine how electrophysiological responses to incentive cues 
differ between adolescents and adults. EEG/ERP activity was recorded as adolescents (~17 
years) and adults (~29 years) viewed a motivationally salient (reward-associated) or no-
reward incentive cue and then did a simple visual search task involving two letters each in a 
different colour. Cue shape informed the participant about the reward magnitude for correct 
search performance; this required letter identification (colour was irrelevant). Importantly, in 
a previous conditioning task, cue shape also predicted target colour. Although irrelevant for 
the current task, the colour associated with the cue was either congruent or incongruent with 
the target colour. In adolescents, when cues signalled high reward, colour congruency 
between cue associations and target determined response times, an effect not seen in adults, 
but not when the cue signalled no reward.  ERP activity suggested that adolescents reactively 
suppressed the no-reward cue (cue elicited Pd), which inhibited the learned colour-
association. In adults, no behavioural or ERP effects were found. However, pre-stimulus alpha 
activity prior to the onset of the incentive array was increased in adults compared to 
adolescents. Together, these data suggest that adults proactively initiate task-related strategic 
control, whereas adolescents reactively initiate control consistent with that instantiated by 
the most rewarding motivational state (i.e., goal).  
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Adolescence is a time when morbidity rates soar relative to both older and younger 
age-groups (Dahl, 2004). Often this is ascribed to an increase in impulsive and risky behaviours 
considered to be the result of extensive neurobiological and psychological change occurring 
during this epoch of life. Typically, the increased impulsivity associated with teenagers is 
thought to relate to discrepancies in the maturation of cognitive control – the ability to 
regulate cognitive resources to coordinate actions in accordance with internal goals - and 
reward mediated neural circuitries (Casey, Jones, et al., 2008; Crone & Dahl, 2012; Steinberg 
et al., 2008). Specifically, neuroanatomical studies in adolescents have revealed that synaptic 
density in reward processing regions follows a parabolic trajectory, peaking at around 14 years 
of age. In contrast, cognitive control regions develop linearly throughout adolescence only 
reaching full maturity in early adulthood at around 25 years of age, consistent with the 
strengthening of long-range connectivity and greater neural specialization (Giedd et al., 1999; 
Gogtay & Giedd, 2004; Luna et al., 2015).  
Recent electrophysiological work has reported that immature cognitive control in 
adolescents is the result of inappropriate allocation of control that relies on reactive 
compared to proactive mechanisms (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011; Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 
2012). Proactive control reflects preparatory activation of control related to behavioural goals, 
whereas reactive control is instantiated post-stimulus onset in response to goals activated by 
stimuli. When proactive control is strong, the competition from reactive goals is only weakly 
represented and unlikely to control cognition (Braver, 2012). Conversely, reactive control is 
relatively more competitive for cognitive resources when proactive control is weak (Shenhav 
et al., 2013). Although adolescents demonstrate a propensity for the reactive allocation of 
control, they do not completely lack the ability to initiate control proactively (Andrews-Hanna 
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et al., 2010; Romer et al., 2017). Nevertheless, even by late adolescence (~17 years) 
preparatory response related activity, indexed by the contingent negative variation of the ERP, 
is attenuated compared to adults, but subsequent P3b activity during response execution is 
relatively increased compared to adults (Killikelly & Szűcs, 2011). Together, this evidence 
along with supporting neuroimaging research (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011) suggests that 
adolescents are not inclined to prepare sustained cognition in preparation for later responses 
(Luna et al., 2015). Instead, using reactive control, they rely on post hoc cognitive strategies 
that are activated post-stimulus onset (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011; Braver et al., 2007; 
Braver, 2012; Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013; Solomon et al., 2014). The reduced tendency for 
adolescents to initiate control proactively is likely to contribute heavily to the increased risk-
taking in adolescents.  
In conjunction with immature proactive cognitive control, adolescents experience 
heightened sensitivity to value associated-stimuli, due to heightened incentive salience (e.g., 
Chapter 3, Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Roper et al., 2011). Hyper-activity in reward related 
processing regions may increase the relative weight of value associated stimuli compared to 
perceptually similar but motivationally neutral stimuli making suppression of these stimulus-
linked motivations more difficult (Spears, 2004; Steinberg et al., 2008; Chapter 3). There is a 
large bank of fMRI research showing heightened striatal reward related activity in response 
to reward contingent stimuli in adolescents compared to adults (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Galvan 
et al., 2006; Geier et al., 2010; Padmanabhan et al., 2011; van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). 
Adolescents tend to show increased striatal activity in risk-taking studies both in anticipation 
and receipt of rewards (van Leijenhorst et al, 2010; Galvan et al., 2006; Ernst et al., 2005; 
Padmanabhan et al., 2011; Braams et al., 2014; Crone et al., 2016, although see Bjork et al., 
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2004, 2010). Behaviourally, a similar propensity for adolescents to be overly biased by reward 
related cues has been shown, even when attending to them may be detrimental to current 
task demands (Geier & Luna, 2009; Roper et al., 2014). The strength of this evidence has led 
researchers to assume that adolescents are excessively driven by rewards without 
consideration of costs, leading to an increase in risk-taking (Crone et al., 2016).  
To examine how irrelevant, reward-associated stimuli gain control over behaviour, 
adolescents (14 – 17 years) and adults (25 – 35 years) first took park in a value-learning task 
wherein white abstract symbols became instrumentally associated with a specific colour and 
a monetary value (win or no-value) outcome. These same colour-value associated symbols 
were then used as incentive cues in a subsequent 2-item target location task. Specifically, the 
white cue’s associated value predicted the monetary outcome for correct performance on the 
search task. Although the cue’s associated colour was irrelevant, the search array always had 
one item (target or distractor) in the cue-associated colour. The task was to locate a 
predefined target letter regardless of its colour. On half of trials the target’s colour was the 
same as that predicted by the incentive cue, as learnt in the value-learning task; on remaining 
trials the incentive cue predicted the distractor’s colour. This created a potential competition 
between the irrelevant colour and letter processing.  
Effective proactive control should emphasize task-relevant processing (letter-
processing), irrespective of the meaning of the incentive cue. When proactive control is strong 
there should be no influence of the cue-colour association, and no colour congruency effect. 
Conversely, when control is more likely to be allocated reactively the cue-colour association 
should be more competitive with task-relevant behaviours, making a colour congruency effect 
Adolescent Incentive Cue-related Signal Suppression: An EEG Study 
 150 
more likely. However, when the cue-colour association was not rewarded during learning the 
competition should be resolved in favour of the task-relevant processing strategy.  
To investigate strategic differences between adolescents and adults in the allocation 
of control, ERPs were measured during the letter-target detection task (but not the value-
learning task). Of particular interest was neural signatures of attentional control in response 
to the incentive cues, i.e., when the symbols predicting reward (and formerly predicting 
colour) were presented. Previous research has shown that the N2pc and the distractor 
positivity (Pd) can both be used to index attentional control dynamics in response to incentive 
cues (Sawaki et al., 2015). The N2pc is thought to reflect the deployment of covert visuospatial 
attention (Luck, 2005; Luck & Hillyard, 1994b, 1994a); it is observed as relatively more 
negative voltage at contralateral than ipsilateral scalp sites, relative to the location of the 
attended stimulus (Luck, 2005). The Pd is associated with the active suppression of stimuli 
(Hickey et al., 2009; Luck, 2005; Sawaki, Geng, & Luck, 2012; Sawaki et al., 2015); it is seen as 
a more positive voltage at contralateral than ipsilateral scalp sites, to the visual field of the 
suppressed stimulus (Luck, 2005). Both components onset around 150 – 350 ms post stimulus 
at parietal-occipital electrode sites (Luck, 2005; Sawaki et al., 2015; Hickey, et al., 2010a). 
Recent reports have demonstrated the N2pc in children and adolescents (Couperus & Quirk, 
2015; Shimi, Nobre, & Scerif, 2015; Wang et al., 2017), which suggests that 
electrophysiological markers of attentional capture are comparable to those found in adults. 
Evidence for the Pd in age-groups younger than adults though is lacking. Here, the adolescents 
might not show a Pd because suppression mechanisms are not yet developed but finding a Pd 
in adolescents would provide a means of investigating the application of suppression in future 
research. 
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In addition to analysing active suppression of incentive cues after stimulus 
presentation, posterior alpha power in the EEG prior to the onset of the incentive array was 
also examined. Increased pre-stimulus alpha activity is thought to indicate a reduced 
readiness to attend to external stimuli (Mazaheri, Nieuwenhuis, Van Dijk, & Jensen, 2009; 
Sawaki et al., 2015). Indeed, posterior alpha power is thought to be a marker of preparatory 
suppression modulated by top-down areas (Van Dijk, Schoffelen, Oostenveld, & Jensen, 2008). 
The primary aim was to investigate active suppression (Pd) as an index of reactive 
inhibitory mechanisms in response to reward-predicting and neutral incentive cues. It was 
predicted adolescents would rely on post-hoc strategic control to maintain task-relevant 
behavioural goals (letter processing) and suppress the re-activation of the goal instantiated 
by the incentive cue when it is not associated with reward, reflected in a Pd. However, because 
the goal re-instantiated by a reward-predicting cue is more motivationally intense, it should 
be more difficult to reactively inhibit, so no active suppression (Pd) was expected. Rather, a 
N2pc to the reward-predicting cue was predicted because adolescents’ hyper-sensitivity to 
rewards. In adults, a different pattern was expected. It was reasoned that if adults were more 
likely to utilize preparatory inhibition that effectively ignores the incentive cue, they might 
show increased alpha prior to their onset coupled with active suppression of the cues (a Pd), 
regardless of cue value.  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixteen adolescents (5 males, mean age = 16.6 years [range: 14 – 17, SD = 0.8]) and 
sixteen adults (9 males, mean age = 28.5 years [range: 23 – 38, SD = 4.4]) from the West 
Midlands, UK area took part in the experiment in exchange for £20. The adolescents were 
recruited from advertisements in local secondary schools and through the university 
webpages. Adults were recruited from online advertisements (GumTree and Call For 
Participants). Couperus and Quirk (2015) reported an eta2 = .386 for the analysis of N2pc in 
children, based on a power = 0.8 (two-tailed) a sample size of 16 was calculated to be 
sufficient. This sample size is consistent with previous ERP studies with adolescents, such as 
Killikelly & Szűcs (2013) wherein there were 15 adolescents and 15 adults. 
All participants had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of 
neurological illness, and were naïve to both Japanese hiragana characters and the purpose of 
the experiment. In fact, no participant had participated in any previous psychology 
experiment at this or any other institution. Participants also completed the Munsell D-15 test 
for colour-blindness; all were successful. Informed consent was obtained not only from all 
participants but, in the case of the adolescents, also from their parents/guardians. 
Stimuli/Apparatus 
 The stimuli were presented on a gray ([128, 128, 128]) background of a 68 cm LCD 
monitor with a screen resolution of 1920 x 1080 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Viewing distance 
was approximately 70 cm. Stimuli were programmed in Matlab (MathWorks Ltd.) using 
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Psychtoolbox. Responses were given using a standard keyboard. Eight Japanese symbols (PJ 
Hiragana font) subtending approximately 1.9° x 1.4°, always presented in white [255, 255, 
255], served as relevant incentive and control (irrelevant) stimuli. The incentive array used in 
the value-learning task and the letter-detection task comprised two Hiragana, presented 2.5° 
to the left and right of fixation from the Hiragana edge. The colour choice array in the value-
learning task comprised two filled circles subtending approximately 2° in diameter. The circles 
appeared 2.5° from fixation to the left and right along the horizontal meridian. One was always 
presented in orange [119, 84, 0] and the other in purple [99, 84, 99]. In the letter detection 
task, targets were always ‘p’ or ‘d’ and distractors were always ‘q’ or ‘b’; each letter measured 
approximately 2° x 1.5° and was presented in either orange or purple (as in the value-learning 
task). Letters were also presented in pairs along the vertical meridian, 2.5° above or below 
centre. Rewards (Arial font) were always presented at fixation.  
Procedure 
  Value-Learning Task. See Figure 5.1a. Each trial began with a fixation cross that 
remained on screen throughout the task but was presented alone for 1000 ms between trials. 
Next, two white Hiragana symbols appeared until the symbol designated as ‘relevant’ was 
selected. Then a colour choice array comprised of two circles appeared until response. This 
sequence was followed by the fixation (1000 ms), and finally by a reward feedback screen that 
indicated the amount of points earned (if correct) or lost (if incorrect) on that trial (200 ms).  
For each participant, four Hiragana symbols were designated as ‘relevant’ cues and 
four as ‘irrelevant’. A ‘relevant’ cue was always presented alongside an ‘irrelevant’ item; each 
was equally likely to appear on the left or the right. Of the four ‘relevant’ symbols, half were 
assigned a point value of 0 (no-reward) and half a value of 500 (win). One symbol with each 
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value indicated that the correct colour choice for the subsequent screen was orange and its 
value-mate indicated that purple was the correct choice. Irrelevant symbols had no meanings. 
When the Hiragana symbols were presented at the start of each trial participants were 
instructed to select the ‘relevant’ symbol by pressing the ‘left’ or ‘right’ arrow key with their 
index finger or ring finger, respectively. If the ‘irrelevant’ symbol was chosen, the word 
‘INCORRECT’ appeared and the trial ended. If the ‘relevant’ symbol was chosen, the trial 
progressed to the colour choice array.  Now the task was to choose the colour associated with 
the ‘relevant’ symbol on that trial by using the middle finger to depress the ‘up’ or ‘down’ 
arrow key to select the circle on the top or bottom, respectively. The correct choice was 
equally likely to appear above or below fixation. If correct, the participant received the 
amount of points associated with the ‘relevant’ symbol for that trial; if incorrect, 500 points 
were deducted from their overall tally. Accumulated points were constantly presented at the 
bottom of the screen and updated after every trial. Participants were informed that points 
could later be exchanged for cash.  
 In total there were 256 trials, with each ‘relevant’ symbol appearing on a quarter of 
trials, pseudo-randomly ordered. Each ‘irrelevant’ symbol also appeared on a quarter of trials, 
equally often with each ‘relevant’ symbol. The assignment of Hiragana to relevance, and 
relevant symbols to value/colour were chosen randomly for each participant. There was a 
break every 64 trials, where the participants could see how much cash had been earned thus 
far.  
Letter-Target Detection Task. See Figure 5.1b. Each trial began with a fixation cross 
presented alone for a jittered interval between 1000 – 1400 ms, which remained onscreen 
throughout the trial. Next, the incentive array was presented for 200 ms. Following another 
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jittered interval (between 800 – 1200 ms), the target-letter detection display was presented 
for 200 ms, followed by a fixation alone for 1000 ms, and finally the amount of points earned 
on that trial (200 ms). 
 The incentive array consisted of a ‘relevant’ and an ‘irrelevant’ symbol appearing to 
the left and right of fixation, the location of each was equally likely to be the left or the right. 
The ‘relevant’ cue informed the participant how many points they could earn for being correct 
on that trial, based on the reward-assignment from the value-learning task. The colour 
assigned to the ‘relevant’ symbol during learning was no longer informative and was equally 
likely to be congruent with the colour of the target letter as incongruent. Although only one 
‘relevant’ symbol was meaningful for the trial both were presented to ensure that lateralized 
ERP responses were not confounded by low-level physical stimulus confounds. For the target-
letter detection task, participants had to locate one of two predefined target letters (‘p’ or ‘d’) 
presented alongside a distractor letter (‘q’ or ‘b’). On each trial there was always one, but only 
one, target letter presented in either the top or bottom location; the other location had a 
distractor letter. Participants pressed the ‘/’ key with their left index finger or the ‘z’ key with 
their right index finger if a target letter was presented at the top or bottom, respectively. One 
of the letters was always presented in purple and the other in orange, although this was not 
informative for the letter-target detection task. If correct the participant received the amount 
of points associated with the ‘relevant’ symbol on that trial, if incorrect 500 points were 
deducted.  
 There were a total of 1024 trials in total. Half of trials had a win-associated incentive 
array; on remaining trials the incentive array indicated that no-reward was on offer for that 
trial (0 points could be earned if correct). On half of trials for each incentive array the colour 
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associated with the ‘relevant’ cue was congruent with the colour of the target letter meaning 
that a colour search would have resulted in the correct answer. On remaining trials for each 
incentive array the associated colour was incongruent with that of the target letter, meaning 
that searching for colour would give the wrong response. The target letter was equally likely 
to be either a ‘p’ or a ‘d’ on each trial, as the distractor letter was equally likely to be a ‘q’ or 
a ‘b’ (target and distractor letters being fully crossed). There were 128 trials per block. Each 
break between blocks was for a minimum of 15 seconds, apart from the fourth break that was 
a minimum of 1 minute. Participants could start the next block as soon as they liked after the 
minimum interval. During breaks participants could see how much extra cash they had earned 
so far.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Schematic of a value-learning task trial (A), and a letter-target detection task trial (B). In the value-learning task, 
participants had to first decide which symbol was the ‘relevant’ symbol, then decide which colour was associated with this 
relevant symbol. If they chose the wrong symbol the trial would terminate with a message reading “Incorrect”. In the 
current example, if the symbol on the left predicted purple in the value-learning task, attending to the colour in the letter-
target detection task would slow responses because it is incongruent with the colour of the target (in this case P). 
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Recording and Analysis 
 With few exceptions the recording and analysis were consistent with a previous 
reported study also measuring the N2pc and Pd in response to incentive cues, but in adults 
(Sawaki et al., 2015). EEG was only recorded during the letter-detection task. The EEG was 
recoded using active Ag-AgCl electrodes (BioSemi) from 32 scalp sites (FP1, FP2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, 
F8, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, P9, P7, P5, P3, P1, Pz, P2, P4, P6, P8, P10, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4, PO8, O1, 
Oz, O2, and Iz) and the left and right mastoids according to the modified 10-20 system 
(American Electroencephalographic Society, 1994). For the detection of eye movements and 
blinks, the EOG was recorded from electrodes placed above and below the right eye and at 
the outer canthi of each eye. The EEG and EOG were low-pass filtered with a fifth-order sinc 
filter (half-power cutoff at 208 Hz) and digitized at 1024 Hz. 
 All ERP data analyses were conducted using the EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) 
and ERPLAB toolboxes (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) in Matlab (The MathWorks, Inc). The 
EEG signals were offline referenced to the average of the left and right mastoids. The EEG was 
bandpass filtered offline using a Butterworth infinite impulse response filter with half-power 
cutoffs at 0.05 and 30 Hz and a roll-off of 12 dB/octave. The data was then down-sampled to 
256 Hz. To minimize sensory confounds EEG signals were collapsed across the possible 
locations of the relevant Hiragana stimuli (left or right) and the two Hiragana stimuli used for 
each reward possibility during the incentive array. 
Trials containing noisy channels or segments (eye blinks, movement, muscle tensing, 
etc…) were removed via visual inspection and artefact rejection. Trials were removed if the 
EEG exceeded 100 µV in any channel or if a step function applied to the horizontal EOG 
exceeded 25 µV (Sawaki et al., 2015; Luck, 2005) between 100 ms before and 700 ms post 
Adolescent Incentive Cue-related Signal Suppression: An EEG Study 
 158 
stimulus onset. Trials were also excluded if the vertical EOG exceeded 80 µV between 100 
ms prior to and 200 ms post stimulus onset, this ensured that the eyes were not closed when 
the stimuli were presented. 
 Averaged ERP waveforms were computed encompassing 100 ms before the onset of 
the incentive array to 500 ms post stimulus onset. As is conventional, N2pc and Pd 
components were measured as the difference wave between the contralateral hemisphere 
minus the ipsilateral hemisphere, relative to the stimulus (Luck, 2005; Sawaki et al., 2015). 
The contralateral waveform for the ‘relevant’ stimulus was the average of the right 
hemisphere electrodes when the ‘relevant’ stimulus was in the left visual field, and the left 
hemisphere electrodes, when the ‘relevant’ stimulus was in the right visual field; the 
ipsilateral waveform for the ‘relevant’ stimulus was the average of the right hemisphere 
electrodes when the ‘relevant’ stimulus was in the right visual field, and the left hemisphere 
electrodes when the ‘relevant’ stimulus was in the left visual field. The amplitude for both the 
N2pc and the Pd were measured as the mean voltage during predefined time windows, 
baseline corrected to the 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline period recorded at posterior electrode 
sites where the N2pc and Pd were largest (Luck, 2005). The analysis was first conducted 
collapsing over multiple parietal-occipital electrode sites (PO3/PO4, PO7/PO8, P5/P6, and 
P7/P8) where the N2pc and Pd are typically observed, across the posterior of the scalp (e.g., 
Bacigalupo & Luck, 2015), and then the analysis was repeated focusing only on the PO7/PO8 
electrode sites where the components have previously been found to be largest when 
investigating attention to incentive cues (Sawaki et al., 2015). The same time windows were 
measured as used by Sawaki et al. (2015) when determining the N2pc and Pd to incentive cues 
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in young adults. These were 250 – 300 ms post stimulus onset for the N2pc and 325 – 375 ms 
post stimulus onset for the Pd.  
 Prior to the calculation of time frequency representations (TFRs) independent 
component analysis (ICA) was used to estimate eye-blinks from the pre-stimulus period 
relative to the incentive array. Eye-blink related ICA components were identified using 
EyeCatch (Bigdely-Shamlo, Kreutz-Delgado, Kothe, & Makeig, 2013) and then removed. 
Consistent with the analysis of TFRs in Sawaki et al. (2015), the EEG was convolved with a 
Hanning-tapered seven-cycle Morlet wavelet and TFRs of power between 2 – 20 Hz were 
computed. To analyse power differences in the alpha band, the power was calculated for 
individuals from -2000 to 2000 ms relative to the onset of the incentive array, then averaged 
for each age-group. To examine age-related differences in pre-stimulus alpha activity (10-14 
Hz, Sawaki et al., 2015), the power of alpha band frequencies across channels and time were 
analysed. Unpaired parametric statistical comparisons were conducted with alpha levels set 
at .01. 
Behavioural Data Analysis 
Value-Learning Task. Accuracy (percent correct) during the symbol selection stage and 
the colour selection stage were analysed separately in a 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The within-subject factor was cue-reward (reward vs. no-reward) and the between-subject 
factor was age-group (adolescents vs. adults). 
Letter-Target Detection Task. Incorrect trials and the first trial of every block were 
excluded before participant condition means were averaged for the RT analysis. All remaining 
data were analysed with a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subject factors 
of incentive value (reward vs. no-reward) and colour congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) 
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and the between-subject factor of age-group (adolescents vs. adults). Follow-up planned 
pairwise comparisons were corrected for multiple comparisons using the False Discovery 
procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Alpha levels were set at 0.05. 
Table 5.1. Mean percent correct (standard error in parenthesis) for each age-group, decision 
stage and reward condition in the Value-Learning Task. 
 Adolescents Undergraduates Adults 
  Shape-selection stage    
    Reward 93 (1) 94 (2) 96 (1) 
    No-reward 89 (2) 91 (3) 96 (1) 
  Colour-selection stage    
    Reward 84 (2) 88 (3) 89 (2) 
    No-reward 83 (3) 83 (3) 85 (2) 
 
Results 
Value-Learning Task. Performance measures are shown in Table 5.1. At the shape 
selection stage, although adults were overall more accurate by 5% at selecting the ‘relevant’ 
symbol than adolescents (F(1, 30) = 8.212, p < .01, eta2 = .215), accuracy was unaffected by 
cue-reward (F(1, 30) = 2.524, p = .123, eta2 = .078), and the interaction between cue-reward 
and age-group was also not significant (F(1, 30) = 3.054, p = .091, eta2 = .092). When analysing 
performance from only the final block, adults (99.7%) were again marginally more accurate 
than adolescents (98.05%) at selecting the ‘relevant’ symbol (1, 30) = 3.433, p = .074, eta2 = 
.103), suggesting that adults may have been better able to discriminate the meaningful from 
the irrelevant Hiragana symbols. However, given that performance in the final block is 
approaching ceiling for both age-groups, both groups appear to know which symbols were 
‘relevant’. Similar to the analysis of overall accuracy, in the final block there was also no effect 
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on accuracy of the cue-reward (F(1, 30) = 1.686, p = .204, eta2 = .053), and no interaction 
between age-group and cue-reward (F(1, 30) = 1.218, p = .279, eta2 = .039).  
At the colour selection stage, accuracy was unaffected by cue-reward (F(1, 30) = 1.173, 
p = .287, eta2 = .038) and age-group (F(1, 30) = 1.202, p = .282, eta2 = .039). The interaction 
between cue-reward and age-group was also non-significant (F(1, 30) = .061, p = .806, eta2 = 
.002). Together, these data from the value-learning task suggest that although adults may 
have been marginally better at discriminating the ‘relevant’ symbol, this was not differently 
affected by cue-reward. In addition, the ability to associate colour with Hiragana symbol was 
not different between age-groups. 
Table 5.2. Mean RT (ms) and accuracy (standard error in parenthesis) for each age-group, 
congruency, and reward condition in the Letter-Target Detection Task. 
 Adolescents Undergraduates Adults 
RT    
  Reward    
    Congruent 429 (19) 479 (24) 482 (16) 
    Incongruent 443 (19) 501 (17) 475 (15) 
  No-reward    
    Congruent 435 (18) 515 (26) 482 (15) 
    Incongruent 438 (18) 506 (20) 485 (15) 
Accuracy    
  Reward    
    Congruent 84 (2) 95 (1) 94 (1) 
    Incongruent 86 (3) 87 (4) 93 (2) 
  No-reward    
    Congruent 86 (3) 94 (1) 93 (1) 
    Incongruent 87 (2) 93 (2) 93 (1) 
Notes. The undergraduate sample were from Experiment 2 and EEG was not recorded. 
 
Letter-Target Detection Task. 
Behavioural Data  
Table 5.2 shows the behavioural data. Adolescents were marginally faster than adults 
at selecting the target letter (F(1, 30) = 3.528, p = .08, eta2 = .105). The two-way interaction 
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between age-group and congruency was significant (F(1, 30) = 4.519, p < .05, eta2 = .131. 
Crucially, the three-way interaction between age-group, congruency, and value was also 
significant (F(1, 30) = 6.894, p < .05, eta2 = .186). No other effects reached significance (all ps 
> .17). 
To further explore the three-way interaction, separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted 
for each age-group. In adults, RT were unaffected by congruency (F(1, 15) = .275, p = .608, eta2 
= 0.18), cue-reward (F(1, 15) = 1.387, p = .257, eta2 = .085), and the interaction between cue-
reward and congruency was not significant (F(1, 15) = 2.465, p = .137, eta2 = .141). In 
adolescents, RT were faster when the colour of the target letter was congruent versus 
incongruent with the colour associated with the incentive cue (F(1, 15) = 6.331, p < .05, eta2 = 
.297). Importantly, the two-way interaction between cue-reward and incentive value was also 
significant (F(1, 15) = 5.746, p < .05, eta2 = .277). Specifically, after a reward incentive cue, RT 
were slowed by 14 ms when the incentive cue predicted the incongruent compared to the 
congruent colour (t(15) = 4.020, p < .005). However, after a no-reward incentive cue, RTs on 
congruent versus incongruent trials were not different (t(15) = .899, p = .383). In addition, the 
congruency effect (incongruent – congruent, see Figure 5.2) was larger after a reward (14 ms) 
than a no-reward (3 ms) incentive cue (t(15) = 2.397, p < .05). Finally, the congruency effect 
after a reward incentive cue was significantly (t(30) = 3.615, p < .005) larger in adolescents (14 
ms) than in adults (-7 ms). 
Adults were more accurate than adolescents (F(1, 30) = 8.630, p < .01, eta2 = .223). The 
two-way interactions between cue-reward and age-group (F(1, 30) = 5.711, p < .05, eta2 = 
.160) and between congruency and age-group (F(1, 30) = 4.541, p < .05, eta2 = .131) were 
significant. No other effects reached significance (all ps > .2). Although adolescents were 
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overall faster and less accurate compared to adults, speed-accuracy trade-offs do not appear 
to explain the value x colour congruency effects observed in the adolescent RT. In particular, 
when considering accuracy, the three-way interaction was not significant (F(1, 30) = 1.680, p 
= .205, eta2 = .053), and neither was the two-way interaction between congruency and cue-
reward (F(1, 30) = .044, p = .836, eta2 = .001). 
 
Incentive Array ERPs – The Pd 
 Figure 5.3 shows the ERP waveforms time-locked to the onset of the incentive arrays 
as collapsed across parietal-occipital electrode sites (PO3/PO4, PO7/PO8, P5/P6, and P7/P8, 
Bacigalupo & Luck, 2015), contralateral and ipsilateral to the ‘relevant’ cue. In adolescents, a 
significant Pd (a contralateral positivity) was observed only for an incentive cue that predicted 
no-reward, indicating that this was actively suppressed. Adolescents did not show a Pd for the 
 
Figure 5.2. Response time congruency effects (incongruent – congruent) for reward and no-reward trials across all age-
groups (Experiment 1: adolescents [mean age = 16.6 years]] and adults [mean age = 28.5 years], Experiment 2: 
Undergraduates [mean age = 20.9 years]). 
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reward predicting incentive cue. Interestingly, in both adults and adolescents, the N2pc was 
not significant for either the no-reward or the reward symbol. 
 When measuring from all posterior electrode sites (Bacigalupo & Luck, 2015) the 2 
(age-group) x 2 (incentive cue value) ANOVA on mean voltage, at the predefined time window 
of 325-375 ms (Sawaki et al., 2015) showed a significantly larger Pd when the incentive cue 
predicted no-reward (F(1, 30) = 5.199, p < .05, eta2 = .148). The Pd was also larger in the 
adolescents than the adults (F(1, 30) = 4.816, p < .05, eta2 = .138). Importantly, the 2-way 
interaction was also significant (F(1, 30) = 4.665, p < .05, eta2 = .135). In the adolescents, the 
mean voltage was significantly different from zero in a one-sample t test of the contralateral 
– ipsilateral difference wave for the Pd component when the incentive cue predicted no-
reward (t(15) = 2.382, p < .05) but not different from zero for the reward condition (t(15) = 
.124, p = .903). Moreover, for adolescents, the Pd was statistically larger in the no-reward than 
the reward condition (t(15) = 2.568, p < .05). In adults, no Pd signal was present on either 
reward or no-reward condition.  
 A similar pattern was also found at the PO7/PO8 electrode site. The two-way 
interaction was significant (F(1, 30) = 8.305, p < .01, eta2 = .217). Again only in adolescents was 
the mean voltage greater than zero in the no-reward (t(15) = 2.739, p < .05), but not the 
reward (t(15) = .285, p = .485) condition. The Pd was also greater in response to a no-reward 
compared to a reward incentive cue (t(15) = 3.060, p < .01) at PO7/PO8. 
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Pre-Incentive Array TFRs 
 Figure 5.4 shows the TFRs of the data prior to the onset of the incentive cue arrays. 
Statistical comparisons revealed significantly greater alpha power (10 – 14 Hz) in a cluster of 
electrodes (O2 and PO8) in the right posterior region in adults compared to adolescents during 
the pre-stimulus period, from 800 ms prior to the onset of the incentive array until the onset 
 
 
Figure 5.3. ERPs elicited by the incentive cues over lateral parietal/occipital electrodes (P5/P6, P7/P8, PO3/PO4, and 
PO7/PO8). Grand-averaged waveforms for no-reward and reward cues at contralateral and ipsilateral electrode sites 
relative to the ‘relevant’ symbol. On the top row are the ERPs elicited by adolescents to the no-reward (A) and the 
reward (B) cues. The bottom row are the ERPs elicited by adults to the no-reward (C) and the reward (D) cues. Positive 
is plotted up. 
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(p < .01). This pre-stimulus difference between adolescents and adults is consistent with both 
age-groups preparing differently for the incentive array4.  
                                                      
4 The same analysis was also repeated comparing pre-stimulus alpha (10 – 14 Hz) activity in adolescents and 
adults in the interval preceding the letter search array (-800 – 0 ms). No differences were observed at any 
electrode sites (all ps > .1). Therefore, the pre-stimulus alpha difference observed prior to the incentive array is 
unlikely to be an age-related difference related to skull thickness (Minhas, Bikson, Woods, & Kessler, 2012), 
because the same increased pre-stimulus alpha power difference was not observed in this second analysis. 
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Figure 5.4. TFR results during the pre-stimulus period prior to the incentive array during the Letter detection task. Figures 
on the left are for the adolescents, on the right are for the adults. (A) Grand-averaged topographic plots of the TFR power 
averaged over 10 – 14 Hz between -800 – 0 ms prior to the incentive array. Circles with white outlines mark the locations 
(O2 & PO8) with significantly different (p < .01) activity between the adolescents and adults. (B & C) Grand-averaged 
power of neural oscillations in the EEG as a function of oscillation frequency and time prior to the incentive array at 
electrode sites O2 (B) and PO8 (C).  
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Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 2, a group of participants that are more typically used in studies 
examining the influence of motivationally salient stimuli on cognition were used; namely, 
undergraduate students. The aim was to investigate whether behavioural performance in 
undergraduates is more akin to adolescents or adults. Neural maturation is believed to 
continue into the mid-20s. Therefore, it could be argued that typical undergraduate students 
fall into a distinct category of ‘very’ late adolescence, but they are not yet fully mature adults. 
If this were the case, then performance should be influenced by the colour predicted by the 
incentive cue, as it was in adolescents.  
Method 
Participants 
 Nineteen new undergraduate participants (4 males, mean age = 20.9 years [range: 18 
– 31, SD = 2.9]) were recruited from the University of Birmingham. All participants had normal 
or correct-to-normal vision, no history of neurological illness, and were naïve to both Japanese 
Hiragana characters and the purpose of the experiment. Participants also completed the 
Munsell D-15 test for colour-blindness; all were successful. Informed consent was obtained 
from all participants. Two participants were removed because their accuracy on the value-
learning task was at chance. A further participant was removed because their performance on 
the letter-target detection task was at chance. All analyses reported in the results section were 
conducted on the remaining 16 participants.  
Stimuli/Apparatus 
 The same as in Experiment 1. 
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Procedure 
  Value-Learning Task. The procedure was the same as Experiment 1, except there were 
fewer trials. In total there were 192 trials, with each ‘relevant’ symbol appearing on a quarter 
of trials, pseudo-randomly ordered. Each ‘irrelevant’ symbol also appeared on a quarter of 
trials, equally with each ‘relevant’ symbol. There was a break every 32 trials, where the 
participants could see how much cash they had earned so far.  
 Letter-Target Detection Task. The same as Experiment 1, except there was no EEG 
recording. 
Data Analysis 
 Behavioural data in both parts of the experiment were treated the same as in 
Experiment 1, but analyses were run without the between-subject factor of age-group. 
 
Results 
Value-Learning Task.  
At the shape selection stage, RT were faster on reward than no-reward trials (F(1, 15) 
= 5.526, p < .05, eta2 = .269). However, accuracy was unaffected by the cue-reward value (F(1, 
15) = 2.019, p = .176, eta2 = .119). At the colour selection stage, RT was unaffected the cue-
reward value (F(1, 15) = .996, p = .335, eta2 = .064). Accuracy, though, was better for the 
reward associated than no-reward associated colours (F(1, 15) = 4.776, p < .05, eta2 = .242). 
Importantly, though by the final block of trials accuracy was similar when selecting the colour 
for both cue-reward values (F(1, 15) = 1.614, p = .223, eta2 = .097), suggest that all cue/colour 
associations had been equally well learned.  
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Letter-Target Detection Task.  
 RTs (see Table 5.1) were faster when the incentive cue predicted a reward versus no 
reward (F(1, 15) = 7.302, p < .05, eta2 = .327). There was no main effect of congruency (F(1, 
15) = .206, p = .657, eta2 = .014). However, the two-way interaction between incentive cue 
value and congruency was significant (F(1, 15) = 4.753, p < .05, eta2 = .241). As in the 
adolescents, the congruency effect in the undergraduates was significantly (t(15) = 2.193, p < 
.05) larger when the incentive cue predicted a reward (22 ms) compared to no-reward (-9 ms).  
 Accuracy mirrored RT. The two-way interaction was significant (F(1, 15) = 5.223, p < 
.05, eta2 = .258). When the incentive cue predicted a reward, accuracy was reduced when the 
colour-association was incongruent compared to congruent (t(15) = 2.435, p < .05), but not 
when it predicted no reward (t(15) = .718, p = .484). 
 
General Discussion 
 In the current study, participants first learnt to associate novel cues with both a value 
(reward or no-reward) and a colour (purple or orange). These cues were then used as incentive 
cues in a subsequent letter detection task were participants had to locate a predefined target 
letter. The colour predicted by the cue could either be congruent or incongruent with the 
colour of the target letter. The colour prediction was, therefore, task-irrelevant. However, 
adolescents still demonstrated a bias for colour processing. Behaviourally, adolescents 
showed a colour congruency effect based on the colour predicted by the incentive cue, but 
only when this contingency was reward-associated in the learning task. When the incentive 
cue predicted no reward, no colour congruency effect was observed. The lack of a colour 
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congruency was also accompanied by a Pd signal to the no reward cue, indicating active 
suppression. Adults showed no such Pd or colour congruency for either cue, instead there was 
an indication that pre-stimulus alpha activity was increased in adults compared to adolescents 
in the interval prior to the incentive cues. This may be indicative of preparatory inhibition.  
 The behavioural data is consistent with the extant literature that rewards bias 
cognition in adolescents more so than in adults. For examples, Roper et al. (2014) showed that 
attentional control in adolescents is more sensitive than in adults to previously rewarding 
stimuli. Moreover, they found that value driven attentional capture persisted longer in 
adolescents than adults. Both those results (Roper et al., 2014) and the current data could be 
explained by slower extinction of stimulus-response associations in adolescents than in adults. 
However, in the current study there was no significant differences in performance between 
the age-groups by the end of the learning task. If the symbol-colour-value associations were 
equally well learned between groups and across stimulus values, then there is no reason to 
believe that extinction rates should differ. Furthermore, consistent with previous literature 
(Reimers & Maylor, 2005) the colour congruency effect observed in the adolescents in 
response to the reward incentive cue is not because of task-switching difficulties between the 
value-learning task and the letter detection task. Specifically, the lack of a colour congruency 
effect for the no reward incentive cue in adolescents suggests that they switched to letter 
processing for the letter-detection task. 
 The data are consistent with recent models of cognitive control that incorporate prior 
reward learning into the current allocation of control (Braver, 2012; Kool et al., 2017; Shenhav 
et al., 2013, 2016). These models may be useful when interpreting the current behavioural 
and EEG data, and more widely when considering adolescent risk-taking. Specifically, such 
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views suggest that behavioural goals can be activated both by external stimuli, based on prior 
associative learning, and internally, consistent with task-relevant requirements. It has been 
proposed that the competition between these sources for the allocation of cognitive 
resources is determined by the computation of an internal cost-benefit analysis that takes into 
account the predicted benefits (e.g., rewards) and costs (e.g., effort required) of each goal. 
The most potentially beneficial goal relative to the others ‘wins’ control over high level 
cognition. The current data can be easily interpreted within this framework. 
Here, the two potential goals in the current letter detection task are, ‘attend letter’, 
which is the task-relevant goal, and ‘attend colour’, which is re-activated from learning by the 
presentation of the incentive cues. For the ‘attend letter’ state, the costs are related to 
potential opportunity costs (Kurzban et al., 2014; Shenhav et al., 2017), i.e., on congruent 
trials, if the strategy was to ‘attend colour’ the task would have been easier. The predicted 
benefits are task-related, i.e., correct performance on the task, which has an intrinsic value 
and also avoids a loss. For the ‘attend colour’ state, the costs are related to the conflict that 
needs to be resolved when the colour is incongruent (Botvinick et al., 2001). The benefits are 
that colour processing is easier (and faster) than letter processing by virtue of the hierarchical 
nature of the visual processing stream. Here, in adolescents and undergraduates, the ‘attend 
colour’ goal ‘won’ the competition for cognitive control, but only when the predicted benefit 
was heightened (i.e., reward incentive cue), because of the learned reward association with 
colour processing. Without this additional predicted benefit conditioned during the learning 
task, the intensity of the ‘attend colour’ goal is not strong enough to overcome the task-
relevant ‘attend letter’ goal. 
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The current results also extend this framework. Specifically, the processing of external 
stimuli that trigger competing, but less successful goals must be suppressed, so that the 
strongest state can take control. Consistent with this notion is the signal suppression 
hypothesis (Sawaki & Luck, 2010) that suggests that a distractor stimulus with an attentional 
priority (e.g., perceptual salience) must be suppressed to halt further processing of that 
stimulus, if task-relevant stimuli are to be successfully attended. In the current study, this is 
evidenced by the Pd to a no-reward incentive cue, which inhibits the ‘attend colour’ goal 
resulting in the congruency effect being eliminated.  
This is the first observation of a Pd marker of active suppression in adolescents. The 
presence of the Pd in adolescents is consistent with previous work that showed an N2pc 
response in both children and adolescents (Couperus & Quirk, 2015; Shimi et al., 2015; Wang 
et al., 2017). Both the N2pc and Pd have similar topographies, but with opposite polarities, 
and are thought to rely on similar underlying neural mechanisms (Sawaki & Luck, 2014). The 
knowledge that markers of active suppression can also be observed in adolescents offers a 
potentially interesting avenue for future research into the development of attentional 
suppression mechanisms. 
Interestingly, despite previous studies showing an N2pc in adolescents (Couperus & 
Quirk, 2015; Shimi et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2017), here, no evidence of an N2pc to the 
incentive cues was found here. Although the no-reward cue required active suppression, the 
reward cue did not capture attention but still biased cognition and behaviour. The lack of a 
perceptual response to the reward cue suggests that although adolescents are hyper-sensitive 
to goals that have been conditioned with rewards, the cues themselves do not garner 
increased salience. The lack of an N2pc response further suggests that selective attentional 
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resources were not required to identify the relevant symbol from the incentive array, which 
is consistent with previous research showing an attenuated N2pc when target search is easy 
(Luck, 1995).  
 The pattern of data in adults was quite different to the adolescents. Not only did they 
show no behavioural colour-related processing, they also did not demonstrate active 
suppression or attentional selection ERP responses to the incentive array. However, pre-
stimulus alpha activity prior to the incentive array was increased in adults compared to 
adolescents. Previous work has shown that increases in pre-stimulus alpha power are 
associated with reduced visual discrimination abilities (van Dijk et al., 2008), and have been 
linked to inhibitory processes (Mazaheri et al., 2009). In the current study, the increased 
posterior alpha in adults compared to adolescents possibly reflects a reduced readiness to 
process the incentive cues in adults. In other words, strategically or passively, adults may have 
proactively disengaged from the incentive array. Conversely the decreased alpha activity in 
adolescents compared to adults may have reflected an increased readiness for processing the 
incentive array. The current data cannot disentangle the two possibilities. However, 
consistent with prior research (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011; Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013), it is 
apparent that proactive control is utilized differently in the two age-groups.  
 This EEG responses to the incentive cues in the current study are at odds with a 
previous experiment. In that study, adults demonstrated a Pd to a high value incentive cue 
(Sawaki et al., 2015). It was suggested that the active suppression to the incentive array 
allowed the participants to optimize attentional resources for the subsequent search task. 
Indeed, subsequent alpha suppression was also found prior to the search task following a high 
incentive cue. A couple of key differences between this previous study and the current 
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experiment may go some way to explain the different pattern of results. First, the age-groups 
used in the two experiments were different. Whereas the sample used by Sawaki et al. (2015) 
was typical of an undergraduate sample (18 – 30 years), in the current study EEG responses 
were obtained from a younger group (14 – 17 years) and an older group (23 – 38 years). This 
may have contributed to the different patterns of active suppression observed in both studies. 
However, this explanation is perhaps unlikely given that in Experiment 2 the behavioural 
results observed in the current undergraduate sample appear to mirror those of the 
adolescents and contradict what would be expected if the reward incentive cue was actively 
suppressed. A more likely explanation is that although the incentive array in both studies 
notified the participant of the reward available on each trial, in the current study the symbol 
also had a colour association that was potentially disruptive to performance. This may have 
discouraged adults from processing the incentive array; thus, active suppression was not 
required, and anticipatory inhibition was applied.  
 Despite the evidence in favour of adolescents and adults utilizing proactive control 
differently towards the incentive array in the current study, it should be noted that the time-
frequency analysis was not optimal and therefore the results should be treated with caution. 
First, as absolute pre-stimulus alpha power was compared across two different populations 
the results are confounded by any potential differences in alpha power recorded at the scalp 
level. For example, differences previously observed in the skull size, shape and thickness 
through development, as shown in rats (Gefen, Gefen, Zhu, Raghupathi, & Marguiles, 2004) 
and humans (Susanne, Guidotti, & Hauspie, 1985), may have contributed to the alpha power 
differences observed here. Rather than taking a measure of absolute pre-stimulus alpha it 
would have been more appropriate to compare changes in alpha power from a baseline to 
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the pre-stimulus period between the two age-groups (e.g., Sawaki et al., 2015). Such an 
analysis would have also allowed for a stronger conclusion to be made about the direction of 
the possible difference observed between adults and adolescents. Despite alpha power being 
increased in adults compared to adolescents, it is unclear whether this represents an increase 
in alpha power in adults, a reduction in alpha power in adolescents, or both. Comparing 
changes in alpha power within groups would have better characterised the underlying 
direction of the effect. A second issue with the time-frequency analysis is that despite the 
primary frequency of interest being alpha band activity the current analysis offers the best 
frequency resolution at lower frequencies (2 Hz – 8 Hz). Instead, it would have been more 
appropriate to use linearly spaced frequency bins (e.g., Sawaki et al., 2015) to better 
understand the specific frequency of interest. Similarly, as I was not interested in high 
frequency activity, rather than using a seven-cycle Morlet wavelet, a lower number of cycles 
(three – five) may have been desirable to increase the temporal resolution and more 
appropriately analyse the alpha band activity. Given, the apparent issues with the time-
frequency analysis these results offer only tentative evidence in favour of a difference in the 
way proactive control was utilized between adolescents and adults.  
 Finally, the observation that behavioural performance in a typical sample of 
undergraduates is more akin to that found in adolescents than adults also has potential wider 
implications for research investigating reward-driven effects in attentional control. 
Convenience typically dictates that the majority of research is conducted with 
undergraduates, but results are generalized to a wider population of ‘adults’. In future, it is 
worth bearing in mind the potential neural immaturity of undergraduate populations. This is 
especially important when investigating reward-effects because adolescence is known to be 
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a time when rewards have maximal impact on behaviour, so generalizations to the wider 
population may not always be appropriate. Future research should investigate potential 
differences in underlying neural activity in response to rewards between undergraduate and 
‘fully mature’ adult samples.  
 In sum, adolescents are more inclined to reactively re-active learned reward-
associated goals even when doing so is potentially harmful to current task performance. This 
is consistent with adolescents inflating the perceived benefits of previously rewarding 
behavioural goals, as was also found in Chapter 3. The current study also expands this notion 
by showing that stimuli instigating behavioural goals that are not chosen are actively 
suppressed in a reactive fashion by adolescents.  
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Chapter 6. Can Value-associated Stimuli Influence Ensemble 
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Abstract 
Even with very brief exposure to multiple object arrays, observers seem able to use summary 
statistics of display properties to make generalized judgments of object attributes. Such 
ensemble perception is thought to aid visual cognition of complex scenes by overcoming tight 
capacity limitations through extraction of 'gist'. However, even when a scene is rich with 
perceptual consistencies, some stimuli within it may have greater motivational salience than 
others. Previous work from our lab has shown that value-associated stimuli are processed 
faster and maintained in WM better than neutral stimuli, suggesting that such stimuli may 
bias ensemble perception. To investigate participants were asked to adjust a response circle 
to match the average size of 12 heterogeneously sized circles viewed simultaneously for 200 
ms (test array). In an initial value-learning phase, all circles had the same colour; responses 
were rewarded in a performance contingent manner with either a high or a low reward 
depending on array colour. In the second phase, test arrays comprised circles of three 
different colours and again the participant had to adjust a response circle to match the 
average size of the just viewed test array circles. No rewards were provided. On different 
trials, the smallest or largest four circles were presented in the previously high reward-
associated colour. In the first experiment, average size estimates were biased towards the 
mean size of circles with the high reward-associated colour, especially when they comprised 
the largest circles. To investigate whether this effect occurred late in processing, the 
experiment was repeated, this time inserting a pattern mask immediately after the test array 
in test phase trials only. In addition to value-biasing being eliminated, test phase (but not value 
learning phase) performance accuracy was significantly better than in the first experiment. 
The results demonstrate that previously rewarding stimuli bias the extraction of summary 
statistics and I suggest that such biases result from slow recurrent processes. 
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The world is rich with visual redundancy; objects with shared features, such as leaves 
on a tree, could be represented more efficiently in the brain as a single entity or ensemble 
rather than each item being represented individually. Such an approach to scene processing 
would aid visual cognition by overcoming the tight capacity limitations of high-level visual 
perception, attention, and working memory (Cohen, Dennett, & Kanwisher, 2016). Indeed, 
substantial evidence of ensemble-oriented processing has recently been accumulated. For 
example, low level features such as the orientation of visual gratings (Dakin & Watt, 1997; 
Haberman, Brady, & Alvarez, 2015), colour (Haberman et al., 2015), the speed and direction 
of motion (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008; Sweeny, Haroz, & Whitney, 2012), and the size of circles 
(Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005) are just a few domains where ensemble 
perception has been shown. Nevertheless, little is known about how different types of 
saliency (physical or motivational) within scenes influence the coding of ensembles.  
Typically, when investigating ensemble perception, the observer views an array of 
items and is instructed to judge the mean of a feature, e.g. size, shared by these items. Ariely 
(2001) was the first to demonstrate that the visual system could compress complex scenes 
into a summary of the scenes statistical properties (e.g., average size of all items). In this study, 
observers were presented with a brief (500 ms) array of up to 16 heterogeneously sized 
circles; immediately thereafter they judged whether a probe circle was larger or smaller than 
the average size of the original array. Mean size was estimated remarkably precisely; 
discriminations were accurate when the probe was around 4% different than the actual 
average size. However, the same participants were unable to correctly identify whether a 
probe item was actually a member of the original set. This series of experiments demonstrates 
that even with set sizes well beyond what is considered the capacity (around 4 items) for 
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selective attention (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) and working memory (Luck & Vogel, 1997), the 
visual system is proficient at creating representations of stimulus features that are informed 
by the entire set, but without explicit knowledge of individual items. 
In fact, ensemble perception is largely unaffected by increases in set size that are well 
beyond the limits of attention and working memory (Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005), indeed 
performance may actually improve with larger set sizes (Ariely, 2001; Robitaille & Harris, 
2011). In addition, ensemble estimates can be performed with stimulus durations of 50 ms 
(Chong & Treisman, 2003) or 200 ms with masked displays (Whiting & Oriet, 2011), below the 
time necessary for sufficient shifts in attention (Egeth & Yantis, 1997). It therefore appears 
that ensemble statistics are independent of single object representations (Cohen et al., 2016), 
with evidence suggesting that ensemble representations can become consciously available 
without explicitly encoding individual items (Corbett & Oriet, 2011). Such studies support the 
view ensemble coding is automatic and uses a parallel mode of processing (Chong & Treisman, 
2005).  
Despite individual identities being supposedly lost, participants are capable of creating 
ensemble estimates for only a subset of items in a display. Brady & Alvarez (2011) used a 
working memory task wherein participants viewed an array of nine circles. Importantly, three 
circles were blue, three were red, and three were green. Participants were told to remember 
the sizes of all the red and blue circles but ignore the green circles. Following a brief delay (1 
s), a probe circle then appeared in the location of one of the blue or red circles and participants 
had to adjust its size to match the original circle. Participants responses were found to be 
biased towards the mean size of all the circles in the probed circle’s colour. However, in a 
subsequent experiment, when participants were not told to segregate the display based on 
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colour, responses were not biased by the mean size of the circles in the probed circle’s colour 
(Brady & Alvarez, 2011). 
Therefore, despite much evidence suggesting that representations of individual items 
are somehow lost during ensemble perception, there is some indication that individual items 
can be segregated based on task-relevant stimulus features before ensemble measures are 
formed. However, Brady and Alvarez (2011) demonstrated that the representation of a single 
entity is biased by the average of similar items. It still remains unclear whether individual items 
that are characterized by task-irrelevant features may bias ensemble judgments about entire 
displays. Specifically, in all previous such studies all items presented in the arrays have been 
equal in terms of salience, selection history, and reward properties. Here, I was interested in 
the influence of two types of saliency on ensemble judgments; the first was physical salience, 
determined by size, the second was motivational salience, determined by prior reward 
learning.  
Physically salient stimuli garner preferential visual processing in a bottom-up fashion 
(Theeuwes, 1991). Size contrast is one determinant of physical salience, with larger items 
receiving visual priority (Proulx & Egeth, 2008). Similarly, many previous studies have shown 
that stimuli once associated with a large reward but that no longer result in the receipt of the 
reward are nevertheless prioritized for visual processing, resulting in faster recognition 
(O’Brien & Raymond, 2012) even when attention is limited (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; O’Brien 
& Raymond, 2012). Although these findings suggest that both the physical saliency and the 
motivational saliency of specific stimuli might bias ensemble perception, high level 
representation of individual stimuli it is not thought necessary for ensemble perception 
(Corbett & Oriet, 2011), arguing against this possibility.   
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To investigate, participants performed two ensemble judgment tasks wherein they 
were required to adjust the size of a probe circle to match the average size of 12 different-
sized circles presented briefly in a circular fashion around a central fixation point. In the first 
phase, all the circles were presented in the same colour. Participants were rewarded with a 
low (maximum 10 points) or a high (maximum 1000 points) reward for their responses 
depending on circle colour. Points were later exchanged for cash. Following this colour-reward 
learning phase, participants repeated the ensemble size task; however, now the test array 
comprised circles of three different colours and no rewards were forthcoming. Importantly, 
the four largest circles (large set), the four mid-sized circles (medium set), or the four smallest 
circles (small set) could be presented in the high value-associated colour. A control condition 
was also included wherein no circles had the high value-associated colour; instead all sets had 
novel colours.  
The influence of large items should be evident across ensemble estimates. It was 
predicted that participants would overestimate the average size of the arrays, during both the 
colour-reward learning task and the second task that was performed in extinction. The effect 
of motivational salience was expected to be more nuanced and specific to the extinction task. 
Average size estimates were expected to follow the average size of the subset of circles 
presented in the high value-associated colour compared to the control condition. A second 
experiment investigated whether the mechanism by which saliency biases ensemble 
judgments is consistent with early selection or late, recurrent processes. To do so, a pattern 
mask was presented between the test array and the probe to inhibit late processing.  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
23 participants (4 males, between the ages of 18 – 35 years [Mean = 22.0 years, SD = 
4.42 years]) from the University of Birmingham took part in exchange for course credits or 
were compensated £6 (plus the extra cash earned on the value-learning task). All participants 
had normal or corrected to normal vision and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. 
Participants also completed the Munsell D-15 colour blindness test; all were successful. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Alvarez and Brady (2011) tested 20 
participants and obtained an effect size of Cohen’s d = 1.82. To calculate the sample size, I 
assumed a more conservative Cohen’s d = 1.4, a power = 0.80 and a two-tailed test. The result 
was a sample size of 19. 
Apparatus 
 Value-Learning & Extinction Task. Stimulus presentation and data recording were 
controlled by a Macintosh computer and were programmed in Matlab (The MathWorks, Inc) 
using the Psychophysics Toolbox. Responses were recording using a standard keyboard and 
mouse. Stimuli were presented in RGB colour space on a black background ([0, 0, 0]) of a 68 
cm LCD monitor [name manufacturer and model) with a screen resolution of 1920 x 1080 and 
a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Viewing distance was approximately 60 cm.  
Stimuli 
 Value-Learning & Extinction Task. There were two primary displays presented on all 
trials: a test array and a response circle. Test arrays comprised 12 colour-filled circles with 
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diameters that could range between 10 and 160 pixels. The diameters of the circles on each 
trial were drawn from a log-normal distribution (natural logarithm) with a standard deviation 
of 35 pixels; there were 25 actual mean diameter sizes possible, equally spaced between 49 – 
121 pixels. Each possible mean diameter was presented equally for all conditions. In each 
condition the average correct mean diameter was 85 pixels (an area of 5675 pixels2). The 
centre of each circle was placed along the circumference of an invisible circle that was 
centered on fixation and had a radius of 8°. Circle positions were chosen randomly with the 
constraint that no circle overlapped. In the value-learning task, all test array circles had the 
same colour (drawn in RGB colour space); in the extinction task, three different colours were 
used (with 4 circles in each colour). Colours used in experimental trials were purple [148, 131, 
165], red [230, 93, 85], and orange [182, 133, 58]. Three different colours were used for 
control trials, pink [226, 90, 121], brown [215, 115, 58], and green [110, 151, 125]). The 
response display comprised a single circle presented at fixation, it matched the colour of the 
test array on that trial in the value-learning task, and was grey ([127, 127, 127]) in the 
extinction task. On initial presentation, its diameter was randomly chosen (between 10 and 
160 pixels) but could never be within 20 pixels of the actual mean size.  
Procedure 
 Value-Learning Task. See Figure 6.1. Following a fixation cross (1000 ms), the test array 
was presented for 200 ms immediately followed by the response circle (until response), and 
finally the amount of points earned on that trial (1000 ms). There were two colours that the 
circles could be presented in on every trial. One colour denoted a potential high reward trial 
(maximum reward of 1000 points), the other a low reward trial (maximum reward of 10 
points). Each test array contained 12 circles. Participants were instructed to estimate the 
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average size of all of the circles in the test array. To indicate their response the participants 
adjusted the size of a central response circle by moving the mouse to the left (to shrink it) or 
right (to enlarge it) until it matched the perceived average circle size, pressing the left mouse 
button to submit the response (cf. Brady & Alvarez, 2011). The response circle size adjusted 
linearly in response to movements of the mouse. If response was within 5% (smaller or larger) 
of the actual average size, the maximum number of points for that trial was presented; 
otherwise the percentage error (larger or smaller) was deducted from the maximum amount 
of points for that trial (rounded to the nearest 10%) and presented as feedback. A running 
total of the points earned was presented at the bottom of the screen throughout the session 
and was updated after each trial. 
 There were 200 trials in total with high and low reward trials presented equally often 
in a pseudo random manner. Participants completed four blocks of 50 trials. During inter-block 
breaks, participants were presented with the number of points earned so far and how much 
cash this translated into (20000 points = £1). At the end of the value-learning task, participants 
were given the cash that they had earned. For the first five trials of every block the participant 
was given the choice of which colour test array they would like on the next trial. Participants 
were explicitly told to pick the colour that would give them the highest number of points. This 
gave us an explicit measure of whether participants had learned the reward contingencies. To 
ensure that participants had equal exposure to both colours, five extra trials were randomly 
placed in the subsequent block composed of the alternate colour to that which the participant 
chose on the choice trials.  
 Extinction Task. See Figure 6.1. All stimulus timings were the same as in the value-
learning task, although there was no feedback stage. Participants were explicitly told that no 
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further points would be awarded for performance on this task. On each trial the test array 
consisted of 12 circles, and as before the task was judge the average size of all the circles. 
Unlike the value-learning task, the response circle was always grey, and the colour of the test 
circles differed from one another.  Here, the four largest circles (Large Set) were presented in 
one colour, the four mid-sized circles (Medium Set) in another colour, and the four smallest 
circles (Small Set) in a third colour. On every trial the average size of circles in the Medium Set 
was equal to the average size of all circles in that array. On each trial, one set was presented 
in the previously high-reward colour, one in the previously-low reward colour, and one in a 
novel colour (the unused colour from the value-learning task, see Stimuli section). There were 
four possible colour x set experimental conditions. Of primary interest are the high-value 
biasing conditions. In these, the high-value colour was used for the Large or Small set, the low-
value colour was used for the Medium set, and the remaining set (Small or Large, respectively) 
had the novel (no-reward) colour. The high-value colour was also used for the Medium set; in 
this condition the low-value colour was used for the Small or Large set and the novel colour 
made up the remaining set. A fourth control condition used three different novel colours for 
each set of circles. Each of these colours was pseudo randomly assigned to set so that each 
was used for the Large, Medium, or Small sets equally often.  
 There were 500 trials in total, with 100 trials of each experimental and control 
condition, the order of which was pseudo random. There were 10 blocks of 50 trials.  
Data Analysis 
 Value-Learning & Extinction Task. Three participants failed to choose the correct 
colour on the choice trials on more than 13% of trials, indicating weak or absent colour-value 
learning. One further participant was removed because their average response was over 2.5 
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SD greater than the group mean. Their data was excluded from further analyses. For both the 
value-learning task and the extinction task, the first two trials of every block were removed 
before the mean response circle area (pixels2) of the response circle for each condition was 
then calculated. The mean percent increase from the actual average size was then calculated. 
For the value-learning task, paired-sample t-tests were used to compare high vs. low reward 
trials on measures of percent increase and response times (RT). For the extinction task, the 
effect of the high-biasing conditions was analysed in a one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) 
on the percent increase. The ANOVA used biasing set (Small, Medium or Large) as a within-
subjects factor. Follow-up planned pairwise comparisons were corrected for multiple 
comparisons by means of the False Discovery Rate procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
Alpha levels were set at 0.05.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Left) The value-learning task trial structure in both Experiment 1 and 2. Right) The extinction task structure in 
Experiment 2. In Experiment 1 there was no mask presented between the test array and the response circle in the 
extinction task. 
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Results and Discussion 
Value-Learning Task. See Table 6.1 for mean RT and mean circle areas. Performance 
was more effortful for high rewards as revealed by longer RT for the high (2681 ms) versus 
low (2474) reward condition (t(18) = 2.820, p < .05), but there was no difference in percent 
increase from the actual average size (t(18) = 1.607, p = .125).  
Table 6.1. Mean RTs (ms) and percent increase in the estimates of circle size in the value-
learning task for low-value and high-value circles in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Trial type 
Experiment 1 (No-mask) Experiment 2 (Mask) 
RT Percent increase RT Percent increase 
Low-value 2474 (28) 38 (1.4) 2999 (42) 32 (1.0) 
High-value 2631 (28) 42 (1.4) 3229 (42) 33 (1.0) 
Note. Within-subject standard error (Cousineau, 2005) in parenthesis.  
 
Extinction Task. See Figure 6.2 for percent increase in all conditions from both 
experiments. Participants overestimated the average circle size; percent increase was greater 
than zero in the control condition (33%, t(18) = 4.966, p < .001). 
For the high value-biasing conditions, the set with the high value colour had a 
significant influence on performance (F(2, 36) = 4.472, p < .05, eta2 = .199). When the high 
value colour was used for the Small set, percent increase (29%) was significantly smaller than 
when this colour was used for the Large set (33%, t(18) = 3.217, p < .01). When this colour was 
used for the Medium set, percent increase was marginally smaller than when used for the 
Large set (t(18) = 1.762, p = .095). 
Comparisons of the percent increase in the different high value-biasing conditions 
compared to the control condition suggest that the influence of value was driven by the Small 
set reducing the percent increase in average circle size estimates. Percent increase was 
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significantly smaller than in the control condition when the high value colour was used for the 
Small set (t(18) = 2.511, p < .05), but not the Medium or Large set (both ps > .19). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Percent increases in the judgments of average circle size from the actual average size depending on the high 
value-biasing condition in the Extinction task. A) Experiment 1. B) Experiment 2. 
A
B
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Experiment 1 provides novel evidence for a bias in ensemble perception from both 
physical and motivational salience. Specifically, average circle size judgments were 
consistently overestimated. However, when the smallest circles in the display were in the high 
value-associated colour this overestimation was slightly reduced. It remains unclear at what 
stage of ensemble processing the physical and motivational salience were having an influence. 
It is possible that the salient stimuli captured attention during the initial encoding of the 
stimuli influencing the formation of the ensemble estimate, in line with previous research 
showing that high value-associated task-relevant stimuli are processed faster (O’Brien & 
Raymond, 2011) than low value task-relevant stimuli. However, it may also be possible that 
salience has no influence during the initial ensemble formation but nevertheless facilitates 
entry of these items into WM (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009) or facilitate their maintenance in 
WM (Pedale & Santangelo, 2015; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Thomas, FitzGibbon, & Raymond, 
2016) and thereby influence recurrent processing that may be used when ensemble estimates 
are computed. The second experiment examined these two possibilities.  
 
Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 2, a pattern mask was introduced immediately following the 
presentation of the initial ensemble test array. If in Experiment 1, physical and motivational 
salience influenced the formation of the ensemble judgment then again it should be found to 
be overestimated with an influence of the high-reward coloured circles. However, if rewards 
operated through a recurrent feedback mechanism then the masking of the test array should 
block this operation, eliminating high-reward effects.  
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Method 
Participants 
23 participants (3 males, between the ages of 18 – 21 years [Mean = 19.35 years, SD = 
0.81 years]) from the University of Birmingham took part in exchange for course credits or 
were compensated £6 (plus the extra cash earned on the value-learning task). All participants 
had normal or correct to normal vision and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. 
Participants also completed the Munsell D-15 colour blindness test; all were successful. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants.  
Apparatus 
 Value-Learning & Extinction Task. Same as Experiment 1. 
Stimuli 
 Value-Learning & Extinction Task. In Experiment 2 a mask was used in the Extinction 
task, but all other stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. The mask was a grid, subtending 
approximately 9.5° x 9.5°, comprised of randomly coloured squares, each subtending 
approximately 0.5° x 0.5°. Each square was presented in one of the six possible colours from 
the Extinction task.  
Procedure 
 Value-Learning Task. Same as Experiment 1.  
 Extinction Task. All information was the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception. 
Immediately following the test array, the mask was presented for 100 ms, which was 
immediately followed by the response circle. 
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Data Analysis 
 Value-Learning & Extinction Task. Four participants failed to choose the correct colour 
on the choice trials on more than 13% of trials, indicating weak or absent colour-value 
learning. Their data was excluded from further analyses. All other information was the same 
as in Experiment 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Value-Learning Task. As in Experiment 1, RT were longer for high rewards as revealed 
by longer RT for the high (3229 ms) versus low (2999 ms) reward condition (t(18) = 2.738, p < 
.05), but there was no difference in percent increase (t(18) = .659, p = .518). 
Extinction Task. In contrast to Experiment, the presentation of the pattern mask after 
the test array eliminated the overestimation in average circle size estimates. Percent increase 
was not significantly greater than zero in the control condition (9%, t(18) = 1.593, p = .129). In 
addition, the percent increase in the control condition was significantly smaller in Experiment 
2 than in Experiment 1 (t(36) = 2.771, p < .01)5. There was also no effect of the high-value 
biasing conditions (F(2, 36) = .142, p = .868). 
The presentation of a mask after the initial test array not only substantially reduced 
the tendency to overestimate the average circle size but also eliminated any influence of 
value. These data from Experiment 2 suggest that the initial formation of an ensemble 
                                                      
5 Percent increase was not different between the experiments during the value-learning task 
(t(36) = .741, p = .463). 
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judgment is highly representative of the actual visual array. However, these judgments are 
then heavily biased by recurrent processing of salient stimuli. 
 
General Discussion 
 The first experiment reported here shows that ensemble perception of mean circle 
size can be biased towards the mean size of a subset of the display. Specifically, when a subset 
of an array of circles was previously predictive of a large monetary reward, ensemble 
estimates were biased towards the mean size of that subset. In addition, regardless of value, 
estimates were also found to be heavily biased by the largest circles in the display. The second 
experiment showed that these effects of both motivational salience and physical salience are 
abolished when a coloured pattern mask is applied immediately after display presentation. 
The latter findings suggest that the underlying mechanism for the value-associated bias seen 
in the former experiment most likely stems from recurrent processing of higher order brain 
areas on lower level sensory areas. 
 The finding that value-associated stimuli disproportionately influence ensemble size 
estimates suggests that the neural mechanisms responsible for ensemble perception are 
sensitive to motivational cues. This finding is perhaps unsurprising given that reward-
associations have previously been shown to have a positive influence on visual processing of 
task relevant information. For example, masked recognition tasks show that high-value 
associated stimuli are processed faster than similar low-value associated stimuli (O’Brien & 
Raymond, 2012). Moreover, these items are also more likely to access conscious processing 
when attention resources are limited (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009) and are maintained better 
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in working memory (Thomas et al., 2016). Other works shows that reward associations also 
influence distractor processing, causing irrelevant items to capture attention during visual 
search (Anderson et al., 2011), Generally, reward-associated stimuli are assumed to be given 
priority in visual processing because of learned incentive salience (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). 
Here, it was demonstrated that even when making general judgments about entire displays 
reward-associated stimuli remain prioritized.  
The current results are contrary to previous conclusions that ensemble estimates are 
performed independently of individual item coding (Ariely, 2001; Corbett & Oriet, 2011; 
Whitney et al., 2014). The results, though, are consistent with Brady and Alvarez (2011) who 
showed that individual item representations can be biased by the average of a subset of items 
in an array. However, the current study extends these findings. First, here, the average of a 
subset of items was found to bias global ensemble judgments, rather than judgments about 
individual items. Second, Alvarez and Brady (2011) only found separate ensembles to be 
formed when the segregating feature was task-relevant, whereas here, the feature was task-
irrelevant (colour).  
I believe the current data suggest a unifying framework that accounts for the 
contradictory evidence on the role of individual object processing in ensemble perception. 
Specifically, Experiment 2 suggests that ensemble coding can proceed automatically 
(Treisman, 2006) in a very precise manner, within 200 ms, and without the need for high-level 
coding of individual items. Later processing of a subset of items then interacts with the initial 
formation of the ensemble, in a recurrent manner, as seen in Experiment 1. The selection of 
this subset is driven by the (physically or motivationally) salient items in the display, likely 
related to selective attention mechanisms prioritizing these items for working memory 
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maintenance (Thomas et al., 2016; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2005). Together, these data 
show that ensemble estimates of low-level visual features are initially very precise but are 
subject to later interference from both physically and motivationally salient items in the 
display. 
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Chapter 7. General Discussion 
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A core aim of this thesis was to develop and test a motivation-based as opposed to a 
perception-based explanation for reward association effects on visual attention. Even when 
irrelevant to current goals and perceptually conspicuous, value-associated stimuli capture 
attention (Anderson et al., 2011). Such super-distraction effects do not fit with classic models 
of top-down and bottom-up attentional control (Awh et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). 
Recent conceptualizations of value-driven biases in attention suggest that learned value 
boosts the perceptual representational strength of value-associated stimuli on attentional 
priority maps (Anderson et al., 2011, 2014; Awh et al., 2012; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 2009). In this view, this representational boost 
allows value-associated stimuli to be perceptually competitive for attention with task-relevant 
stimuli. However, an alternative proposal that is grounded in the cognitive control literature 
suggests that value-associated stimuli compete to alter current goals. This motivational 
competition is resolved by a rapid computation of the predicted costs and benefits 
(motivational intensity) of achieving each goal (Shenhav et al., 2013). Motivational states can 
be instantiated by external stimuli, such as value-associated stimuli, based on prior 
experience. They can, of course, also be instigated internally in a ‘top-down’ manner based on 
task-relevant demands. The benefits associated with each state are determined by payoffs 
predicted by previous experience. The costs are internally computed based on the potential 
negative outcomes of each state and the cognitive effort required. For example, conflict with 
task-relevant processing is one such cost (Botvinick et al., 2001). In this thesis, I have 
demonstrated that this motivational competition may likely be at the core of super-distraction 
effects. Next, I will summarize the evidence in favour of this conclusion.  
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Summary of the studies 
 In all but two experiments in this thesis, I utilized a two-phase experimental procedure. 
First, stimuli were associated with a value. In Chapters 2 and 3, stimuli were associated with 
loss, neutral and gain values. In Chapters 4 – 6, losses were excluded, and the value could be 
neutral, low-reward or high-reward. Then, in the second phase, these same stimuli were used 
as either distractors (Chapters 2 – 4) or incentive cues (Chapter 5) in attention tasks, or targets 
(Chapter 6) in an ensemble perceptual judgment task. Taking a developmental approach, in 
Chapters 3 and 5, value-driven biases in cognitive control were examined in late adolescents 
(14 – 17 years old).  
 In Chapter 2, the aim was to contrast the different predictions made depending on 
whether motivational or perceptual competition is used to explain super-distraction effects. 
To investigate, I used a simple colour-flanker task; crucially, flankers could be motivationally 
or perceptually salient. Of interest was whether sequential trial effects (conflict adaptation, 
CA) would differ depending on the motivational versus perceptual salience of the flankers. 
Effects attributable to motivational salience only occurred following conflict trials (colour-
incongruent flankers); whereas effects attributable to perceptual salience only occurred after 
no-conflict trials (colour-congruent flankers). Importantly, this demonstrated that value-
based super-distraction effects are inconsistent with classic perceptual competition accounts. 
Perceptual salience appeared to boost distractor representations when attention was 
unconstrained. Motivational salience counteracted the conflict driven adjustments in 
cognitive control that are typical in CA. These experiments are consistent with motivational 
salience competing to alter cognitive control settings.  
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In Chapter 2 (experiment 4) and Chapter 4 (experiment 1), the basic two-phase 
experiment was elaborated to involve a secondary WM task during the second phase.  Whilst 
maintaining information in WM, the presentation of perceptually similar stimuli is known to 
distort WM representations (Ahmad et al., 2017). Consistent with this finding, studies have 
also shown that observers are more likely to ignore stimuli in a secondary attention task that 
match the contents of WM (Kim et al., 2005). In Chapter 2, the concurrent WM task and the 
target in the flanker task required colour processing, whereas distractor value-associations in 
the flanker task were defined by shape. Super-distraction (following conflict) in the flanker 
task was shown to be increased with a concurrent colour-based WM load compared to 
without a WM load. In Chapter 4, the shape-colour contingencies were reversed. Here, the 
attention task was a partial replication of the visual search paradigm developed by Anderson 
et al. (2011). Distractor value-associations were defined by colour during search for a unique 
shape. Alongside the search task, participants held either a colour- or shape-based WM load. 
This time, super-distraction was increased when the WM load being maintained was shape-
based compared to colour-based. Motivation based competition explains these results as 
follows. By introducing a WM task that relies on the same or similar processing networks as 
those required for identifying the target in the attention task, the cognitive cost of processing 
the target is increased, thus markedly reducing motivational intensity for target processing. 
Importantly, the concurrent WM does not affect motivational intensity to engage with the 
value-associated items in the test array. Thus, the relative difference in motivational intensity 
to engage with targets versus distractors is shifted in favour of distractors and super-
distraction is more evident.  These studies again suggest that estimates of motivational 
intensity are relative to those of other active states.  
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As a further test of these ideas within the value-driven attentional capture paradigm, 
In Chapter 4 (experiment 2), using a direct replication of Anderson et al. (2011), I examined 
sequential trial effects, so that the role of conflict could be investigated. In this experiment, 
following a trial with a high value-associated distractor, which presumably interfered with 
target processing, value driven attentional capture was reduced on the subsequent trial. This 
demonstrates that when value-associated motivational states are experienced as costly to 
performance, they are less likely to bias cognition.  
Such sequential trial effects also concern a larger issue in the study of attentional 
control. Specifically, in a host of attentional paradigms sequential trial effects have been 
observed (e.g., Gratton et al., 1992; Tipper, 1995; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982; Della Libera & 
Chelazzi, 2006; Hickey et al., 2010), yet they are often overlooked in the literature. Attentional 
processing on a single trial is not an isolated event. The data from Chapter 4 further 
demonstrated that sequential effect may even mask differences between conditions. 
Although top-down attentional control may be set based on task-demands, such settings are 
constantly being updated, even on a trial-to-trial basis.  
 In Chapters 3 and 5, super-distraction effects were investigated in adolescents (14 – 
17 years). In Chapter 3, adolescents performed the same colour-flanker task used in Chapter 
2 (Experiment 3 & 4). Whereas, adults showed no super-distraction when the value was only 
weakly associated with the stimulus in the flanker task, adolescents showed strong super-
distraction effects (following conflict trials). This was despite both groups being equally 
reactive to conflict signals, i.e., both groups demonstrated CA when flankers were associated 
with a neutral outcome. This study suggests that developmental stage is an important factor 
in the internal predictions of payoffs for value-associated motivational states. Specifically, in 
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this experiment, adolescents appeared to inflate the rewarding properties of value-associated 
states but estimates of costs (conflict) were similar to those in adults.  
Similarly, in Chapter 5, adolescents were again unable to ignore value-associated 
motivational states. In this study, during learning, a symbol presented prior to an array of 
colours informed the participant which colour should be chosen and whether they would be 
rewarded for choosing the correct colour. In a subsequent attention task, the same symbols 
were used as incentive cues, but the colour association was now irrelevant. Instead, search 
was for a target letter. Crucially, on half of trials the distractor was in the previously associated 
colour; on remaining trials the target was in the associated colour. There was evidence that 
adolescents altered their strategic control to search for colour, but only when the cue also 
predicted a reward. ERP evidence further suggested that adolescents actively suppressed a 
neutral cue, evidenced by a Pd signature (Hickey et al., 2009) in the ERP, but not the reward 
cue. This further suggests that when two competing motivational states are active, one must 
be suppressed.  
To the best of my knowledge, a Pd signature has not previously been observed in 
adolescents. Therefore, the Pd found here could have wider implications for studying the 
development of active suppression mechanisms in adolescents.  
These chapters also show the utility of a taking a developmental approach in the study 
of motivation. Although my studies are not the first to examine the effects of rewards on 
attention in adolescents, Chapter 3, and to a lesser extent Chapter 5, are among the few 
experiments (see Roper et al., 2014) that have studied value-driven motivation independently 
of top-down attention (Maunsell, 2004) in this age group. Nearly all previous reward and 
attention studies in adolescents confounded motivation with attention by making rewards 
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contingent on attention to a stimulus or location (c.f. Geier & Luna, 2009). In this thesis, I have 
shown that when motivation and attention are dissociated, adolescents can offer a window 
into the mechanisms underlying motivational competition.  
 
Link to other theories of super-distraction 
  The motivational competition framework is compatible with other recent accounts of 
super-distraction, although the emphasis here is shifted to competition between motivational 
states rather than perceptual competition. For example, consistent with selection history 
accounts (Awh et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017), a key to motivational competition is 
the idea that the goal during prior learning is re-activated when the value-associated stimulus 
is re-encountered. The selection history of value-associated stimuli, therefore, forms the basis 
of the motivational competition. However, the new framework offers a more mechanistic 
appraisal of the conditions under which the learned goals will be re-instantiated, which is 
lacking in selection history accounts. Similarly, super-distraction has also been discussed in 
terms of habitual control (Anderson, 2016, Anderson et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2017), 
whereby the response is automatically re-activated on perception of the stimulus. One 
possibility is that because of their automatic nature, habitual behaviours generally ‘win’ the 
competition for cognitive control because they do not require cognitive resources to initiate 
and complete (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). In effect, they are a ‘low-cost’ form of information 
processing. Whether this is the case for value-associated stimuli is an open question, but the 
evidence presented in this thesis suggests that value-associated motivational states are 
certainly not always perceived as ‘low-cost’. More broadly, to comprehensively integrate 
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habitual control into the motivational competition framework more focused research into the 
question is required.  
 
Future considerations 
 The studies in this thesis have added to a growing literature on motivated cognition 
but they also raise some interesting questions for follow-up experiments. First, a key tenet of 
the proposed motivational competition framework is the concept of a cost-benefit trade-off 
for each motivational state that determines how cognitive control is utilised (Shenhav et al., 
2013). However, although the neural correlates of the costs that lead to adjustments in control 
are quite well delineated, the rapid incorporation of benefits into computations of 
motivational intensity are less well understood. 
Conflict as a cost leading to adjustments in top-down control is well established 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). There is imaging evidence that conflict is registered in the dACC and 
prefrontal regions regulate control based on this conflict (MacDonald et al., 2000). Many ERP 
components have also been discovered that have a neural source in the dACC that are 
responsive to conflict, errors and performance feedback, such as the N2, ERN, CRN, and FRN, 
respectively. Cognitive effort is another source of costs (Shenhav et al., 2013; Botvinick & 
Braver, 2015); again, evidence suggests that the ACC is rapidly responsive to the amount of 
cognitive effort required (Botvinick & Braver, 2015).  
In this thesis, I have suggested that value-associations act as a potential benefit in the 
rapid computations of motivational intensity. This is consistent with the vast neuroimaging 
work that the brain processes value codes in the midbrain (Anderson et al., 2016; Anderson 
et al., 2017; Schultz, 2000), OFC (Saez et al., 2017), and DLPFC (Marcos et al., 2018) regions. 
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However, the motivational competition theory suggests that these value codes can lead to 
rapid adjustments in cognitive control. For example, in Chapter 2 the behavioural responses 
to the value-associated distractors were evident after only around 600 ms from onset of the 
stimuli. A future line of research may be to investigate neural responses originating from the 
ACC in response to value-associated stimuli. Similar ERP responses as those found for 
predicted costs may also be evident for estimates of predicted benefit. These responses may 
be linked to midbrain dopaminergic activity that signal the presence of reward-associated 
stimuli (Anderson et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2017), and should be predictive of behavioural 
change in response to value-associated distractors. 
A second potential line of future investigation could further explore the developmental 
course of motivational competition. Although the two adolescent studies reported here 
demonstrated clear differences in motivated cognition between adolescents and adults, the 
adolescents tested were from a narrow developmental window, namely late adolescence (14 
– 17 years). It is unknown how much the ideas expressed in this thesis would relate to younger 
adolescents and children. For example, previously it has been shown that younger compared 
to older adolescents under-recruit the ACC during tasks requiring performance monitoring 
(Ladouceur et al., 2010). Given that the ACC is thought to be central in determining how 
cognitive control is allocated (Shenhav et al., 2013), does this lead to more irrational biases in 
decision making in younger adolescents compared to adults and even late adolescents? 
Related to investigating the developmental course of motivated cognition, Chapter 5 
demonstrated that late adolescents (14 – 17 years) and adults (24+ years) show markedly 
different response tendencies to value-associated stimuli, but in a third sample of typical 
undergraduates participants, performance was remarkably similar to that found in 
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adolescents. Given the ongoing neural maturation throughout adolescence and into earlier 
adulthood (Giedd et al., 1999) that often manifests itself as a heightened sensitivity to rewards 
(Geier & Luna, 2009), generalization of motivation effects from undergraduates to wider 
‘adult’ populations may not always be appropriate. In addition, the use of undergraduate 
samples may also make comparisons between studies problematic. For example, a study 
conducted on first year students (~18 years old) may not yield comparable results to a study 
performed with a group of neurally more mature third year students (~21 years old) or ‘fully’ 
mature, at least in terms of neural maturation (Giedd et al., 1999), graduate students (~25 
years old). A further goal of future research could be to characterize the changes in super-
distraction through this important period of development (i.e., 18 – 25 years) to better 
understand the current literature.  
A third area for future work to investigate is the influence of different types of reward. 
In this thesis, monetary feedback was used as the measure of reward. However, it is not clear 
whether all participants value money equally. Indeed, this may be particularly true when 
investigating developmental differences. For example, adolescents may be more motivated 
by the relatively small monetary incentives used in experimental paradigms. To this end, 
future studies should seek to better equate the incentives between different experimental 
groups. In addition, future research should also investigate the roles of different types of 
incentives, such as social rewards, as well as the influence of negative outcomes on motivated 
cognition. 
Finally, in the current thesis, the sample sizes were small, which may limit the 
generalizability of the findings. In particular, although the power to observe the experimental 
effects in the current experiments was high, this may have been artificial. In all the reported 
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experiments, participants were removed from the analyses if their accuracy in the value-
learning task did not meet strict criteria for assessing whether they had learned the stimulus-
reward contingencies. By applying these criteria, it is possible that two types of participant 
were removed from the analyses, 1) those that did not understand the instructions, and 2) 
those that were not sensitive to rewards, which may have hindered their learning. By 
potentially removing participants that were insensitive to rewards, the interpretations of the 
results may be limited to a specific reward-sensitive group of people. To overcome this 
limitation, future studies should increase the sample sizes and investigate how individual 
differences to reward sensitivity impact motivated cognition.  
 
Wider implications 
The proposed motivational competition framework has wide reaching implications 
for the understanding of a broad range of experimental findings and potentially in 
understanding the mechanisms underlying addiction and other mental health issues. For 
example, individuals with depression may under-estimate the perceived benefits of 
stimulus-driven motivational states, leaving them unmotivated, whereas addicts may inflate 
the perceived benefits, making them oversensitive to addiction related motivational states. 
How the motivational competition framework applies to different mental health disorders is 
a further possible line of future research.  
In conclusion, in this thesis, I have built on the work of Shenhav, Botvinick, Braver 
and colleagues to develop a cognitive model of motivated cognition that can quickly 
incorporate relevant experience into a simple cost-benefit analysis that determines goal-
directed behaviour. This work addresses an age-old question raised by Renaissance 
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philosophers Dante Alighieri and Jean Buridan; how can motivation dictate competitive 
decision making? I believe that the proposed framework suggests a plausible and 
mechanistic model that allows humans to make quick decisions that are grounded in 
experience and contextual knowledge. 
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